The Social Contract

Vol. XI, No. 2 Winter 2001

Highlights

Immigration and the consequent multiculturalism are rapidly changing the culture of British-spawned societies.

Guest Editor Derek Turner has assembled comments on the situation in the UK and Canada by:

Alexander Boot
Merrie Cave
Kenneth McDonald
Mark Wegierski
Brett M. Decker
Robert Stacy McCain
Alexander MacLeod
Suzanne Fields
Paul Craig Roberts

K.C. McAlpin, executive director of ProEnglish, believes that problems with multiple languages in the U.S. may cause us to re-examine our immigration policies.

Don Feder and Sam Francis reflect on how mass immigration influenced the November election.

America and Great Britain

Common Past—Shared Future?

St. Paul's Cathedral, London, seen through the smoke of a World War II air raid. The National Archives/Corbis

Otis L. Graham, Jr. surveys the history and prospects of environmental policy; John Cairns assesses sustainability as a goal.
See pages 132-152

U.S. $7.50 • ISSN 1055-145X Visit us at **www.thesocialcontract.com**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

About The Social Contract

The English philosopher John Locke, whose thinking helped inspire the American revolution, said that society should be governed by an understood set of values he termed "the social contract." Under the social contract, governments have obligations to their citizens, and citizens have responsibilities to society.

Most great public issues are basically moral and ethical ones. What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When "rights" collide, which ones take precedence? The concept of the social contract helps us sort out the difficult issues confronting American society today and helps us find balance.

Each quarter, The Social Contract *journal examines trends, events and ideas that could unravel America's delicate social fabric. Key topics addressed by this journal:*

- *Human population issues, including absolute size, rate of growth and distribution. Do cherished American ideals prosper or suffer through further population growth?*
- *Immigration issues. In order to best facilitate meeting the highest goals of the American people, (1) how many immigrants should we admit? (2) who should be admitted, and (3) how can we humanely enforce the rules?*
- *Language, assimilation, culture and national unity considerations. What are the shared values necessary to the maintenance of our social contract?*
- *The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities. Since the previous issues are so often framed in terms of rights, what are the balancing obligations?*
- *Other nations' efforts at guarding or creating their own social contracts. What practical insight can be gained from observing the failures and successes in nation-building by other societies?*

The Social Contract *explores these complex and interrelated issues with articles varying greatly in outlook and philosophy in the attempt to further vigorous public debate.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Vol. XI, No. 2 Winter 2001

Contents

87 **A Note from the Editor**

87 **Introduction to the Feature Section**

89 **Letters to the Editor**

91 **UK-USA: The British Character of America**
by Joseph Fallon

95 **A Love-Hate Relationship: Quotes By and About Americans**
by Derek Turner

98 **Damn *la difference*: Bemoaning the Homogenization Caused by Modernity**
by Alexander Boot

103 **The 'Special Relationship' and Why Restoring It Might Help Save Britain**
by Merrie Cave

105 **Revolution from Above: How Welfarism and Multiculturalism Changed Canada**
by Kenneth McDonald

109 **Liberal Rule Continues: The Federal Election in Canada, 2000**
by Mark Wegierski

110 **Tony Blair's 'Cultural Revolution'**
by Brett M. Decker

113 **Anglo-America's Ambiguous Triumph**
Books reviewed by Mark Wegierski
The Cousins' Wars by Kevin Phillips
The Roots of American Order by Russell Kirk
Is Blood Thicker Than Water? by James M. McPherson

116 **EU May Spell End to Britain's Sovereignty**
by Robert Stacy McCain

119 **What's In a Name: Maybe a Lot If You're British**
by Alexander MacLeod

120 **Reformers Target Great Britain's History and Landscape**
by Suzanne Fields

121 **What's Wrong with Having an England?**
by Paul Craig Roberts

123 **Language as the Entry Point for the Debate**
by K. C. McAlpin

125 **An Election America Lost by Default**
by Don Feder

126 **Both Parties Have Imported a New Electorate**
by Samuel Francis

128 **Green Bay's Diversity Revolution**
by Michael Kuehl

132 **The Evolution of Environmental Policy: A Historical Survey and A Look Ahead**
by Otis L. Graham, Jr.

146 **Speculative Scenarios: Is There a Way To Use and Sustain Our Planet?**
by John Cairns, Jr.

Book Review

153 John Attarian reviews *In Praise of Hard Industries: Why Manufacturing, Not the Information Economy, Is the Key to the Future* by Eamon Fingleton.

156 **Bulletin Board**

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is published four times a year by The Social Contract Press, 445 East Mitchell Street, Petoskey, MI 49770-2623.
Phone (231) 347-1171, Fax (231) 347-1185. Send mail correspondence and address corrections to address above,
or e-mail to info@thesocialcontract.com. See our World Wide Web page at www.thesocialcontract.com.
To order subscriptions or books call toll free: 1-800-352-4843. Third class postage paid at Petoskey, Michigan. *Copyright © 2001.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Right Now!
is Britain's number one conservative magazine, and it's now available in America.

Right *NOW!* is one of the most articulate, unabashed and politically incorrect magazines in Britain, with informed, diverting and often provocative writing on culture, race, immigration, Northern Ireland, Europe, America (North as well as South!) sexual politics, ecology, psychology, and literature.

Edited by Derek Turner, Right *NOW!* is already Britain's number one conservative magazine and a growing number of American conservatives are subscribing as well — more with each new issue! In much of Europe the right is on the advance, and there is no reason why the same cannot happen here in America. If you want to see that happen, then please give us your support — Right NOW!

Please send just $20.00 for a one-year subscription (four issues) or $7.00 for a sample copy of the latest issue. You will not be disappointed!

Checks or postal money orders should be made payable to "Right *NOW!*" and sent to:
333 East Maple Avenue, #225
Vienna, VA 22180-4717

PUBLISHER
John H. Tanton
Petoskey, Michigan

EDITOR
Wayne Lutton
Petoskey, Michigan

MANAGING EDITOR
Robert Kyser
Alanson, Michigan

WASHINGTON EDITOR
Roy Beck
Arlington, Virginia

Washington Office
1601 N. Kent St., #1100
Arlington, VA 22209
phone 703-816-8820
fax 703-816-8824

International Correspondents
Wolfgang Bosswick
Nürnberg, Germany

Denis McCormack
North Fitzroy, Victoria
Australia

Editorial Advisory Board
Sharon Barnes
Brooklyn, New York

Viktor Foerster
Nürnberg, Germany

Katharine Betts
Mt. Waverly, Victoria, Australia

Hugh Graham
Nashville, Tennessee

Gerda Bikales
McLean, Virginia

Otis L. Graham, Jr.
Wilmington, North Carolina

Leon Bouvier
Norfolk, Virginia

Ira Mehlman
Los Angeles, California

Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Ithaca, New York

David Simcox
Louisville, Kentucky

Dan Stein
Washington, D.C.

The Social Contract
is published quarterly.

© 2001 by The Social Contract Press

Editorial and subscription offices:
445 E. Mitchell Street, Petoskey, MI 49770-2623
phone: (231) 347-1171; fax: (231) 347-1185
e-mail: info@thesocialcontract.com
web page: www.thesocialcontract.com
archives: www.thesocialcontract.com/archives

Third Class postage is paid at Petoskey, Michigan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Note from the Editor A 'Special Relationship' Revisited

Like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the United States derives its mores, political purposes, institutions, and language from Britain. We share a common pattern of law and politics, a body of literature, religious heritage and a common history.

In all of these outposts of British civilization mass immigration and the demands of multiculturalists threaten to sever the Anglo-link that ensures cultural continuity. Indeed, in Australia, the United States, and Britain itself, the mass in-migration of wholly different peoples bringing with them non-Western cultures, will, if not halted, lead to the displacement of the majority populations and the extinction of the culture that was so attractive to other non-Westerners in the first place.

The Winter 1997-98 issue of *The Social Contract* (Vol. VIII, No.2) featured a discussion of "Australia's Identity Crisis." The guest editors noted that, "Far from being of interest only to Australians, this identify crisis is of relevance to all... the English-speaking countries," since they are now being demographically and culturally "transformed."

The transformation is occurring in Britain. On September 3, 2000 the *Sunday Observer* (UK) admitted that "whites will be an ethnic minority in Britain by the end of the century." The next day the *London Times* reported: "On current projections, the change could happen as soon as 2060."

We have invited Derek Turner, a respected London-based political analyst and editor of the quarterly journal *Right Now!*, to address this issue. He draws on contributors from both sides of the Atlantic to review the Anglo-American connection. Suggestions are offered to help re-forge these essential ties.

A future issue of *The Social Contract* will take a closer look at demographic and cultural changes in Canada.

WAYNE LUTTON, Ph.D.

Introduction to the Feature Section

How things have changed since 1833, when de Tocqueville observed how "One hardly ever meets an American who does not want to claim some connection by birth with the first founders of the colonies, and as for offshoots of great English families, I think America is simply full of them." Now Vachel Lindsay's excitable statement that "We here renounce our Saxon blood" seems to have become widely accepted by many Americans — certainly those in positions of power or influence.

America is neglecting her essentially Anglo-Saxon and Celtic heritage as either irrelevant or discriminatory. On the one hand, neo-conservatives say that America is a 'proposition nation' whose inhabitants need only believe in the free market to be good Americans. On the other hand, and to similar effect, Leftists are in endless pursuit of the chimera of "multiculturalism" or deliberately downplaying America's British roots in order to further some ethnic agenda of their own.

Yet this is ingratitude on a monumental scale. In this special issue of *The Social Contract*, Joseph Fallon demonstrates that the things Americans take for granted about their country stem directly or indirectly from England. The very freedom of expression that some Americans abuse in order to try to impose Left-wing totalitarianism stems from the Puritan desire to find "free air, free ocean and a harmless shore." As David Hackett Fisher puts it in his magisterial *Albion's Seed*: "In a cultural sense, most Americans are Albion's seed, no matter who their own forebears may have been."

The estrangement from her roots of the most powerful country in the world is of great consequence for everyone. Even those toward whom America is well-disposed are likely to find out that, as Arnold Toynbee said wearily, "America is a large, friendly dog in a very small room. Every time it wags its tail it knocks over a chair," while those whom America dislikes face bombing or invasion. What happens in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America affects everywhere else, fulfilling the *American Quarterly Review*'s 1831 prophecy that "the old world is destined to receive its influences in future from the new."

American upheaval has affected Britain more than any other country. There have been monumental political changes, not just in respect to Northern Ireland, but also in Serbia, where British politicians have allowed themselves to get caught up in the American mania for imposing the "American way of life." American foreign policy today is governed much less by the perceived national interest or rational (if unedifying) motives of economic exploitation than it is by perfervid ideology. As the wise Italian, Luigi Barzini, noted, American politicians appear to think that the world is populated by "law-abiding angels" (who may need to be freed from nasty rulers). Today's British politicians seems to find equal enjoyment in bombing foreigners until they draft shiny, new, politically correct constitutions or open up their economies to be taken over by multinational corporations.

But policy changes are less important than cultural and social changes. And, as Alexander Boot points out in his thoughtful "Damn La Difference," modernity means that every day there is less to differentiate average Americans and Britons from each other. There are all too many baseball caps and hip-hop fans in British High Streets, while a visit to the antiseptic, planned town of Milton Keynes in Buckinghamshire — a town whose grid-pattern roads have names like "Midsummer Boulevard" — bears out Boot's thesis.

Merrie Cave regrets the parting of our ways, and calls for a revival of the 'special relationship', with the UK joining the USA in NAFTA, as an alternative to being absorbed into the European Union. This is an idea now being examined closely on both sides of the Atlantic, and might indeed lead to greater understanding between the two countries along with Canada. Kenneth McDonald, an Englishman who has lived in Canada for decades, tells of the differences and similarities between the American and Canadian situations, and hopes that the intimate links between the two countries can "survive the attacks of country-changing socialists on both sides of the border."

Brett Decker uses the Labour government's reforms of the House of Lords as a jumping-off point to relate how, simultaneously with America, Britain has begun to forget her own roots. The British government has embraced wholeheartedly the Marxist maxims of "multiculturalism" and "equality," and is anxious for Britain to relinquish her independence in a European empire. It is not even as if this decline in British importance will lead to a specifically English renaissance, for our political masters have decreed that Englishness (if it exists at all) is inherently dangerous and evil. Not only has the government abolished hereditary peerages and said that the arts are "elitist," but it has endorsed — or mostly endorsed — the *Parekh Report*, which calls for Britain to be officially declared "a multicultural society" and says openly that British history needs to be "rewritten" to accommodate recent immigrants and their descendants.

Such *Reports* are not just of relevance to British people, of course, but to everyone who values British (and Western) patrimony and wishes to see British distinctiveness preserved, as is indicated in several columns by American journalists in this issue. The sentiments — there is little thought involved — of those who produce such ludicrous but dangerous documents as the *Parekh Report* are widespread within the Western world, but perhaps especially within the Anglo-American ambit, whose constituent countries have long stressed civic rather than ethnic forms of patriotism and whose opinion-forming classes are perhaps especially naive and prone to chiliasm.

Mark Wegierski sums up the state of America and Britain well as "a curious mixture of technological and economic prowess and triumph, combined with social and cultural decline." The challenge for Britons and Americans of good will is to arrest that decline, and reinvigorate our flagging relationship. It is my hope that this collection of articles may prove to be of some utility. ■

Derek Turner *is editor of the British journal* RightNow! *, PO Box 2085, London, W1A 5SX, UK.*
Website: <www.right-now.org>
E-mail: rightnow@compuserve.com.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letters to the Editor

EDITOR:

Readers of The Social Contract who are also members of the Sierra Club will want to know of an opportunity to cast a vote for population sanity. The group Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization (SUSPS) has used the democratic process the Sierra Club provides to place a proposition before the membership as a whole — it requires that the organization include in its extensive Sprawl Campaign materials a reasonable discussion of population growth as it contributes to unending sprawl.

SUSPS is a group of thousands of Sierra Club members who think the Club is not paying enough attention to domestic overpopulation. Many of us have been disturbed by the Club's yearly sprawl reports — expensively packaged publications of several dozen pages each which hardly mention population growth. Also distressing is the degree to which the Sierra management has endorsed the trendy ideology of "smart growth" — which is also favored by developers. Improved regional planning and transportation will be woefully inadequate in preserving our environment and quality of life against the onslaught of a population doubling within the lifetimes of children born today.

Watch your mailbox for the Sierra Club mail-in ballot. Then vote YES on the sprawl ballot question and send it back immediately so you won't forget. A very small percentage of Sierra members actually vote, so your participation is very important!

For more information, please see our website www.susps.org and Roy Beck's excellent new sprawl website www.SprawlCity.org.

BRENDA WALKER
Berkeley CA
Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization

EDITOR:

Let me make some small observations about Leon Bouvier's review of the recent UN study, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?"[1]

The two figures in the review contain consistent errors. Figure 1 shows a quantity growing at 1% per year which then doubles in size every 70 years. The graph shows the size to be zero at time t = 0, and to be 2 at time t = 70 years. Two is not twice zero. The line in Fig. 1 should have the value 1, not zero, at t = 0. Figure 2 shows a quantity declining 1% per year, so consequently it decreases to half its size every 70 years. At t = 210 years, the quantity has the size 12.5, and one half-life later at t = 280 years the quantity is shown to have the size zero. Zero is not half of 12.5. The declining quantity should have the value of 6.25, not zero, at time t = 280 years.

We can summarize this by saying that a growing exponential curve can never start at zero, and a declining exponential curve can never reach zero.[2]

We must note that population curves can be approximately exponential only when the population sizes are large, so that we don't have to deal with difficult situations involving fractions of one person.

Bouvier asks, "In a region with a constant above-replacement fertility, what level of emigration would be necessary to attain a stationary level?" Perhaps I'm missing something, but it seems that the Law of Conservation of People says that the number of emigrants per year should equal the number of births per year, plus the number of immigrants per year, minus the number of deaths per year.

The answer to a somewhat similar question has been given.[3] The similar question is, "What combinations of fertility and immigration would it take to produce zero population growth instantly in the U.S.?" One of the combinations that would yield this result instantly is a fertility of one child per family and zero net immigration. Then, over a period of 70 years, if zero net immigration is maintained, the fertility rate could gradually increase to 2.1 while the population remained stationary throughout.

Bouvier writes of population momentum, explaining that "Even if fertility falls considerably, growth continues for another 50-70 years because there are so many young individuals in their reproductive years." The origin of this 50-70 years was unclear until we constructed a simple computer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

model of a growing population that was used to answer the question about zero population growth for the U.S.[3] The computer modeled an isolated population that is growing at a rate R(1) because the fertility rate F(1) is above the replacement level. This isolated population would grow at a rate R(2) if the fertility rate is F(2). When the population is growing at the rate R(1), one suddenly changes the fertility from F(1) to F(2). The growth rate does not then suddenly change from R(1) to R(2). The growth rate changes gradually from R(1) to R(2). *The change to the new growth rate R(2) is not complete until every person (in the isolated population) has died who was living at the time the change in fertility was made.* This is the origin of the 50-70 year span for the transition to take place from the old rate to the new rate. This leads to the frightening observation that, in the absence of migration, the course of population growth some 70 years hence is determined by today's population policies.

The quantitative relationships between fertility rates and population growth rates has been explored in another paper.[4]

REFERENCES

[1] Leon Bouvier, "Replacement Migration?!" *The Social Contract,* Vol. XI, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp.80-84.

[2] A. A. Bartlett, "The Arithmetic of Growth, Methods of Calculation," *Population & Environment,* Vol.14, March 1993, pp.459-387.

[3] A. A. Bartlett, E.P Lytwak, "Zero Population Growth in the United States," *Population & Environment,* Vol.16, May 1995, pp.415-428. [See also the response and the rejoinder: G.C. Daily, A.H. Ehrlich, P.R. Ehrlich,"A Response to Bartlett and Lytwak (1995)" *Population & Environment,* Vol.16, July 1995, pp.521-526; E.P. Lytwak, A.A. Bartlett, "Rejoinder to Daily, Ehrlich, and Ehrlich: Immigration and Population Policy in the United States," *Population & Environment,* Vol. 16, July 1995, pp.527-537.]

[4] A.A. Bartlett, "Arithmetic of Growth: Methods of Calculation, II," *Population & Environment,* Vol. 20, January 1999, pp.215-246.

ALBERT A. BARTLETT
Professor Emeritus of Physics
University of Colorado, Boulder

EDITOR:

Having read the learned exchange between professors Parsons and Attarian in the Letters section of the last issue (Fall 2000) I'm almost embarrassed to bring up something as pedestrian as the gender of nouns in the Spanish language. Nevertheless, I will.

The title of Dr. Nelson's article, "El Republica del Norte," [in that same issue, p.42] almost frightened me. Is there something very basic about Spanish that I didn't learn when I graduated from college in Mexico many years ago? At that time "republica" was feminine and carried the feminine definite article, "la." As far as I know, la Academia Real Español (the Royal Spanish Academy) has not changed that. (Although it did eliminate the separate letters "ch" and ll" a few years ago.)

...Before I run the risk of appearing pedantic, let me stop and simply say that I have been a loyal subscriber since the first issue and commend you for all your excellent work. Unfortunately, you are a voice crying in the wilderness and no one seems to be listening. But anyway, carry on.

H. DAVID O'MALIE
Colonel, Army of the United States, Retired
Burke, Virginia

An Invitation to Subscribe
to
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The only journal that focuses on the interrelated issues of immigration reform, environmental protection and national unity.

Four issues per year for only $25.

Two-year subscription, $40.

Consider providing a subscription for a friend,

or for your local or college library.

Call 1-800-352-4843

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UK-USA: The British Character of America

The U.S. depends strongly on its British heritage

by Joseph Fallon

The character of the United States of America — its language, literature, laws, constitution, political structure and economic system — is British to the core.

The English language is the most obvious, and in many ways the most important, British feature. It is both a means — a medium of communication — and an end — the articulation of a specific Anglo-American culture. For American culture, its literature, laws, and values, is British culture adapted to the American experience and is not only inseparable, but virtually inconceivable apart from its British roots.

From the 1607 founding of Jamestown in the New World, to the 1969 landing of Apollo 11 on the Moon, from the King James Bible to Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress* and Milton's *Paradise Lost*, from the plays of Shakespeare and poetry of Dryden, to the novels of Hawthorne, Melville and Faulkner to the poetry of T. S. Eliot, from Blackstones' *Commentaries on the Laws of England* to Jefferson's *Notes on the State of Virginia*, from Amherst to William and Mary, from the speeches in the Continental Congress, to the Declaration of Independence and The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, from the speeches in the Constitutional Convention, to the *Federalist Papers* and the Anti-Federalist papers, from the ratification debates in the State conventions, to the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights — for Americans, until the rise of the 'bilingual' lobby, the language of religion and education, of social and political discourse, of values and identity, was the English language.

Less self-evident is the fact that the economic system of the United States is, in its origin and theory, British. The beginning of American industrialization was in imitation of and in reaction to the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom. It was encouraged as a means for ensuring both the political independence and economic well-being of the United States. American capitalism is founded and justified, if not always practiced, on the British theories of capitalism, free trade, and free markets as expounded by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* and David Ricardo in *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. The British influence on American economics is not limited to the "Right." The official American version of "socialism" involving deficit spending and its various corollaries — programs pursued aggressively by the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson — is based on the theories British economist John Maynard Keynes presented in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*.

The British character of the United States, and its importance to the success of the Republic, is deeper and more profound than simply economics, as John Jay emphasized in *The Federalist Papers*. Jay wrote that Americans are "a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs." The ancestors Americans honored and the language, religion, government, and customs that Americans treasured were British.

Non-British European immigrants to the United States adopted this language, and these folkways and mores. As Professor David Hackett Fischer wrote in his 1989 book *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways*

***Joseph Fallon**, a frequent contributor to The Social Contract, is a published author and researcher on the topics of immigration and American demography.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in America, "Today less than twenty percent of the American population have any British ancestors at all...But in a cultural sense most Americans are Albion's seed, no matter who their own forebears may have been. Strong echoes of four British folkways [Puritan, Cavalier, Quaker, and Borderland] still may be heard in the major dialects of American speech, in the regional pattern of American life, and in the continuing conflict between four different ideas of freedom in the United States."

"When American Revolutionaries demanded independence, it was for the stated reason that London had repeatedly violated their rights as Englishmen."

The birth of the United States was based on a defense of these British mores. When American Revolutionaries demanded independence, it was for the stated reason that London had repeatedly violated their rights as Englishmen. In 1765, the Stamp Act Congress declared that "That His Majesty's liege subjects in these colonies are entitled to all the inherent rights and liberties of his natural born subjects within the kingdom of Great Britain." In 1772, the Committee of Correspondence compiled "A list of Infringements and Violations of Rights" which asserted that the colonies possessed "all the rights of British subjects." In 1774, the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress affirmed the colonies' rights "under the principles of the English constitution." Speaking before the Continental Congress in 1774, James Duane of New York and president of that body, spoke of "grounding our Rights on the Laws and Constitution of the Country from which we sprung [the United Kingdom]." John Jay declared the purpose of independence was "in defense of old [English] liberties, not in search of new". In the Declaration of Independence, King George III is denounced for "abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighboring Province...so as to render it at once an Example and fit Instrument for introducing the same absolute Rule into these colonies."

The very names of the signers of the Declaration of Independence are British — Adams, Bartlett, Franklin, Hancock, Jefferson, Livingston, Lee, Lynch, Nelson, Paine, Read, Ross, Stockton, Williams, etc. All the signatories except eight were born in the 13 British colonies. And those eight were born in the United Kingdom — two in England (Button Gwinnett and Robert Morris), three in Ireland (James Smith, George Taylor and Matthew Thornton), two in Scotland (James Wilson and John Witherspoon), and one in Wales (Francis Lewis).

The inherent British political nature of the United States is its establishment as a confederation. In creating an historically unique union, the Founding Fathers relied not on the lessons of Greek leagues, the Roman Republic, Holland, Venice, Genoa, Switzerland or the Iroquois for guidance, but on familiar British models in the United Kingdom and in North America. There was the example of the confederation between Scotland and England in the United Kingdom — the Union of Crowns in 1603, the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1659 and finally the Union of Parliaments in 1707. British North America had the experience of the New England Confederation, 1643-1684, an alliance of four colonies — Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Haven, and Plymouth - and the Dominion of New England, 1686-1689, which united all the British colonies from Maine to New York and New Jersey.

Shortly after independence was achieved, a debate arose in the United States over whether or not to abandon the original constitution, The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, and adopt a new one. In 1787, a Constitutional Convention convened and drafted a new political document, which was submitted to the States for ratification. The new constitution preserved the confederation, but proposed changes on how it should function. While Federalists supported the new document and Anti-Federalists opposed it, both sides based their respective positions on whether or not the proposed constitution preserved the British character of the United States.

In the Virginia debates on ratification, Patrick Henry, for the Anti-Federalists, condemned the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposed constitution because "there is not an English feature in it." But George Nicholas, for the Federalists, urged ratification, arguing that the constitution not only preserved their rights and liberties under the English constitution but strengthened them. To win ratification by the required nine States in order that the constitution could be adopted, the fears of Anti-Federalists had to be allayed. To do this, ten amendments were added to the constitution between 1789 and 1791. Collectively known as the Bill of Rights, these amendments were derived from the Magna Carta, the British Petition of Right of 1628, the English Act of 1679 and the British Bill of Rights of 1689. Even the definition of treason adopted by the U.S. Constitution is British. It was taken from the English Statute of Treason of 1352.

"After reading the U.S. Constitution, Edmund Burke, British political philosopher, parliamentarian and friend of the 13 colonies, found it to be the British constitution 'well adapted to its circumstances.'"

The political structure adopted for this Second Republic was the triplex model of the United Kingdom — King, Lords, and Commons. The presidency was patterned after King George III with only those powers that Americans thought he was granted under the English constitution. The Senate is the American version of the British House of Lords but as an elective, not hereditary body. The powers of the House of Representatives set forth in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution, especially section 7 which confers on it alone the power of the purse, correspond to those of the British House of Commons.

After reading the U.S. Constitution, Edmund Burke, British political philosopher, parliamentarian and friend of the 13 colonies, found it to be the British constitution "well adapted to its circumstances." According to American historian Forrest McDonald, that was the intent of the Constitutional Convention. The legal system of the United States, as an emanation of the U.S. Constitution, reflects the desire of the Founding Fathers to preserve their historic rights as Englishmen. The laws of the United States, therefore, are rooted in English Common Law. The right to private property, trial by jury, a presumption of innocence, against self-incrimination, against double jeopardy and against retroactive liability are part of America's British inheritance.

Trashing the past, threatening the future

But today's multiculturalists — ie, the federal government, dominant media and special interest groups — are together threatening to obliterate America's British character altogether. They are erasing its history and eradicating its reality by permitting or encouraging mass Third World immigration.

The multicultural assault upon the British character of the United States follows George Orwell's famous dictum in *1984*: "Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past." Two examples illustrate this process.

We the American Hispanics, an official publication of the U.S. Census Bureau, declares: "Our ancestors were among the early explorers and settlers of the New World. In 1609, 11 years before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, our Mestizo (Indian and Spanish) ancestors settled in what is now Santa Fe, New Mexico." The meaning is clear. The true founders of what would become the United States were non-white 'Hispanics,' not the white British.

Santa Fe, however, was not settled by "Mestizos." It was founded by governor and Captain-General Don Juan de Onate who was, along with his large party of priests and settler-soldiers, white. More importantly, the first permanent British settlement in the New World was not Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1620, but Jamestown, Virginia in 1607. The settlement of Jamestown predates that of Santa Fe by more than two years.

Equally important is what this government publication deliberately omitted. The British colony of Jamestown thrived. It established the House of Burgesses, the first representative assembly in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New World. From Jamestown arose Virginia, and from Virginia arose the United States. In sharp contrast, the Spanish colony of Santa Fe was destroyed by Hopi, Tewa, and Zuni Indians and even after the Spanish founded Santa Fe for a second time the colony soon withered into political, economic and social insignificance.

Then there is the exhibit at the Ellis Island Museum of Immigration that declares "By 1789, when George Washington was inaugurated president, we were already a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society." The truth is that in 1790 the first census showed the United States was a bi-racial, not multi-racial, country. The population consisted of a white majority of over 80 percent with a black minority approaching 20 percent. There were no Asians, Pacific Islanders, Aleuts, or American Indians. The latter were legally recognized independent nations and not part of the United States.

"After 1965, Third World immigration which was obviously likely to endanger the British character of the United States — demographically, linguistically, and culturally — began in earnest."

Among the white population, the English alone accounted for over 60 percent, the Scots more than 8 percent and the Irish nearly 10 percent. In other words, the British accounted for nearly 80 percent of the entire white population. These statistics reveal an essentially homogenous, not multi-ethnic, population. In addition, the non-British whites were fellow northwest Europeans — Germans, Dutch, French, and Swedes — who were physically indistinguishable from the British. Furthermore, most of the non-British whites were Germans and Dutch who shared many political and cultural ties with the British.

There was religious homogeneity as well. Virtually the entire population of the United States, which numbered approximately four million people, both black and white, was Christian, and not just Christian but Protestant, and most were not just Protestant, but adherents to British denominations — Anglicanism, Presbyterianism, and their offshoots. Catholics made up less than one percent of the population, approximately 23,000, and there were just 4,000 Jews. Even deists, such as Thomas Jefferson, were "culturally" British Protestants, if not observant or orthodox ones.

Third World immigration is the second phenomenon by which the multiculturalists are effectively extirpating the reality of the British character of the United States.

While it started innocently in the 1940s, legislation established the precedent. In 1943, 1949, 1951 and 1963, Congress enacted laws to import agricultural workers from Mexico and Central America. In 1943, Congress also authorized the importation of temporary workers from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for industries considered vital to the war effort. In 1943, 1946 and 1961 Congress approved limited immigration from the Asia-Pacific triangle, in particular from China and India.

After 1965, Third World immigration which was obviously likely to endanger the British character of the United States — demographically, linguistically, and culturally — began in earnest. Since the passage of the 1965 immigration and nationality act, the U.S. government has effectively barred ethnic European immigration while encouraging massive Third World immigration with its significantly higher fertility rates. Annual immigration from all sources now exceeds one million. Over 80 percent of legal immigration is from the Third World — the single largest source of both legal and illegal immigration is Mexico — whereas less than 20 percent is from Europe and Canada. But the percentage for Europe and Canada may be misleading. Immigration from Europe and Canada does not necessarily mean ethnic European immigrants, for Third World immigrants can immigrate to Europe or Canada then enter the United States under the quotas for those countries.

The effect of mass Third World immigration into the United States is to replace the historic European-American majority population, which adopted the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

English language and British character of the United States, with a Third World majority population which will not — in other words, to impose on the country what already has been successfully imposed on Los Angeles, Miami and New York.

Third World immigration provides the federal government, dominant media, and special interest groups with an excuse to abolish the historic liberties of Americans. Because the United States is now a multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic country, they claim it is necessary to impose extensive censorship, thereby increasing their political power, under the guise of "hate" crimes and "hate" speech, and presumably in the future "hate" thought, in order to maintain inter-communal peace and respect. George Orwell foresaw this in *1984*. The dictatorship of Big Brother prevents even the possibility of critical thought against the regime through "doublethink" and "Newspeak." The politically correct mantra of the multiculturalists that "diversity is enriching" reflects the logic of the three slogans of Big Brother: "War Is Peace, Freedom Is Slavery, and Ignorance Is Strength."

According to a projection by the Census Bureau, the demographic *coup d'etat* will occur around the year 2100, when the United States will have a "Hispanic" majority population and officially become an "Hispanic" country. At that time, the success of Jamestown will have been replaced by the failure of Santa Fe, the liberties under common law by the tyranny of the Inquisition and the First World by the Third World. And the United States will enter the new Dark Ages. ■

A Love-Hate Relationship

Quotes by and about Americans

Assembled by Guest Editor Derek Turner

The first British comments on America were overwhelmingly positive. Captain John Smith and other early settlers spoke glowingly of the rich new country being opened up for exploitation, while Puritans seem to have thought, with Winthrop, that America was their "City on a Hill" or rhapsodized: "Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation, rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: methinks I see her as an eagle, mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her endazzled eyes at the full mid-day beam."[1]

But political problems and the struggle for independence soon weakened the charm for many British observers. The usually well-balanced Dr. Johnson disliked Americans even more than he disliked Scots, and said of them: "Sir, they are a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging."[2] It was Johnson, of course, who famously asked: "How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of Negroes?"[3]

Johnson was counterbalanced by Burke, an early advocate of a "special relationship": "My hold of the colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron."[4]

But British criticism continued almost unabated during the 19th century. "I do not like them. I do not like their principles. I do not like their manners. I do not like their opinions" said Frances Trollope in 1832.[5] Charles Dickens too disliked American democracy, and found himself temporarily unpopular in America thanks to his heavy-handed satire in *Martin Chuzzlewit*, in which he makes the newsboys cry: "Here's this morning's New York *Sewer*! Here's this morning's New York *Stabber*!"[6]

Distrust of America was shared by some British politicians. Robert Cecil, three times Prime Minister, was a strong supporter of the South during the Civil War, noting Lincoln's "personal nullity" and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comparing Sherman to Genghis Khan and Tamerlane.[7] More recently, British politicians have been far less critical. But in the 1940s, Harold Macmillan could still say: "You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans " great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt."

"Some Americans find Britain frustrating, but it is the frustration felt by one family member toward another."

When a British delegation went to Washington to discuss the repayment of the American war loan, a joke note was circulated, which read: "In Washington Lord Halifax / Whispered to Lord Keynes / "It's true they've all the money bags, / But we've got all the brains."[8]

When Enoch Powell was asked whether he were anti-American, he replied: "Most people are. The only change is that it has become a term of abuse." When asked why, he answered, somewhat unsatisfactorily: "Well, I just don't like America, or Americans. It is like saying you like sugar in your tea. *De gustibus non est disputandum*."[9]

The generally negative tone of many British commentators was explained thus by the American writer, Washington Irving: "It has been the peculiar lot of our country to be visited by the worst kind of English travelers. It has been left to the broken-down tradesman, the scheming adventurer, the wandering mechanic, the Manchester and Birmingham agent, to be [Britain's] oracles respecting America."[10]

But some British people — and their number is increasing — are devoted to America. "A few generations of life in the new country had already made a change in the English stock ... the sleepy, good-humoured lion of the old world seemed to be taking on talons and wings... The old English love of law and home was still there, but something fierce and primitive was being added. Soon an eagle would take the air" wrote the popular historian Arthur Bryant in 1936 .[11] "In the Mid West and West the young man, in his blue jeans and crew cut, can still feel that he represents something simpler, bigger, better, than his European equivalent. He is still in a special sense the heir of honesty, adventure, self-assertion without privilege or protection" observed Martin Green in 1957.[12] Nowadays, more people seem to realize, with Peter Brimelow, that "No civilized person can be indifferent to the fate of America."[13]

Although few Americans can match the Anglophilia of Alice Duer Miller — "I have seen much to hate here — much to forgive, / But in a world where England is finished and dead, / I do not wish to live"[14] — the American view of Britain is generally kinder than the British view of America. Washington Irving again: "With all his odd humours and obstinate prejudices, ["John Bull"] is a sterling-hearted old blade. He may not be as wonderfully fine a fellow as he thinks himself, but he is at least twice as good as his neighbours represent him."[15] America seems to have spent less time insulting other countries than in praising itself, often in extravagant terms.

The attitude of the American tourist encountered in Exeter Cathedral in 1929 by the British writer H. V. Morton is still a common one: "We kind of sneer at tradition, but, believe me, under our skins we admire it and wish we had it."[16] But although Americans may like seeing Beefeaters at the Tower of London, or the Trooping of the Color, their attitude toward our monarchy is understandably colored by history. However, Truman's behavior may have been more than usually disrespectful when he diarized: "George VI sent me a personal letter today ... not much impressed ... save it for [their daughter] Maggie's scrap book."[17]

Some Americans find Britain frustrating, but it is the frustration felt by one family member toward another. As Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador to Britain, wrote: "These English are the most interesting study in the world. Just when you'd like to hang them for their stupidity, you become aware of such noble stuff in them that you thank God that they were your ancestors."[18]

Hines Page is not the only American to have found British complacency puzzling or irritating. As Ogden Nash noted "To be an Englishman is to belong

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the most exclusive club in the world." Bill Beutel, an American newspaperman, once said "The English don't give a damn about what others think of them ... they think it is everyone else's genuine loss not to have been born English."[19] Paul Gallico had to concede that "No-one can be as calculatedly rude as the British."[20] Americans (and others) often say that the British are repressed. An amusing echo of this perception is found within the sex industry, where the slang term "English culture" means bondage.[21]

A suitable quotation to close this brief selection from a vast literature of Anglo-American encounter is Emerson's ringing peroration to *English Traits*: "All hail! Mother of nations, mother of heroes, with strength still equal to the time ... if the courage of England goes ... I will go back to the capes of Massachusetts, and my own Indian stream, and say to my countrymen, the old race are all gone, and the elasticity and hope of mankind must henceforth remain on the Alleghany ranges, or nowhere."[22]

Americans and Britons of good will should alike hope that Emerson's words, written so long ago and in such a climate of optimism, may find a contemporary resonance. ■

NOTES

[1] *The Liberty of the Press,* Milton, no date.

[2] Conversation with Dr. John Campbell, 1769.

[3] *Taxation No Tyranny: an answer to the Resolutions and Address of the American Congress*, 1775.

[4] *On Conciliation with the Colonies*, 22 March 1775.

[5] *Domestic Manners of the Americans*, 1832.

[6] *Martin Chuzzlewit*, 1843-44.

[7] Quoted in *Salisbury: Victorian Titan*, Andrew Roberts, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1999.

[8] Both quoted in *The English*, Jeremy Paxman, Penguin, London, 2000.

[9] Interview, 1986, cited in *Like The Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell*, Simon Heffer, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998.

[10] *The Sketch Book of Geoffrey Crayon, Gent*, published in periodical form between 1819 and 1820.

[11] *The American Ideal*, Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1936.

[12] *A Mirror for Anglo-Saxons*, Longmans, London, 1957

[13] *Alien Nation,* Random House, New York, 1995.

[14] *The White Cliffs*, Methuen, London, 1941.

[15] *Sketch Book*, ibid.

[16] *In Search of England*, Methuen, London, 1929.

[17] Cited in *Eminent Churchillians*, Andrew Roberts, Phoenix, London, 1994.

[18] Letter to Woodrow Wilson, 1916.

[19] Both quotations from *As Others See Us*, Reader's Digest Association, London, 1991.

[20] *As Others See Us*, ibid.

[21] Cited in *Words Apart: The Language of Prejudice*, Jonathon Green, Kyle Cathie, London, 1996. "American culture" is the "missionary position."

[22] *English Traits*, 1856.

Forbidden (after 1492):

Not Everyone Can Come to America

As soon as the news of the discovery is known, the Spanish monarchs attempt to organize and arrange the travel of settlers to American lands.

First, travel is prohibited by any Jew, Arab, or Protestant — even if converted to Catholicism — unless a family tradition of several generations in the Catholic church is confirmed. This prohibition extends to gypsies and lawyers. These last, "...because their profession is considered particularly harmful, because of their influence on the Indians and colonialists, their love of lawsuits and their ability to gobble up assets and fortunes in interminable processes..."

But by the third trip there are not enough volunteers. Therefore, the monarchs issue a law of pardon to delinquents who embark. Those condemned to death expunge their sentence with two years of service in American lands, while those sentenced to prison may serve one year [abroad].

Excluded from royal pardon and therefore forbidden to travel are those condemned for heresy, treason, murder by gun or arrow; those guilty of circulating false money and taking gold or money out of the kingdom; and, finally, homosexuals.

— translated from *El Pregonero* (The Towncrier) Washington, DC, Spanish language newspaper October 8, 1992
re: 500th anniversary of "The Discovery"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Damn *la Difference*

Bemoaning the homogenization caused by modernity

by Alexander Boot

In the past, Britain and America may have been divided by a common language. These days they are united by a common culture. It is called modernity.

Culture is something of a misnomer here, particularly if one uses the word in the narrower sense of Western culture. For modernity is precisely the opposite of that.

Western culture grew out of the shared need to comprehend and then reflect individual salvation. Modern culture grew out of the similarly universal need to gain collective, and totally equal, comfort.

Salvation is always individual; perdition — and I find it hard to describe the cultural content of modernity by any other word — seeks companions. The more modern a society, the more urgent is the need for uniformity. If one defines society as something co-extensive with a country, then the quest for uniformity means increasingly hazy demarcation among classes. If one broadens the concept of society, then one can understand why the idiosyncratic differences between, say, the British and the Americans are fast disappearing. Modernity feels about diversity the way nature feels about a vacuum.

These somewhat truncated thoughts form a plinth on which empirical observation can rest. Without such a support, observation can well tumble into the mire fed by reporters, especially of the travel variety, who dissemble as only eyewitnesses can. Now, I have undertaken to observe the social differences between the Americans and the British, which is something I am possibly qualified to do, if only because my last 30 years have been divided more or less evenly between the USA and Britain. But as a starting point I would like to venture outside these countries and describe a day in Florence a few weeks ago.

My wife and I were spending a month in Tuscany, and after a fortnight we ran out of books to read. So a quick visit to Florence was a matter of survival, for we always direct such rescue forays toward the English-language bookshop there owned by an amiable and cultured Scot. In no hurry to re-enter the smelly world of Florentine diesel fumes, we spent almost two hours chatting with the owner. He did most of the talking, complaining that Machiavelli's books read like contemporary reportage to anyone who knows today's Florence. Our part consisted primarily of admiring the Tuscan lilt to his Edinburgh English. That civilizes chat was punctuated at regular intervals by American tourists seeking an Anglophone haven from the gesticulating Borgias outside.

First came a vaudeville Midwesterner whose baseball cap displayed his academic credentials in the form of the *Indiana State* logo. Bringing into question the educational standards at that venerable university, the gentleman asked directions to the Parthenon. "It's not here," said the unflappable Scot accustomed to such incidents. "It's in Greece." "No, I don't mean the Parthenon," said the Indiana alumnus, impatient with the foreigner';s lack of understanding. "I mean the Colosseum." "That's in Rome." Unsatisfied, the man walked out, only to be replaced in short order by a stream of his countrymen, now coming in thick and thin.

One of them expressed dismay over the absence of the Bridge of Sighs among the mementoes the bookshop sold as a sideline. The owner apologized for the oversight but pointed out respectfully that the bridge was, after all, a Venice landmark. "And where are we?" wondered the perplexed visitor. Several couples then came in demanding general information on what, if anything, there was to do in Florence. "Not much," explained the Ascot, "if you don't like art." "Love it. Don't you love art, babes?" "Well, in that

---

***Alexander Boot** is a frequent contributor to conservative journals, and is presently writing a book to be entitled* Death of the West.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

case, there are a few decent paintings here and there." "Like where?"

After several more interruptions, all in the same vein, we bid goodbye to our friend and, laden with purchases, walked in the direction of the Pitti Palace. Along the way we passed by a mile-long queue outside the Uffizi which we did not dare to join. Because of the strong dollar, the queue was mostly manned by Americans, bracing themselves for a sprint through a thousand rooms full of Madonnas. We overheard one "honey-we've-worked-hard-for-this-so-goddamit-let's-enjoy-ourselves" tourist suggesting to several others that they stroll to the Rialto Bridge afterwards, which idea, if acted upon, would have resulted in a rather lenthy walk indeed. Finally, when inside the Palace, we overheard another American, Texan by the sound of him, commenting incredulously that the Pitti (which has only a dozen or so first-rate paintings) was merely Florence's second-best gallery. "What can be better than this?" he enquired, a question his companions obviously regarded as rhetorical.

Feeling superior, we decided that was enough for one day and escaped back to our serene village. A fortnight later we were back in London, where the sense of superiority quickly vanished into the mist so characteristic of this great city. I was tempted into buying a copy of the Leftwing *Guardian* newspaper, a temptation to which I had never before succumbed as the name of the paper affects me as the word "culture" affected Dr. Goebbels. Except that particular issue carried the results of a poll designed to find out how firmly young Brits are rooted in their cultural heritage. Not very, as it turned out:

81 percent could not name three novels by Charlesd Dickens,

93 percent could not quite place John Milton,

94 percent had never heard of Tom Paine (some will say this this is not such a tragic omission),

77 percent of Magna Carta,

90 percent did not know what conflict took place in 1815,

79 percent were blissfully unaware of who were the opposite sides in the English Civil War.

Even poor Dr. Livingstone was a stranger to 77 percent. And so forth, *ad* gushing *nauseam*.

Suddenly one realizes that a cultural chasm between the two countries exists only in the memories of retired, port-befuddled colonels from some of Britain's better regiments. If asked, these gentlemen would probably guess, wrongly, that the poll covered only the "proles," which term in Britain describes people who show the upper portion of their rectal divide above their jeans and chant "if it wasn't for England, you'd all be Krauts" at the visiting football fans. What the colonels may not know is that all of Britain has joined the louts to form a cultureless, and generally classless, mass.

"Undeniably, the social landscape in both Britain and America is speckled with a few Western holdouts, for whom our cultural heritage is still a matter of life or death. But in neither place do they add up to a social, or even cultural, force."

Undeniably, the social landscape in both Britain and America is speckled with a few Western holdouts, for whom our cultural heritage is still a matter of life or death. But in neither place do they add up to a social, or even cultural, force. Realizing they have lost, most of these underground Westerners just try to survive in an alien environment, usually by attempting to blend in. They cower among their books and records, only venturing outside to make a living on the terms set by their conquerors. And they particular care to suppress a wry smile when yet another modern barbarian opines that John Lennon is every bit as talented as J. S. Bach, although admittedly in a different way.

If culture is no longer there to separate the two countries, then what about social differences? Here one has to delve into the issue of class, which creates an equally uncomfortable feeling on either side of the Atlantic. In Western times class was a useful term describing commonly acknowledged differences

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among various estates. In post-Western times along came Marx with his claim that class was defined solely by people's relation to the means of production. In modern times, neither description holds true (come to think of it, the second never did).

To begin with, America, with its "self-evident" founding claim that "all men are created equal," never had any estates to being with. Only the South once had a simulacrum of a hereditary hierarchy, but it was deconstructed by that great social reformer Gen. Sherman. In the absence of a functional aristocracy, social divisions can only mimic a traditional class structure, in the same way in which American separation of power into branches mimics England's constitution.

"In an increasingly global, publicly-owned economy, where the managers seldom own the capital of which they dispose, the Marxian division of classes into capitalists and workers is frankly risible."

Read President for King, the Senate for the Lords and the House of Representatives for the Commons, add a heavily politicized judiciary, and it becomes clear that we are looking at a phantom reflection, not the real thing. For England's constitution evolved to balance the powers of very real estates. Hence the unelected peers keeping the elected democracy in check, both together making sure the prince toes the line, and the latter not letting parliamentary bickering do too much damage. The U.S. Constitution, on the other hand, reflects America's absence of traditional estates, which is why her executive branch and both legislative chambers are democratically elected by more or less the same people. So the branches represent the same estate, or, roughly, the same social class if we insist on defining the term along the traditional lines.

The economic definition of class used to mean something in the U.S. but probably does not any longer. In an increasingly global, publicly-owned economy, where the managers seldom own the capital of which they dispose, the Marxian division of classes into capitalists and workers is frankly risible. Naturally, there are people with more or less money, but such differences are fluid and, in any event, they do not carry the weight of real class distinctions. After all, a marquis even without a penny to his name used to be upper class for life, while a rich shopkeeper was not.

Britain, on the other hand, once had a class structure, but in any meaningful sense this is now relegated to the status of a *Ye Olde England* sideshow. The Crown has no clout, so neither does the aristocracy. Political power is dully vested in the Commons, which — just like the U.S. government — is a single-class institution. The dying social embers are, however, being fanned incessantly by the press (aka public opinion) and popular folklore. The maligned "class system" is being held responsible for demonstrable fact that, alas, men are not created equal, or, in any event, they do not end up so. The flogging continues even though the horse is long since dead, and the exertion involved produces new social pressures. However, these in Britain today are vectored down, not up. Hence the amusing spectacle of our privately educated Prime Minister Tony "Anthony" Blair attempting to master the glottal stop, which is akin to Beacon Hill resident trying to sound like an El Paso roustabout.

The same trend is observable in everyday life where the Brits, especially those involved in modern occupations, are busily getting rid of their natural middle-class accents. Recently, for example, I was introduced to the sister of a friend of mine, an advertising art director. To my surprise, she spoke in a much more refined way than her brother, who hides his intelligence behind Eliza Doolittle's vowels still unrepaired by Professor Higgins. When queried, my friend expressed touching concern about my mental health. "You a nutter or wot?" he said. "If I spoke like me Mum and Dad, or 'specially me Nan, I'd be out of a 'kin job. So I, like, changed the accent wot I was born with. Took three years of watching 'kin *Eastenders* on the old box."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is hard to find in today's Britain a youngster who speaks with as refined an accent as his father. The downward drift has pushed most children at least a couple of ladder rungs lower than their parents, which proves yet again that it is possible to equalize only down, not up. (Those who think that the downward drift is an exclusively British phenomenon should compare George W. Bush with his father.)

So, if traditional class interests now survive only in the pronouncements of those with a vested interest in troubling the social waters, then what exactly has taken their place in British society? The answer is, tropistic reaching out for things American. The British philistine senses that Americans are his kind of people in the sense in which the few remaining toffs at home are not. Assisted by the innate modern craving for uniformity, he wants to be exactly like his victorious American counterpart.

"Sameness is gradually setting in, and before long any substantive differences between Americans and the british will disappear."

Now, imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but it is also a shortcut to epigonic falsehood. So, in his second-hand Yankiness, the Brit is getting things wrong all over the place.

For one thing, he does not realize that today's American philistine is no longer aggressive. He is beyond aggression. After all, he has won, and his Gods are no longer athirst. So the Yank role model can afford to be good-natured, bestowing with an open heart the universal right to one's own opinion. Tell him, "No, pal. Nobody is *entitled* to express an opinion on *anything*; it's a privilege to be earned," and he will merely flash his dentures. Well, you too are entitled to your views. Have a nice day.

His neophyte British counterpart will not be so benign: catch him at a wrong moment, and he can thump you. The Brit is still an ounce short of his pound of flesh, which is why his smugness is still belligerent. After all, the light of the American beacon took a while to reach these shores, and there is a lot of catching up to do.

But when the bean finally hits the Brit in the eye, it dazzles him. Why can't he be like the Americans? He has just returned from a neatly packaged holiday in Orlando, and blimey! Every house there is detached with a swimming pool! What more can you want? Culture? Plenty of that over there, mate. But *our* kind of culture, not the poncy stuff the likes of you affect. Giz the Green Card, we'd *walk* across!

Apart from the more enlightened, or more xenophobic, ten percent, the Brits are being dragged by an invisible hand halfway across the Atlantic. They are met at that hypothetical point by many Americans who feel that Britishness confers a special kind of sophistication not readily available in Topeka. So they affect tweeds and heather-colored jumpers, give names like Kensington Cottage to their bungalows for the whole family and display models of Elizabethan frigates on their decorative fireplaces. Most of the time they get things wrong, but that does not really matter.

The gravitational pull toward the universal middle ground is narrowing the gap between the two countries. Sameness is gradually setting in, and before long any substantive differences between Americans and the British will disappear.

"Substantive" is, of course, an important modifier, for superficial differences between the two will always remain. Also within each country, the encroaching sameness of content does not preclude a variety of form. Britain may no longer have real social classes, and America probably has never had them, but that does not mean that the people do not divide into social sub-groups. Each aspires to the weighty status of a class, but what separates them is not a true hierarchy but an array of petty snobberies and silly semiotic codes for public consumption. At work there is the larcenous shift of modernity whereby traditional Western institutions are destroyed, but their outer shell is kept up for appearances' sake.

Thus a city executive will present to the world the appearance of upward social mobility. He will leave the bottom button of his waistcoat undone, and, if he remembers, will even refer to that garment as *weskit*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He will make sure the loud stripes of his Jermyn Street shirt will clash slightly with the chalk stripes of his three-button jacket. He will affect a passion for opera, suitably as upmarket socially as it is downmarket spiritually. And he will drop a smokescreen of hints that he would much rather be out in the country with his horses.

His Wall Street counterpart will go through similar motions. He will make sure there is not an ounce of polyester in his button-down shirt. He will sport Brookes Brothers or Paul Stuart jackets with no shoulder pads, British regimental ties to which he is not entitled, and black brogues. He will greet strangers with "How do you do?" rather than "Nice to meetcha." In New York, he will know that even one summer weekend spent in the city spells social death. And he will donate $200 a year to the Metropolitan Museum, which modest contribution will get him invited to the annual black-tie do. This will not only enable our hero to wear what he is at pains not to describe as a "tux", but — he hopes — will let him bask in the reflected glory of the wealthy patrons of the arts. In reality, he will be rubbing shoulders only with his fellow $200 donors, but our hero does not know that.

However, come weekday evening, and both protagonists revert to type. Slouching in his armchair with a can of beer or a glass of plonk grafted into his palm, each will stay transfixed to the TV screen fleshing the latest highly-rated soap. Or else he will do some mindless housework to the accompaniment of what he mistakenly calls music. Sheltered from the prying eyes of the world, he no longer needs to pretend.

In the morning, the classless Dr. Jekyll will stay at home, and the class-conscious Mr. Hyde will prowl the streets. But even though he will be at pains to distinguish himself from other classless prowlers representing different sub-groups, he will betray his quest for sameness by conforming rigidly to the semiotic shibboleths of his own type.

Pluck ten executives out of a Park Avenue crowd at lunchtime, and you will have before you ten sartorial clones, each wearing an identical suit in one of the two regulation colors. Likewise, ten Texans in a Pasadena honky-tonk will be wearing identical clobber of jeans with silver belt buckles, Stetsons, Western shirts and cowboy boots. Or else drag ten media types out of a wine bar in London's Soho, and you will regaled by the sight of ten. Black, oversized Italian suits (upmarket Italians wear British cuts, by the way) and black shirts buttoned up all the way to the top. Within each sub-group uniformity reigns in every superficial detail. And by looking deeper, one will realize that it is only the superficial details that separate one group from another. *Vive la difference*, indeed! ■

Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to granting special rights and privileges to minorities...
CHAVEZ
Unless they're illegal aliens doing my dishes...
CHAVEZ

© 2001 Steve Benson, the Arizona Republic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The 'Special Relationship'

Why restoring the special relationship might save Britain from dissolution

by Merrie Cave

Any comprehensive account of the relationship between America and Britain would need to start with the Pilgrim Fathers, but I shall confine my observations to the 20th century. However, America's British culture must be emphasized, and as Adlai Stevenson pointed out, America is a political and moral fact as well as a geographical one — the first community in which men set out in principle to institutionalize freedom, responsible government and human equality. The efforts of the Founding Fathers, who were practical men, aware of original sin, produced the most successful and wealthy society of modern times, unlike the mythical paradise still promised by followers of Lenin or Castro. According to Dicey, an understanding of the rule of law is peculiar to England and those countries which, like the U.S., have inherited English traditions. This concept is completely different from the European (Napoleonic) tradition.

These circumstances mean that someone like myself, who grew up during the Second World War, regards Americans, even those not of British origin, as part of the extended British family. Memories of friendly GIs throwing chocolate, oranges and chewing gum from tanks gave way to a profound admiration for President Truman whose courage ensured that western Europe did not face the Communist threat alone — we would surely have lost if we had.[1]

'We won't go back 'til it's over over there'

One of the big "ifs" of history is whether America's withdrawal from the European stage would have made the League of Nations a success and stopped the rise of Hitler. Fortunately for us, isolationism did not recur after the Second World War.[2] But in the 1940s, Marshall Plan aid ensured that Western Europe, unlike Eastern Europe, did not starve, although of course it was initially offered to all countries irrespective of ideology. It only became an exclusive Western European enterprise because of the Eastern countries' refusal to accept it. The establishment of NATO, one of the most successful defensive alliances ever, was the diplomatic arm of economic recovery.

Some of us resented the fact that many Americans wished to see the end of the British Empire. But its continuation was not really an option. We were financially and in every other way exhausted by the European wars. Lack of support for the Suez adventure in 1956 rankled with diehards determined to stop Nasser in his tracks, but the episode served to show that no military action of this kind could be undertaken without American support. Staying on longer in Africa, however, might have saved that unhappy continent from some of the horrors it later experienced.

The special relationship survived the storms of the Cold War, helped by the close rapport between individual leaders: one thinks of Attlee and Truman, Macmillan and Kennedy and above all Thatcher and Reagan. Their successful partnerships helped to bring about the death knell of the Soviet Empire. Eastern Europeans of my acquaintance still refer to Reagan and the "Star Wars" program as the decisive factor that accelerated the end.

The Cold War brought into being an international system which was logical and easily understood. The collapse of Russia and events elsewhere, like the break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Iraq, have brought uncertainty and confusion, making the world

***Merrie Cave** is managing editor of the* Salisbury Review, *published in London.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in many ways a more dangerous place than hitherto. At the same time both our electorates seem complacent and only interested in economic advantage; everywhere nations lack strong moral leadership and particularly in America and Britain.

Only a few of us here in Britain are aware that the European Union threatens the extinction of Britain as a sovereign nation. Mr. Gorbachev has been reported as saying that he finds it particularly surprising that our leaders are trying to construct a European Soviet after he had overseen the fall of the Russian one. My impression is that not many Americans have grasped this fact either. Ironically, it was the United States that encouraged Britain's membership in its early stages. Fear of Germany starting another war, and the growing menace of the Soviet Union, inspired early moves towards integration.

"Mr. Gorbachev has been reported as saying that he finds it particularly surprising that our leaders are trying to construct a European Soviet after he had overseen the fall of the Russian one."

These post-war circumstances are now out of date.[3] The polls indicate that at least some 50 percent of the British people want either to leave the European Union or to reduce our connection to one of free trade. We do more trade with the United States than we do with France and Germany combined, and the UK economy continues to diverge from those of the European Union but to converge with that of the United States.

Our interests and those of the English-speaking world would be better served if Britain were to quit the failing, sclerotic, corporatist economies of the EU and join NAFTA and the successful free market economies of the Pacific rim. The political and economic future of the special relationship would surely be enhanced. And we would be a free nation instead of a subservient region of the European Union megastate. ■

NOTES

[1] The Truman doctrine was a response to the Greek civil war, which would have spread communism over all the Mediterranean had the communist guerrillas been successful.

[2] I can understand, however, why many Americans felt and still feel that Europeans should sort out their own problems and not come whining to Uncle Sam for funds and assistance. Their ancestors had gone to America to escape European conflicts.

[3] The process began with the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, then evolved into the bogus Common Market that Britain joined in 1975 — incidentally the CIA generously funded the "Yes" campaign — with a directly elected Parliament in 1979, then developed by way of the Single European Act of 1987 and the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty of Nice in December 2000 will drag us into the EU legal system, *corpus juris*, which threatens *habeas corpus* and trial by jury. These developments have all taken place by *diktat* and without a popular vote. The EU has not been discussed in any election campaign and, as with the immigration issue, both the main political parties have lied to or concealed the truth from their electorates. The BBC, often called by Eurosceptics the "Brussels Broadcasting Corporation," and independent television are now more strongly biased in favor of integration than they were in 1975.

The Death of Citizenship

"History is replete with the sagas of great defeats, of peoples wiped off the face of the earth, and of cultures transformed through clashes with others. Across and throughout history, nations fell, disintegrated, lost their nerve, made disastrous decisions, fought wars of self-destruction, and were not wise enough to sustain themselves, But I, at least, have never been able to discover another nation in human history, much less a great and powerful one, that literally *willed* itself out of existence through lethargy and, worst of all, guilt over things that it did not even do." (page 252).

— Georgie Anne Geyer in
Americans No more: The Death of Citizenship
New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1996
352 pages. $23

Can be ordered from The Social Contract Press

1-800-352-4843

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Revolution from Above

How welfarism and multiculturalism changed Canada

by Kenneth McDonald

Any attempt to trace the strength of British roots in Canada must acknowledge certain facts. "When he has an assured majority in the House of Commons the Canadian prime minister is the nearest thing to a dictator — if he wants to be one." (Lester Pearson)

"A French Canadian is not the same as an English Canadian, differing only as to the tongue he speaks; *he speaks differently because he is different.*" (Former Quebec premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand — emphasis in the original.)

From 1963 to 1984, two Canadian prime ministers, Lester Pearson and his successor Pierre Trudeau, were opposed to nationalism of any kind. A provincial premier — Angus MacLean — said of Pearson that "he had a real obsession that you had to sanitize yourself as a country from anything that was British or traditional." In 1965 Trudeau wrote that "in the advanced societies...where the road to progress lies in the direction of international integration, nationalism will have to be discarded as a rustic and clumsy tool." In 1968, Pearson told the Couchiching Conference that Canadians should work to create a new kind of internationalism rather than trying to reinforce national independence.

From these facts proceeded policies that have eroded Canadian culture, centralized power in Ottawa, fortified Quebec's moves toward sovereignty, and replaced Canada's British-style unwritten constitution with a different one in the French style that has clamped Canadians into the grip of a paternalistic welfare state.

In 1867, the Canadian fathers of Confederation — English, French, Irish and Scots — declared that they were creating a new nation. That Canada is one of the few federal liberal democracies without any provision for direct involvement of the people in constitutional change is a holdover from the British tradition that stamped the country's origins. Parliamentary sovereignty, majority rule by alternating parties, inherent freedom and responsibility under the common law that kept pace with the times — the Canadians who drew up the British North America Act of 1867 sought to avoid the conflict they had witnessed south of the border by establishing what has been called parliamentary federalism.

The Act bestowed exclusive powers upon both the Dominion and the provincial governments, while reserving to the Dominion (with an eye to the south) the power to disallow provincial acts. From the start, therefore, British North America took some pains to differentiate itself from its southern neighbor. As Douglas Verney wrote: "It avoided such American doctrines as republicanism, popular sovereignty, the separation of powers, checks and balances, and limited government. Of all the American principles, federalism alone was extracted, and only one part of federalism, the distribution of powers."

To put the difference another way: to the south, We the People and an elected senate; north of the border, Peace, Order, and Good Government, and an appointed senate. To the south, distrust of government power; to the north, deference to authority.

However, in Canada as a whole it was the coherence of the French Canadian minority in Quebec that dominated federal politics. Quebeckers' political acumen drove them to vote *en masse* for one party.

***Kenneth McDonald**, who writes from Ontario, is the author of several books on Canadian politics and culture, including* The Monstrous Trick, *($10.00 U.S. funds, post paid from APEC Books Ltd, 3080 Yonge St., Suite 5040, Toronto, ON, Canada, M4N 3N1).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Add some votes in parts of English Canada, and the favoured party was assured of victory. Between 1867 and 1988, of 34 federal elections, in all but seven the Quebec vote was solidly for one party. Since Quebeckers' attitude was "to the victor, the spoils," the winning party rewarded the province in kind. Canada became mired in the redistributive politics of socialism that reflected the statist tradition of Quebec. From the start, Canadian culture consisted of two distinct elements. For French Canadians, Quebec was the place, *la nation*. There were only four French-speaking settlements west of the Ottawa Valley before 1760, and none west of Lake Superior. The rest of the country was opened up by many peoples from the British Isles and Europe; very few from France. Those pioneers became Canadians.

"French Canadians regarded themselves as a conquered people and devoted their energies to 'the revenge of the cradle.' Between 1760 and 1960, when the world's population multiplied by four, Quebec's multiplied by 80."

As they shaped the land, and brought civilization to the wilderness, so did the land shape them; so did an English Canadian culture evolve from two sources. First was the struggle with Nature and geography. Second was the history and traditions of European civilization in general and of British parliamentary government in particular.

Two distinct strains emerged: one dynamic, and the other static. The dynamic strain comprised many peoples who became Canadian by choice and whose national characteristics blended into the evolving Canadian culture. The static strain confined itself to Quebec, where French Canadians regarded themselves as a conquered people and devoted their energies to "the revenge of the cradle." Between 1760 and 1960, when the world's population multiplied by four, Quebec's multiplied by 80. As recently as 1960, I was told by a federal civil servant who worked in northern Quebec of three brothers whose wives bore nineteen children each.

As to the dynamic strain, I can speak from the experience of meeting Canadians in England in the late 1930s when the Royal Air Force was expanding. Sprinkled among the candidates for short service commissions as pilots were Canadians who had worked their passages across the Atlantic (and many of them across Canada first) on the chance of being accepted. They were quiet, polite but blunt when necessary, practical and down to earth, independent but ready to help (but not to interfere), not class-conscious. These were the features that distinguished Canadians from other people and were the foundation of an effort in the Second World War that for sheer productivity was unmatched by any other Allied nation. Into the midst of a people marked by these admirable traits marched the two idealistic internationalists who used the singular power of a Canadian prime minister's office to change the country — Pearson and Trudeau.

In 1967, when the immigration rules were turned 180 degrees with no electoral mandate and in the face of majority rejection in opinion polls, 96.8 percent of Canadians were of British or European stock (1961 census). 1.2 percent were Native Indian and Inuit; 2 percent were Asian or not stated — 85 percent of immigrants came from Great Britain and Europe. Of 222,876 immigrants, two-thirds were independent; the remaining third were "family class" — close relatives of the independent immigrants who supported them.

A dozen years later, Liberal immigration minister Lloyd Axworthy told the Commons: "We are not trying to maintain the old stereotypes of what is a Canadian." But under the new regulations, "family class" was expanded into new classes of relatives and extended to all parts of the world. Nominated applicants were defined as sons and daughters aged 21 or over, married sons and daughters under 21, brothers and sisters, parents or grandparents under 60, nephews, nieces, uncles, aunts, and grandchildren but not cousins. A points system effectively barred independent applicants who lacked either government-defined trade or professional skills, or a job offer that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had been approved by the bureaucracy. Immigration offices abroad were required to deal first with family class applicants, second with refugees, and last with independent applicants — who might have to wait years for rulings. By 1978, independents were down to 22.4 percent of the total.

This was the sea change: from independents coming under their own steam and supporting their immediate families, to family class and refugees who were increasingly supported by agencies of the Canadian welfare state. In effect, family class immigrants were being selected by their relatives. One immigrant, who came from the Punjab in 1970, was himself the magnet for, on his estimate, "about sixty to seventy family members" who had joined him in Canada. If friends and neighbors were taken into account, his connection stretched to a few hundred immigrants. In 1992, Conservative immigration minister Bernard Valcourt said: "Last year, we only selected 16 percent of our immigrants. We need a better balance."

Nothing was done; by then the immigrant vote, and the immigration industry that catered to it, were already too strong. Canada's immigrant intake, per capita of population, is more than double that of the United States.

Between 1981 and 1991 immigrants from Europe fell to 25 percent of the total, and almost half of all immigrants came from Asia. In 1987, when 5,182 immigrants were allowed into Canada from Great Britain, 28,000 British emigrants went to Australia, whose points system encouraged independent applicants. Of the required 95 points, 70-75 were awarded to an applicant with a *bona fide* trade certificate and experience. Knowledge of English brought 15 points, age under 39 another ten. Over 80 percent of those who made an initial application to the Australian High Commission in London were approved. By contrast, an applicant with those same qualifications would have been rejected by Canada. The Canadian High Commission in London was getting about 2,000 applications every month, and about 80 percent were being rejected outright, that is, before the applicants even got the chance to fill out the forms.

In Europe, many immigration offices were closed. In the British Isles, the only immigration office was in London. The largest Canadian immigration facility abroad, with 12 Canadian officers and 34 support staff, was in New Delhi. To facilitate the processing of applications by persons outside New Delhi, the Canadian High Commission placed advertisements in Indian newspapers explaining how visitor visa applications could be obtained.

Meanwhile, by agreement with Ottawa, Quebec's static strain was reinforced by ceding control of immigration to the provincial government. A separate points system awarded 15 points for knowledge of French, two for English; 22 for "adaptability"; five for friends or relatives in Quebec; four for a French-speaking spouse; extra points for families with children under 12. At the same time, Quebec's Draconian language law made French its official language, backed by penalties for infractions, all of which led to an exodus of English-speaking Quebeckers that constitutes one of the great migrations in Canada's history.

"This was the sea change: from independents coming under their own steam and supporting their immediate families, to family class [immigrants] and refugees who were increasingly supported by agencies of the Canadian welfare state."

Even that sea change might have been accommodated by the generous traits of Canadian culture (that is to say, English Canadian culture), had it not been for an outcome of Trudeau's obsession with official English/French bilingualism. Because the English/French connotation offended the one-third of Canadians who were of neither British nor French extraction, Trudeau announced "A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework... The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vitality to our society."

This was later entrenched in his justiciable Charter which requires that it "be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."

Responsibility for preserving and enhancing that so-called heritage falls to the federal Secretary of State for Multiculturalism. Government funding enables ethnic-based pressure groups to maintain full-time staffs who then demand special treatment for intending immigrants from the groups' countries of origin, and to ensure that, once they land, the provincial education authorities teach the history, culture, and in many cases the language of the countries they came from.

The immigration revolution was done against the advice of senior civil servants, and it ignored time and time again the most detailed and authoritative reports and studies by academics, journalists, and parliamentary committees; in short, it was done not for Canada but for party. Political leaders boast about our "caring" and "compassionate" society, but never about the cost. Immigrants don't come to fill Canada's open spaces: they come to Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal, where ignorance of English and French overburdens the schools; where sheer numbers, too great and too soon, swamp the cities' infrastructure; where a glaring disproportion of elderly or otherwise unemployable immigrants stretches the social network into frequent crises; and where the taxman has been turned into a fund-raiser for Canada's paternalistic welfare state.

Canada's public debt, federal and provincial combined, and per capita of population, is at least double that of the United States. The interest on it consumes two-fifths of the taxes Canadians are forced to pay; two-fifths that brings them nothing in return: no services, no benefits, and no sign of relief in the foreseeable future.

And yet, in 1999, 86 percent of Canada's exports went to the United States; Canada took in 24 percent of U.S. exports, three times the U.S. exports to Japan. Structural differences give way to the day-to-day matters of business and travel. The ease with which citizens of English Canada and the United States intermingle in jobs, trade and leisure may owe much to their common language, but even more to a common heritage of Euro-British civilization. The celebrated "special relationship" between London and Washington is practiced by Canadians and Americans every day of the year across the 49th Parallel. With any luck it will survive the attacks of country-changing multiculturalists on both sides of the border. ■

THE WIZARD OF ID by Parker. © 2000 Creators Syndicate, reprinted by permission.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Liberal Rule Continues

Canadian Federal Election, November 27, 2000

by Mark Wegierski

The Canadian federal election largely confirmed the Liberal Party's longstanding dominance of Canadian politics. With a total of 301 seats in the federal Parliament, the Liberals (led by Jean Chretien) won a large majority of 173 seats, with 100 seats from Ontario (out of a total of 103 seats available), 37 seats from Quebec, 19 seats from the Maritimes, and 17 from Western Canada. The center-right Canadian Alliance (led by Stockwell Day) won 64 of the 91 seats available in Western Canada, and also 2 seats in Ontario. The separatist Bloc Quebecois (led by Gilles Duceppe) won 37 of 75 seats available in Quebec. The New Democratic Party, Canada's social democrats (led by Alexa McDonough) won 13 seats, 4 of them from the Maritimes, 8 from Western Canada, and 1 in Ontario. The "ultra-moderate" federal Progressive Conservatives (led by Joe Clark) won 12 seats, 9 of them from the Maritimes. (Numbers as reported on November 28.) These voting patterns could indicate that the four main regions of Canada - Western Canada, Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes, may already be seen in many ways as "distinct societies".

Immigration issues had little salience, except negatively. An Alliance candidate's "Asian invasion" comments significantly hurt Stockwell Day's campaign — only ratcheting up the ever-continuing accusations of "intolerance," "bigotry," and "racism" (although that candidate quickly withdrew from the election).

Given the left-liberal dominance in the Canadian media, in the education system (from daycare to universities), in the judiciary and justice system, in the government bureaucracies, in so-called high culture (typified by government-subsidized "CanLit"), in North American pop-culture and "youth culture," in the big Canadian banks and corporations, and in the leaderships of the main churches, any existing "small-c conservative" tendencies are being continually ground down. There is also the panoply of special interest groups who receive extensive government and some corporate funding. Even as elections come and go, the long-term trend is toward the ever-intensifying undermining of conservative and traditionalist impulses in Canada.

An election today is really a "management problem" for left-liberals — of how to assure, by any means necessary, the "anointing" into power of a preferred, center-left party. Such a center-left party has to be commonly perceived as moderate enough to attract a large portion of the general vote, but at the same time must uphold substantive elements of left-liberalism, notably in social and cultural areas. In the last decade, left-liberalism has become far more willing to concede some fiscal and economic issues to the "managerial Right" — while continuing a ferocious struggle against small-c conservatism or social conservatism. They also try to maintain, as far as possible, eviscerated, pseudo-conservative parties as the "official" Right (such as the federal Progressive Conservatives in Canada) to absorb or fragment the right-wing vote.

What can be seen is that the left-liberal attacks on notions of traditional nation, family, and religion, on the work-ethic, and on strict law and order, only grow more intense, even as these notions become increasingly attenuated in society. Perhaps the only thing that can challenge such ever-intensifying attacks is a profound chastisement of the center-left parties at the ballot box, by a substantively conservative party, that will actually try to govern in an "activist," "transformative" fashion. However, given the left-liberal dominance in so many social and cultural areas, the election of a substantively conservative government at the federal level in Canada, may indeed be perpetually stymied. In such a case, ideas of maximal regional devolution may become more salient in Canada. ■

***Mark Wegierski** is a Toronto-based writer and historian. He is a frequent contributor to* The Social Contract.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tony Blair's 'Cultural Revolution'

Breaking with tradition in the old country

by Brett M. Decker

"I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced." So said Alexander Hamilton during the debates of the American Federal Convention in 1787. The import of this great founder's statement is that the American experiment specifically, and Western democracy in general, owe their genesis to the democratic tradition in Great Britain. Today, that tradition has been seriously undermined by the Labour government's 2000 House of Lords Bill, which has effectively removed the hereditary principle within the House of Lords.

Prime Minister Tony Blair has set out to remake Britain. No traditional nuance of British culture is too small or insignificant to be guillotined for the sake of progress: the old bright red phone booths are confined to designated conservation areas; tea rooms are being replaced by fast food chains; village shops are being abandoned in favor of shopping malls; quaint police tunics and helmets are gradually being discarded for fatigues and the ceremony of monarchy is being efficiently chipped away. Blair has even engaged a tutor to help him change his middle class accent into a more downmarket monotone.

A country and people full of charm are sprinting to catch up with the dull, uniform world they had heretofore escaped. The soul of a nation is being pawned for a fleeting fashion. But abolishing the 800-year-old sitting and voting rights of hereditary peers in the House of Lords is the most ambitious connivance to date of Blair's Cultural Revolution. This is nothing less than a coup to overthrow the establishment from within.

British democracy depends on the Lords' role as a check-and-balance on the House of Commons. As with the similarly unelected U.S. Supreme Court, the House of Lords is a reflective and interpretative body. Although technically a legislative chamber, it neither crafts legislation nor makes laws, but rather weighs them for constitutional validity, suggests revisions and occasionally delays them (incidentally, the role of the U.S. Senate was crafted upon this last function). The lifelong, appointed independence of the American federal judiciary was modeled on the non-partisan, unelected and perpetually impartial nature of the hereditary Lords. In their respective countries, both are designed to inject continuity into the legal system and harness the occasionally haphazard mood of the moment common to popularly elected legislatures.

Unsurprisingly, Labour's initiative to abolish a millennium-old institution was initially patently unconstitutional. The crux of the abolition movement depended on the House of Commons single-handedly voting its brother chamber out of existence. Blair pointed to a dubious Parliament Act of 1949, in which the Commons acted alone, as a precedent, but the constitutional validity of this bill had never been affirmed by the Lords.[1] So until the Lords approved their own dissolution — which, tragically, they did on 11 November 1999 — the Government had no legal basis for the move. Blair, however, was determined to abolish the hereditary peerage whether it was legal or not.

Bad means tend to lead to bad ends. Historically, revolutions do not improve society but merely destroy order. Revolutionaries often have no blueprints for

Brett M. Decker *went to an English school (that has recently been demolished). He has been a speechwriter to Majority Whip Tom DeLay in the U.S. House of Representatives and is now a reporter in Hong Kong.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their reformed futures, and Blair is no exception. The Labour government's 1997 manifesto called for a two-part reform of the Lords, but only the first stage was defined. The first stage abolished hereditary rights, but there is still no fully worked out plan for what is to come afterwards. Dismantling a primary component of government without determining what comes next is surely a recipe for chaos.

The most common proposal for the Lords' replacement is equally fatuous. Genuflecting to egalitarianism, a popularly-elected chamber would replace the peers. This would effectively rid the parliamentary system of its only check by entrusting the entire government to one ruling majority coalition at all levels. The same result would be derived if the chamber were to be appointed totally by the Prime Minister.[2] Recently, the government devised a scheme whereby people could nominate *themselves* to be "People's Peers." At the time of writing (November) 5,000 people have applied for the dozen or so positions on offer.

Whatever happens, it now seems possible that Britain may get a one-party government by rubber-stamp. This means that making radical changes would become easier, which is part of the reason Labour wanted hereditary prerogatives done away with in the first place: peers tend to be cautious, and are far less susceptible to party political pressures and considerations.

The House of Lords has often derailed or hindered major Blair government initiatives, including the planned extradition of General Pinochet to Spain and the plans to outlaw fox-hunting.[3] Even in the wake of Blair's Bill, the House has not been a pushover. Recently, in a big blow to the government, several of whose members are evangelizing homosexuals, the remaining hereditary peers[4] in combination with independent-minded Labour and cross-bench peers managed to prevent Labour from repealing Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act.[5]

Blair's ambition to centralize power dictatorially around himself has been assisted by ridding himself of the irritating nobility. It is because of this very danger that Alexis de Tocqueville — a radical democrat — defended the English aristocracy: their existence protects individual liberty by opposing any tendency toward centralized state power.

But practical and historical defenses of the institution fail to take into account the ideological battle-lines underlying the controversy. The principal motivation for abolishing the hereditary principle in the Lords was the modern mania of egalitarianism.

Too Much Diversity?

This is an excerpt from a speech given by Professor Paul Ehrlich to the Australian Population Association's 10th biennial conference, November 29-December 1, 2000, in Melbourne. Denis McCormack, Australian correspondent for The Social Contract, attended. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Science Unit audio-taped Professor Erhlich and has advised that edited highlights will be broadcast sometime in 2001.

"I like diversity of cultures. On the other hand, in the United States, I think we may have gone too far, because the cultures are tending to stay together and are fighting with each other at horrendous levels and I don't like to see that at all. So, I'm not sure whether we need any more diversity in the United States and whether it's wise to encourage any more diversity in the United States. At any rate, I think the basic problem in the United States, which is a very serious one, is what you do to control immigration because, of course, we have two very large, undefended land borders and very long coastlines. Whatever the policy is, as I say, people have to decide on the policy themselves; whatever this policy is, it's going to be extremely difficult to bring about in a world where you have such enormous differences in income. People and goods flow up, flow from poor areas to rich areas, and so the answer to U.S. immigration, as far as I'm concerned, isn't walls, borders, or rules; it's working as hard as we can to get to the solution.

"When the rich-poor gap is closed then you can make your decisions about immigration on entirely different bases, and i think most of the conflict will simply disappear. The problem is that as long as we allow huge areas of poverty in the world, then the people in the rich islands are going to have 'immigration problems.' So, what we ought to be doing is not worrying so much about the immigration as worrying about closing that rich-poor gap."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not even Blair has ever suggested that the House was inefficient or incompetent — merely inappropriate. The modern world of political correctness simply leaves no room for the hereditary principle or any other notion of inherited privilege. Increased property taxes, inheritance taxes and progressive taxation of all kinds (not to mention affirmative action) are now utilized worldwide in an attempt to ensure total equality in the future.

"But despite Blair, England cannot be separated from its great past — nor can the United States. True progress builds upon history rather than erasing it."

This egalitarian ideology flatly contradicts common sense. One need only look at any two or three people randomly assembled together and the intrinsic inequality among all men is obvious. Inherently, some men are more intelligent, more courageous, better looking, more athletic, more popular, richer, more healthy and even more virtuous than their contemporaries. From our first breath until our last, we are born with these inequalities — most of which are inherited from our forebears. Regardless of the intentions of the Declaration of Independence, few statements in history have been as patently preposterous as the notion that "all men are created equal." Socialists and social engineers, however, are attempting constantly to drag us all down to the same debased level.

There can be little doubt that since the hereditary peers have been abandoned the monarchy has become much more vulnerable. There can be no coherent defense for the continued existence of a hereditary monarch in a system stripped of its hereditary aristocratic classes. The clock seems to be ticking against the Queen. One day, when the London fog clears, Olde England may simply have ceased to exist.

Fidel Castro stated nearly 40 years ago that "revolution is a struggle to the death between the future and the past." These words could easily come from the mouth of Tony Blair today. But despite Blair, England cannot be separated from its great past — nor can the United States. True progress builds upon history rather than erasing it. At her founding, the innocence of America was the by-product of 1,000 years of experience in England. Not only does abdication of English tradition entail a loss for American democratic history, but structural turmoil in Westminster also poses a potential security threat by rendering unstable Washington's most dependable ally. Discarding tradition (especially constitutional tradition) does have practical and often unforeseen consequences.

In a disposable world where nothing is held sacred, tradition has an indispensable role. Whether it be sexual mores, the family, religion, nation-states or even the House of Lords, the building blocks of our great modern society rest on the foundation of Western tradition. Persistently remove stones from this foundation and eventually the whole house will come down. Abolishing the hereditary principle in the House of Lords is one more attack against the roots of British (and American) democratic order and another step forward for radical egalitarianism. ■

NOTES

[1] Acting unilaterally and therefore illegally, in 1949 the Commons nationalized the steel industry — giving credence to their Lordships' 2000 argument that Blair's precedent was bogus.

[2] This latter idea seems now to have been dropped, following fierce media criticism.

[3] Contrary to Labour propaganda, hereditary peers are by no means all slavish Conservatives. During the years 1989 to 1997, the House of Lords also hindered or prevented hundreds of Tory government initiatives.

[4] Ninety-two hereditary peers obtained a temporary reprieve after Viscount Cranborne, then Tory leader in the House of Lords, worked out a secret deal with Labour without the knowledge of Conservative leader William Hague.

[5] Section 28 forbids local authorities from using public money to promote homosexuality. If Labour wins the next election, it will have the opportunity of creating more peers for the following parliamentary session, who will help the government to force through Section 28's repeal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Anglo-America's Ambiguous Triumph

Yesterday's winners may become tomorrow's losers

Books Reviewed by Mark Wegierski

Among the central points of *The Cousins' Wars* is that "[t]he great formative events in the rise of England and then of the United States ... were wars — bitter, fratricidal wars — accompanied by Puritan and abolitionist sermons and battle hymns and principally fought to change the shape of internal politics, liberty, and religion." It was through the three cousins' wars — the English Civil War of 1640-1649 (and its follow-up in 1688), the American Revolution of 1775-1783, and the U.S. Civil War of 1861-1865 — that the English-speaking world critically reshaped itself.

> *Broadly, the result was to uphold political liberties, commercial progress, technological inventiveness, linguistic ambition and territorial expansion ... from the seventeenth century, the English-speaking peoples on both continents defined themselves by wars that upheld, at least for a while, a guiding political culture of Low Church, Calvinistic Protestantism, commercially adept, militarily expansionist, and highly convinced, in Old World, New World, or both, that it represented a chosen people and a manifest destiny. In the full three-century context, Cavaliers, aristocrats, and bishops pretty much lost and Puritans, Yankees, self-made entrepreneurs, Anglo-Saxon nationalists, and expansionists had the edge, especially in America... There is also an unmistakable thread of ethnocultural continuity: First, East Anglia led the Parliamentary side in the partly successful English Civil War. Later, New England, East Anglia's seventeenth century Puritan offshoot, was the most aggressive formulator of the American rebellion (and this time, instead of Puritanism being crushed by the Restoration of 1660, New England Yankeedom triumphed and expanded). Finally, in the 1860s, Greater New England — a cultural region now stretching west through New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Minnesota to Oregon and Puget Sound — won the battle to control the expansion and orientation of the United States into the mid-twentieth century."* (pp.xiii-xv)

The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America
by Kevin Phillips
New York: Basic Books
707 pages, $28.95

The Roots of American Order
(third edition)
by Russell Kirk
Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway
540 pages, $14.95

Is Blood Thicker Than Water?
by James M. McPherson
Toronto: Vintage Canada
90 pages, $14.95

Phillips' entire book is an elaboration of this grand thesis — of the Puritan, Anglo-Saxon march of progress, culminating in "the triumph of Anglo-America" (ie, primarily the U.S. and Britain, and, secondarily, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Phillips also pays attention to the various losers — the Celtic fringe of the British Isles, especially Ireland; Roman Catholicism (many native Irish lost their attachments to Catholicism in the unsettled and intolerant conditions of the New World); the American South;

Mark Wegierski *is a Toronto-based writer and historian. He is a frequent contributor to* The Social Contract

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American blacks and Indians; and even Germany (because America absorbed and assimilated tens of millions of Germans that might have well-served Germany's future).

Phillips supports his arguments with a mass of demographic, political, electoral and sociological data. Unfortunately, there are some obvious errors in the details (eg, about the numbers of Federal troops stationed in the South during Reconstruction, p.476). Phillips' grand narrative pretty well rolls over the reader in a crescendo of WASP celebration. However, it is more difficult to see an unalloyed world-historical triumph of Anglo-America in the 1960s and after — certainly not in the sense in which it was earlier conceived.

Russell Kirk's View

Russell Kirk's *The Roots of American Order* reaches further back than Phillips, to the ancient Hebrews, although Phillips also argued that the U.S. was heavily influenced by Protestant reading of the Old Testament, seeing itself as a "Chosen People" and a "New Israel." After introducing the necessity of order as "the first need of all," Kirk moves on to look at "The Law and the Prophets," and their link to the Massachusetts founding. Burke's view that the main American tradition constituted "the dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion" (p.47) is cited. The author then traces roots through the ancient Greeks, the Romans, Christianity, and then "the light of the Middle Ages."

Successive chapters return to "The Refomers' Drum," the English Civil War period, and the Glorious Revolution. The "salutary neglect" of the Thirteen Colonies by Britain is seen as challenged by George III's and the British Parliament's policies. Further roots of American order are found in such Eighteenth Century intellects as Montesquieu (the exponent of the division of powers); Hume (a sceptic who supported tradition); Blackstone (the leading authority on British common law); and Burke (who was sympathetic to the American colonists, but also later opposed the French Revolution).

In his chapter on the "Declaration and Constitution" — where the main idea is that the American conflict was "a revolution not made, but prevented" (p.296) — this was also Burke's term for the Glorious Revolution of 1688 — Kirk tries to accentuate the aristocratic aspects of early American character quoting, for example, John Randolph of Roanoke: "I am an aristocrat: I love liberty, I hate equality" (p.318). (Today's U.S. "paleoconservative" John Randolph Club is named after him.) Chapter XII on "Contending against American Disorder" includes panegyrics to Lincoln.

The last major thinker examined is Orestes Brownson, who, while he condemned socialism, cherished the value of community. Looking at the same historical events as Phillips, Russell Kirk is able to give a more conservative cast to what Phillips saw as the unalloyed WASP and liberal march of progress. Russell Kirk claims that "...[a]s an instrument of order, the Constitution of the United States would be more successful than any other formal written device in the history of mankind" (p.431). He also says that, even at the time of the writing of his book (the third edition appeared in 1991) "...the general character of American order remains little altered" (p.482).

Kirk's book is weighty, including a foreword, notes for each chapter, an epilogue by Frank Shakespeare, a list of suggested readings, a chronology, a note of acknowledgement, a note about the author and an extensive index.

Crises of Nationalism

James M. McPherson, acclaimed as one of the leading current historians of the American Civil War (he won the Pulitzer Prize for non-fiction for *The Battle Cry of Freedom*) offers a fairly slender book, based on his Barbara Frum Lectureship address in 1998 (under the aegis of the History Department of the University of Toronto).

The main themes of the book are an extended comparison between the movement for Southern secession in the 1850s, and the Quebec separatist movement in today's Canada; and an examination of the Cavalier, anti-Puritan theme in the self-definition of Southern secessionists. The book is based heavily on a comparison of civic as opposed to ethnic nationalism, that is, the notion of a multi-ethnic citizenry united by political rights (the United States or Canada) versus a polity where membership is defined by ethnicity (for example, the Southern Confederacy or Quebec). This divide of civic or ethnic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalism is taken from Michael Ignatieff's *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (reviewed in *The Social Contract*, vol.IV, no.3 (Spring 1994), pp.223-224).

In the current context, making a comparison between Quebec and the American South in the 1850s is highly insulting to Quebecois nationalists, who, it should be remembered, were for many decades second-class citizens in their own province, and are certainly not upholding slavery. There is a presumed condemnation of ethnic nationalism — such as that of Quebec or the white South — as an "artificial," "constructed," "arbitrary" identity. The recounting of the Norman-Cavalier versus Saxon-Puritan conceptions is intended to make the South look ridiculous. Yet, can the present-day models of multicultural regimes, with their panoply of increasingly exotic rights, and all kinds of doublethink, be seen as any more natural?

The line between civic and ethnic nationalism is probably not that easy to draw. Some would argue that the political tradition of civic nationalism which emerged in Britain, America, and Republican France, could only occur out of the matrix of more primordial ethnic factors, and that the numerical decrease of the various 'charter-groups' will almost invariably cause a recursion to more primal ethnic definitions.

Today, the excesses of Anglo-Saxon liberalism and morality appear to have overwhelmed most of the European and European-descended societies, *via* the American empire. It could be argued that the earlier success of the Anglo-Saxons has actually aided "the suicide of the West." Without the earlier triumph of Anglo-Saxon liberalism and mores, the subsequent evolution of history would perhaps have been much different. (For example, France, Ireland, and a royalist, Catholic European tradition might have been more prominent.)

It could be argued that today only various designated minorities are truly valued within most states with European majorities, while the rights of European minorities outside those states are viewed as irrelevant (as recently seen, for example, in Zimbabwe). What may be highly ironic is that Latin America is among the last regions on earth which values its European-descended population. Virtually all of the Latin American societies have pronounced "caste" systems. It may also be pointed out that in Russia and some of the east-central European states, the respective European majorities are clearly treated with respect, although this is often accompanied by strong dislike for their neighbors, who are also European (the classic example being Croatia versus Serbia).

The notion that there can be a viable democratic state without there being a majority group of long-standing history and duration (that sets the tone for the culture and practices of the society as a whole) appears highly questionable. The multi-ethnic state will tend to be either a traditional monarchy or empire (in earlier times), a caste-society, or the current-day bureaucratic regime, mostly favoring only designated "minorities" — who may often end up as the numerical majority. Indeed, if the current sociopolitical, demographic and immigration trends are extrapolated unchanged into the future, most European groups might well become powerless and despised minorities in their own countries.

"The notion that there can be a viable democratic state without there being a majority group of long-standing history and duration (that sets the tone for the culture and practices of the society as a whole) appears highly questionable."

Even purely civic nationalism (which is said to be characterized by "equal rights for *all*") may be under stress from multiculturalism (with its claims to group-rights) and a more radical decentralization, especially at a time of massive, vastly dissimilar immigration into European countries (a situation clearly very different from that prevailing previously). Those societies such as the United States, which appear to have triumphed in the world-historical struggle, and appear to be in the main line of the march of progress,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may, ironically, be subject to ever-fiercer condemnation by multiculturalist, hypermodern forces, and be more prone to a near-total transformation of their identities. This tendency is exemplified by the re-conceptualization of the United States and its earlier notions of "exceptionalism" in terms of "the first universal nation" — which is said to be characterized by loyalty to a liberal idea — rather than to ethnicity. It may be somewhat harder to describe Slavs, Celts and Latins as inveterate oppressors, or to reconfigure their political cultures in hyper-universalist directions. So the new foci for defending European civilization may indeed be shifting to the Slavic, Celtic, and Latin "fringes" or peripheries — as opposed to Anglo-America, which could be seen today as a curious mixture of technological and economic prowess combined with social and cultural decline.

American patriots may perhaps hope for a recovery of some earlier fragments of the national identity. The U.S. continues to be a country where Christian religious belief holds a great deal of sway — and Catholics today are welcomed into the broader Christian alliance. The longstanding Anglo-Saxon tradition of responsible individualism and sound democracy (with its emphasis on self-government and "the free yeomanry") may also have some resonance. There are also elements of the progressive and social scientific traditions in America that could be seen as supportive of American nationalism.

Considering these various factors, neither a total condemnation nor total celebration of Anglo-America is apposite. ■

EU May Spell End to Britain's Sovereignty

by Robert Stacy McCain

Americans who think their society is going to hell should pay attention to Great Britain, which is already there, according to Peter Hitchens.

Not only is Britain infested with many of the same problems — bad schools, rampant illegitimacy, political correctness — that worry conservatives in this country, but the nation of Shakespeare and Churchill may be about to vote itself out of existence.

"We are on the threshold of national abolition and the merger of Britain into the European Union," says Mr. Hitchens, a veteran journalist for the London *Daily Express.*

"The European Union actually has far more in common with the old U.S.S.R. than it does with the U.S.A.," he says. "Its so-called Parliament is much more like the Supreme Soviet than the U.S. Congress. And its Cpuncil of Ministers and the Commission, where power really lies, are not democratically accountable. And now it's launching a new currency that seems to be modeled on the ruble."

The prospect that the United Kingdom might abandon its sovereignty to the European Union horrifies Mr. Hitchens and most other British conservatives, but they are nearly powerless to stop the process, he explains.

The prospect that the Torries can recapture Parliament from Tony Blair's Labor Party are "very Slim," says Mr. Hitchens, in Washington recently to promote his new book, *The Abolition of Britain: From Winston Churchill to Princess Diana.*"

British conservatives "are not united on the cultural and social

---

***Robert Stacy McCain** is a syndicated columnist. This article, ©2000, is reprinted by permission from News World Communications.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issues that I discuss in the book," he says. Among other things, they are divided about homosexual rights, feminism and drug policy. And some of the measures implemented in the 1980s and '90s by Tory Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major are disastrous, in Mr. Hitchens' view.

"Many of the worst changes in our education system were made under the Conservative government, and some of the worst attacks on the married family were made under the Conservative government, using the tax system to de-privilege marriage," he says.

American conservatives are both stronger and more interested in cultural issues than their British counterparts, Mr. Hitchens says.

"Here, there's a conservative counterculture that hits back ... But in Britain, the conservative culture is embattled and sort of complacent."

"The book grew from an essay in which Mr. Hitchens compared the 1965 funeral of Winston Churchill — a solemn, dignified event — to the hysterical emotionalism of the 1997 funeral of Princess Diana. ... the two events took place in 'completely different countries'..."

A spokesman for the British Embassy in Washington declined to comment on Mr. Hitchens' book.

The book — published in the United States by Encounter Books — was intended to shake British conservatives from their complacency. The book certainly outraged British liberals.

"Our leading liberal daily published no fewer than four hostile articles about it, which I took as a compliment," Mr. Hitchens says. "They saw it quite rightly as a well-targeted attack on everything they stand for. Until now, they've got away with the cultural assault because conservatives haven't been interested in it."

The book grew from an essay in which Mr. Hitchens compared the 1965 funeral of Winston Churchill — a solemn, dignified event — to the hysterical emotionalism of the 1997 funeral of Princess Diana. Though separated by little more than three decades, he says, the two events took place in "completely different countries. ...Britain had changed so much, it had become a foreign country."

The difference, he suggests, is that the left had "taken over cultural power largely unnoticed" in the past 30 years.

Mr. Hitchens knows about the left. His older brother is left-wing journalist Christopher Hitchens.

"Neither of us is in the mainstream or ever will be," Peter Hitchens says. "What we both have is independence of mind, which means that you are very likely to dislike the same thing, especially fraudulence in politics, but you are not likely to like the same things. We both despise (President) Clinton. We both believe in principle — saying what you mean and meaning what you say. That's quite rare in modern politics."

The younger Mr. Hitchens was himself a left-winger until the 1980s, when British labor unions refused to support Lech Walesa and the Polish shipyard workers in their stand against the Soviet Union.

"It just seemed to me that social democracy had much more in common with anti-democratic Communism than it liked to admit, and I couldn't call myself a socialist any more after that," he says.

The Abolition of Britain explores what Mr. Hitchens calls his country's "cultural revolution" in entertainment, education, politics, language, manners and sexual morality. As in America, political correctness now reigns in Merrie Olde England.

"The liberal mind believes that a person's character can be judged by his opinions, and is fantastically intolerant," Mr. Hitchens says. "This is why political correctness is not a joke — I always get very irritated when people make fun of it. It's actually an elaborate system to make certain thoughts unthinkable by first making them unsayable,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and it does this by making opinions into a character issue."

"Therefore, if you oppose homosexual equality, you are a, quote, homophobe. If you don't buy the extreme feminist agenda, then you're a sexist."

Mr. Hitchens cites history textbooks as an example of how much Britain has changed.

"A nation is the sum of its memories," he says, explaining how patriotism has been purged from the British curriculum. "The teaching of history in British schools and colleges has been transformed into ... an entirely critical slandering of the past."

The egalitarian ideals of socialism now control how history is taught to British children, he says. "The whole idea of hierarchy ... is derided to make it seem a matter of guilt."

Education "was changed because the cultural left saw education as a social engineering project," Mr. Hitchens says. "They wanted to create a classless society in which people were brought up to believe in equality, and it didn't matter if they couldn't spell, read, write or count — which most them now can't. ...It's failing to teach people to spell, then telling them how good they are."

Conservatives typically retreat in the face of such socialist criticism, he says. "Conservatism often doesn't have any moral confidence in itself. It secretly accepts its opponents constant claims that there is something selfish and wicked about wealth and authority."

This is a major problem of Britain's Conservative Party, according to Mr. Hitchens. "They don't really believe their own case. Persuading some conservatives that you don't have to be a socialist to be a good person is not an easy thing to do. This is my great advantage, that I've been a socialist and I know it's not true."

His book "shows how easy it is for an established civilization to overthrow itself by failing to care," Mr. Hitchens says. "It's a danger that faces the U.S. as much as Britain. I would hate to see what has happened to us happen to you."

The rise of the European Union is a threat to both Great Britain and the United States, he says. "I hope to alert American conservatives to the eminent creation of a potentially hostile new socialist superstate on the continent of Europe," Mr. Hitchens says.

"There's been a general feeling here that the European Union is in some way good for America — easier to deal with and understand than a lot of squabbling nations — and flattering because superficially it appears to be an imitation of the U.S.A. "Actually, it's driven by a profound jealousy of America, amounting in France, at least, to something like hostility." ■

Importing Poverty

America's immigration policy, which has facilitated substantial flows of people with little education and few skills, particularly from Latin America, has aggravated the poverty problem. The creativity and diligence of East Asian immigrants and their rapid assimilation, are clearly a national asset. But with 30 percent of Hispanics below the poverty line, it can be argued that we have imported a poverty problem as well as a cultural problem.

Moreover, unskilled immigrants accept lower salaries and fewer benefits, and they place downward pressure on wages at the lower end that makes it more difficult for poor citizens to escape poverty. The late Barbara Jordan, who chaired the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, was particularly concerned about this problem; her commission recommended lower levels of legal immigration, redoubled efforts to stem illegal immigration, and more emphasis on skills in deciding who gets to immigrate.

— from "The Cultural Roots of Poverty"
by Lawrence Harrison
The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1999

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What's In a Name?

Maybe a lot if you're British

by Alexander MacLeod

The inside of the magistrate's court on central London's Horseferry Road has a definite feeling of diversity.

The presiding judge, a white woman, is flanked by two black male associates. The ebony-skinned court clerk was born in Britain to African parents. The usher hails from the Indian subcontinent. Among those before them are a fair-skinned English teenager accused of drawing a knife on a policeman; a female migrant from Crotia facing shoplifting charges and three brothers from West Africa, accused of making false claims in applying for British passports.

But, in a nation of 57 million where only 4 million are members of racial minorities, does such a scene give a misleading impression of ethnic diversity?

The issue behind such questions is being furiously debated in the wake of a government-sponsored report that urges Prime Minister Tony Blair to declare Britain a multicultural society. More controversial is its suggestion that the word "British" should be scrapped.

"Britishness," the report concludes, "has largely unspoken racial connotations. Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that ... Britishness is racially coded."

A white complexion and Britishness, the report asserts, "go together like roast beef and Yorkshire pudding," and the time has come to accept the "growing ethnic diversity of [United Kingdom] society."

It's not clear what term would be used instead, but the Commission into the Future of Multiethnic Britain, which published its report October 11, apparently didn't anticipate the sharp reaction to such ideas. Gerald Howarth, a senior opposition Conservative member of the House of Commons home affairs committee, said the report was "an extraordinary affront" to the "94 percent of our population which is not from ethnic minorities," adding, "The native British must stand up for themselves." Philip Johnston, political editor of London's right-wing Daily Telegraph newspaper, calls the report "a cauldron of political correctness."

Lord Parekh, the Indian-born chairman of the commission, insists that his panel is merely asking the nation to face ethnic realities and rethink its imperial past. The decision to mount a detailed study of race relations was taken in 1998. At the time, the police, civil service, and judiciary were under fire for institutional racism. Unemployment and crime levels were rising among minority groups from Africa and the Caribbean.

A member of the commission, who did not wish to be identified, explains, his book "shows how easy it is for an established civilization to overthrow itself by failing to care," Mr. Hitchens says. "It's a danger that faces the U.S. as much as Britain. I would hate to see what has happened to us happen to you."

The inquiry was organized by the Runnymede Trust, a charity long involved in racial issues. It is named for the spot near London where King John signed the Magna Carta, a guarantee of rights and rule of law, in 1215.

The 400-page report makes 138 recommendations intended to improve ethnic "inclusivity." Among them: an equality commission, backed by a single equality law, to cover all unlawful discrimination; an independent police complaints body; and a requirement that television franchise holders appoint a specified number of black and Asian staff.

***Alexander MacLeod** is the author of this column from* The Christian Science Monitor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Blair's aides said he greeted the "main body" of the Runnymede report with enthusiasm, but thought its conclusions on Britishness were "a diversion from the main issues" facing the nation. Later, Home Secretary Jack Straw hardened the official response, saying, "I am proud of what I believe to be the best of British values." Downing Street sources say the prime minister is on the side of those who want to redefine what being British means (after all, it was he who coined the catchphrase "Cool Britannia"). But with a general election expected next year, he is leery of ditching the roast beef and Yorkshire pudding approach to Britishness. ■

Reformers Target Great Britain's History/Landscape

by Suzanne Fields

There'll always be an England, and that's a comfort in a world whirling ever faster with change. We all need verities to hang on to.

The English invented wackiness, and the little old lady in tennis shoes, always thought to have originated in Pasadena, actually immigrated to California from England. There's new proof.

A formal government body, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, has delivered itself of recommendations on how to fix what may, or may not, be broke in British society, and it could only have sprung from the head of an English relative of that famous little old lady in Pasadena.

Kate Gavron is the wife of Lord Gavron, who contributed more than a million dollars to the Labor Party in the election that put Tony Blair in as prime minister. So Lady Gavron was appointed vice chairman of the commission to find out what it means to be English, and maybe even British. Not much, the commission learned.

You could have fooled some of us. We've always associated England with Shakespeare, the Magna Carta, Lord Nelson and Trafalgar and all that. If you throw in the *King James Bible* and the *Oxford English Dictionary* of the language of the race of kings, pretty soon you're talking about a pretty impressive bit of the legacy of Western civilization. And I haven't even mentioned Monty Python, Benny Hill, Fawlty Towers and the Beatles.

But no. Britain must "revise, rethink or jettison" its history because much of it is bad and might hurt the feelings of a newcomer. Members of minorities were left out of a lot of the history (probably because they were not around at the time), and Britons should henceforth regard themselves not as a community, but as a "community of communities." Britons, "who never shall be slaves," should henceforth refrain from even regarding themselves as British, because the very word has "racist connotations." And "English" is even worse, how much worse you don't want to know.

Lady Gavron has a nifty idea for making race relations smooth overnight. "It would be great," she told the London *Daily Telegraph*, "if Prince Charles had been told to marry someone black, imagine what that message would have sent out."

We can't imagine. If the prince, or anyone else, wants to marry someone black, or pink or green, you might think a lady, particularly a "Lady," would not expect him to conform to a quota system in such intimate affairs of the heart. Besides, why should a black, pink or green woman feel

---

***Suzanne Fields** is distributed by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

good about a marriage designed to make her feel white? That's racist, not romantic, it seems to me.

"We need to acknowledge that there are different ways of looking at history," Lady Gavron says. "The problem with the empire was the inequality of power. It was something we did to the Indians and Africans, not with them."

It's not clear what the Indians and Africans think of all this, but we can imagine. Like all immigrants, they left their homes in search of a better life, and probably thought Britain, bad history, Shakespeare, the Magna Carta, the Beatles and all, was a good place to look for it.

Lady Gavron seems sympathetic in spite of herself, up to a point. She doesn't want to give up her husband's title, of course. She rails about the peerage, but only the hereditary peerage, which her husband's is not. His title will die with him.

"We should keep the name Trafalgar Square. If you got rid of everything bad you would have nothing at all. We'd have to start losing the Norman names, too, if we were being purist. I love the hymns, such as 'Jerusalem' and 'I Vow to Thee My Country.' I am embarrassed by the words, but the music is wonderful," she says.

Ordinarily, no one would be obliged to treat any of this as anything more than the daydreams of eccentrics with their arteries going hard and with nothing to do at teatime. But some people in London have been acting a little strange lately.

A year ago consultants urged British Airways to jettison the Union Jack emblem on its jetliners because Britain ought to quit thinking of itself as a nation and regard itself as a "brand," like Coca-Cola. And the government did pay for this new study and is trying to appear to be taking it seriously.

What this may mean is that political correctness, like most American cultural junk, has taken a long time to cross the Atlantic. The British often get American stuff slightly askew, as any visitor to London who has wandered into the Old Kentucky Pancake House looking for old Kentucky pancakes, or Wimpy's looking for a hamburger that Wimpy would recognize, could tell you. Maybe we should just take it as entertainment. While we still can. ■

What's Wrong With Having an England?

by Paul Craig Roberts

There won't always be an England or a United States. Both are already fading, not from military conquest but from their own immigration policy.

Paul Craig Roberts, Ph.D., *is a syndicated columnist. ©2000 by Creators Syndicate. Reprinted by permission.*

Demographers have calculated that by the end of this century the English people will be a minority in their homeland. The English are not having enough children to reproduce themselves. In contrast, the "people of color" who have flooded into England have a high fertility rate. Non-whites will comprise a majority of the population of London in just nine years.

It is amazing how fast it is happening. Half a century ago there were a few tens of thousands of non-whites in the entirety of Great Britain. In another half century there will be the beginnings of a black government. What will be the fate of the white minority after decades of being demonized as "white racists" by their own kind at Oxford, Cambridge, and the University of London?

The English may be finished as a people, but they still have twice as long as American whites.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Demographers predict that whites will comprise a minority of the U.S. population by mid-century. It has already happened in California and in many cities.

Like the English, American whites are failing to reproduce. More than 42 percent of American women of child-bearing age are childless. The figure is rising as gender quotas and the breakdown of marriage and family pull more white women into career paths that don't lead to children.

Examining the situation, the London Observer said that this is "the first time in history that a major indigenous population has voluntarily become a minority, rather than through war, famine or disease."

It is amazing that the two most important and powerful countries of the past two centuries have legislated their own path to extinction. But it is astounding that it is occurring in the same two countries where intellectuals prattle on endlessly about the need for diversity. There are many more non-white countries than white ones, yet, it is the white ones that are slated to disappear.

What's wrong with having an England? What a colorful land and unique place! What character and genius! The cradle of the rule of law and representative democracy! The font of the scientific and technological revolutions! It is absurd to think these accomplishments are happenstance unrelated to Englishness. Do we really need another black country, another India, or a mixture of the two? Why can't we keep England English for diversity's sake?

And the United States. What other country has such a strong sense of right and wrong, and such determination to see justice done all over the world? Who but the United States sends its treasure, not as tribute to the powerful but as gifts to the poor? What other country sends its troops to stop genocides and wars in foreign lands? Central and South America are full of Hispanic populations. Do we really need another one here?

What is it that compels the United States and England to destroy themselves with an immigration policy designed to replace the indigenous population with different racial stock? In these two lands agitators fight to preserve every wetlands weed, sand fly and snail darter. What's wrong with preserving England and America?

People had better give this some thought, because the decision won't be theirs to make for much longer.

The 21st century may bring the extinction of white populations. Confined to a small area of the world, white populations are everywhere in decline. Italy, once a fecund Catholic nation where a large family was everything, has such a low birth rate that its population is declining. Everywhere else in Europe birth rates have fallen below replacement rates. European governments open the borders to Third World immigrants in order to keep a tax base for the expensive social welfare systems that have crowded children out of the household budget of the indigenous population. Canada also is well on her way to becoming a Third World country.

Russia, too, has a declining population reeling from environmental and economic destruction after 75 years of communist rule. Pressed on her eastern and southern borders by Asiatic populations, Russia is slowly retreating from her empire.

In the far Pacific, two island nations, New Zealand and Australia, hang on to an exported British culture. Perhaps they will be preserved, like the Galapagos Islands, as a place where creatures reside who have disappeared elsewhere. ■

[*Editor's Note: Australia is not exempt from the cultural changes that Britain and the United States are undergoing. A special issue of The Social Contract (Vol.VIII, No.2, Winter 1997-98) considered "Australia's Identity Crisis" in which several Australian writers illuminated the push toward multiculturalism and the ultimate "Asianization" of that continent.*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Language as the Entry Point for the Debate

Population numbers, immigration policy, culture

by K.C. McAlpin

A few weeks ago I was listening to a story on National Public Radio about the citizen's initiative to ban bilingual education in the State of Arizona. The reporter said that the initiative's supporters were convinced that the evidence was in, that test scores proved that Arizona's bilingual education program was failing to do what it was created to do — teach non-English speaking children to speak English. So the initiative's supporters were saying the bilingual education program should be scrapped in favor of English immersion classes, which was succeeding in states like California where bilingual education had been done away with by a similar initiative two years earlier.

I'm sure most of you are familiar with the argument. But what caught my attention was the fact that when the reporter presented the other side — the supporters of bilingual education — they didn't try to defend the program by saying that it just needed better trained teachers, smaller class sizes, or billions more in tax dollars — the same old arguments we are used to hearing from the NEA. No! They said that doing away with bilingual education would be harmful because it would *cut off children's linguistic and cultural ties to their native countries*. Whether or not children learn English in American public schools is really beside the point. You see, the great fear of the multiculturalists is that these kids will grow up speaking English, forget that they're foreigners, and start thinking of themselves as Americans. That's what bilingual education is designed to stop. It's not to teach English. It's to prevent whole generations of immigrant school children from assimilating. If you teach them English, allow them to get a good education, grow up and earn a decent living, buy a house and start living the American dream — *Watch Out!* They could end up thinking like that Hispanic quoted in the *San Jose Mercury News* story on the poll they did about Hispanic attitudes toward illegal immigration. He was a former illegal alien himself who got a green card in the 1986 amnesty, but now he wants to slam the door on illegal immigration! "You see," the multiculturalists say, "we can't trust them! Without us, immigrants might morph into patriotic Americans right before our very eyes!"

Unfortunately, the multiculturalists aren't the only ones concerned about keeping people segregated into cultural and linguistic ghettos, which are constantly growing thanks to new arrivals from abroad. The *San Jose Mercury News* also reported recently on a growing trend among California's East Indian population. The trend is for parents to send their children back to India to go to school so the children can learn about their true culture and heritage. According to the article, the chief worry of the Indian parents who do this is the fear that their daughters, in particular, might start dating when they grow up and resist the Indian practice of arranged marriages. The newspaper called the phenomenon "reverse assimilation."

Well, I have another word for it. When people settle in a foreign country with little or no intention of abandoning their native culture, or, increasingly, no intention of abandoning their native language and native political allegiance, the correct word for the process isn't "reverse assimilation." And it isn't

***K. C. McAlpin** is executive director of ProEnglish, a national membership organization supporting English as our common language (ProEnglish.org). This speech was given at The Social Contract Writer's Workshop, November 11, 2000.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"immigration." The correct word in the English language is "colonization," because that's exactly what it is.

I believe that the American people are increasingly aware that parts of their country are being colonized by alien cultures — often with the assistance of their own government — and they are increasingly upset about it. And, we should be. Do you want your grandchildren or their children to be born into a culture that imposes arranged marriages? Or live in a country torn by the kind of violent religious persecution and political violence we see in countries like India today? That's hardly out of the question. According to recent estimates, the number of Muslims living in the United States already outnumbers the number of Jews. This colonization by alien cultures is only possible because of mass immigration. Without it the threat would disappear.

"This colonization of our land by alien cultures is only possible because of mass immigration."

Now, I'm not here to tell you that people are worried about the loss of English as our common language. Or that bilingualism or multilingualism represent something far more troubling than simple misguided attempts to accommodate non-English speaking immigrants while they learn how to be Americans. I think you know that. I'm here to tell you that it's time to expose this racket for what it really is — the growing occupation of our land by alien cultures which, thanks to mass immigration, are thumbing their nose at the very idea of assimilation. And that means participating in the movement to preserve English as our common language and make it the language of government in the United States.

I believe that by doing so, we will unmask the enemy's true purpose, which is not immigration at all — but the colonization of our nation by any number of very different populations — populations which are very likely to be in conflict with each other on the basis of language, culture, religion, and ethnicity. A situation that will require — not coincidentally — a large, all-powerful government to keep peace between the contending groups.

Let's look again at the Arizona initiative to ban bilingual education. Arizona is considered a safe Republican State. Republicans hold both of its U.S. Senate seats, the governor's office, both houses of the state Assembly, most of the congressional seats, and almost all of its statewide offices. But in winning the state, George W. Bush got barely 50 percent of the vote there.

On the other hand, Proposition 203 — the initiative banning bilingual education — was opposed by Arizona's top elected officials, all the state's major newspapers, the typical array of pressure groups, including notably native American groups, and was outspent nearly 10-1 in the months leading up to the election. But Proposition 203 won by a margin of 63 percent.

In Utah, where there was an official English initiative on the ballot, the situation was very similar. The state's political establishment was lined up against it, and my friend Jim Boulet of English First said that the state's major newspapers were so openly hostile to it and one sided in their reporting that they made the *Washington Post* look like a model of objectivity in comparison. But despite all their hostility, Utah's official English initiative passed by a margin of 67 percent.

So, I think the strategy indicated by these election results is pretty clear. Americans sense that their culture is under siege and they don't like it. Language is the fault line where this battle will be fought and the official English movement gives us the rare opportunity to play offense. We can capitalize on this to force the issue wherever we can — through initiatives and laws to scrap bilingual education, declare English our official language, and overturn executive actions via the courts. In the process we will expose our enemy – the multiculturalists, we will gain allies, and create a platform to educate the public about the threat to the American way of life that mass immigration represents.

In the end, I believe, we will accomplish our goals sooner, and with less difficulty. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Election America Lost by Default

by Don Feder

Despite the grumbling left and right, this wasn't exactly and issueless campaign. It's just that, in terms of national survival, the real issues were never discussed or alluded to.

The establishment has convinced Republicans that these matters are strictly off limits — that to confront reality here would mark them as haters of huddled masses and alienate Hispanic voters.

So the Republican ticket avoided any mention of immigration policy or of English (matters that will have a far greater impact on our future than a modest tax cut), while Democrats quietly continued to undermine national identity.

In 1999, almost 10 percent of the country was foreign-born, double the percentage of 30 years ago.

Without regard to the wishes of the American people, immigration is radically re-making America. If Census Bureau projections are correct, over the next fifty years, two-thirds of net population growth will be due to future immigrants and their descendants.

As 90 percent of today's immigration is non-white, by the middle of the next century every American will be a member of a minority. This is both a multiculturalist's dream and a nationalist's worst nightmare, especially since many of our newcomers seem determined to remain strangers in their adopted land.

But, sensing political opportunity, the Democratic Party pursues policies of national disintegration. In the waning days of this Congress, Bill Clinton is pushing for yet another amnesty for illegal aliens — this for those who have been here since 1986.

Each amnesty encourages the next wave of illegal immigrants, by holding out the hope of future amnesties. The immigrant waves crashing on our shores are eroding the foundations of nationhood, including the language that united us for more than two centuries.

Just before the Democratic National Convention the president put the weight of the federal government behind language Balkanization. Executive Order 13166 mandates that henceforth all federal grant recipients "take reasonable steps to provide meaningful opportunities for access" for those who refuse to learn English.

Thus, if a hospital accepts federal funds, it is now obligated to hire a staff that is (according to a companion memorandum) "bilingual in English and other frequently encountered languages, in critical patient contact positions."

One of liberalism's cherished beliefs is that America not only has an obligation to take in an unlimited number of immigrants, but the latter have a right to the delivery of tax-funded services in the language of their choice.

Three weeks after the executive order was signed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission finally succeeded in getting a federal court to rule that requiring employees to speak English on the job is a form of discrimination prohibited by the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The case involved assembly-line workers in Illinois. Only a federal judge could fail to see the utility of having co-workers communicate in the same tongue. The eight ex-employees allegedly victimized by the work rule will split a $192,500 judgment and supervisors have been ordered to undergo training in the new multilingual order.

***Don Feder** is a nationally-syndicated columnist.* *This item is © 2000 by Creators Syndicate and is reprinted by permission.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Last month the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal of a ruling overturning an Alabama referendum requiring that government business be conducted in English.

Citizens of six states have passed similar ballot measures (Florida by 84 percent, California by 73 and Colorado by 61 percent). But the immigration lobby, Democratic Party and its judicial lackeys are determined to deny the American people a say on whether we remain an English-speaking nation.

"The public is both passionately pro-English and disdainful of an immigration policy that amounts to slow suicide."

The public is both passionately pro-English and disdainful of an immigration policy that amounts to slow suicide. In a February 2000 Zogby poll, over 72 percent said immigration should be stopped completely or severely limited and illegal immigrants vigorously prosecuted.

Unfortunately, the majority lacks a political voice on these issues. One party (which has found in immigrants a natural constituency it can mobilize with promises of more government giveaways) is committed to the erosion of national identity. The other is too timid to protest. In consequence, this is another election America lost by default. ■

[*Editor's note: Mr. Feder overlooks the fact that Republicans are not just silent on the immigration issue, but many of them lobby for cheap labor.*]

Both Parties Have Imported New Electorate

by Samuel Francis

While Republicans and Democrats bickered over which ballots to count in Florida, the election could have been decided long ago by the fast-track naturalization of non-Americans on behalf of the Democrats. If, as the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, the acme of military skill is to win the battle before you fight it, the acme of political skill is to win the election before the ballots are even cast.

Just before the vote on November 7, the *Boston Globe* reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) helped push through the naturalization of some 1.7 million new immigrants in the last two years, "most of them with an incentive to vote and a lopsided preference for the Democratic Party."

Vote Democratic they did, at least to judge from the exit polls, which reported a landslide 67 percent Hispanic vote for Al Gore (and a modest 85 percent for Hillary Clinton in the New York Senate race). In California, where George W. Bush won a pathetic 23 percent of the Hispanic vote, a consultant for the Democratic Party told the *Globe* reporter just before the election, "Both parties show up at swearing-in ceremonies to try to register voters. There is a Democratic table and a Republican table. Ours has a lot of business. Theirs is like the Maytag repairman."

Nor is California the only state where Hispanic immigrants flock to Democratic standards. As the *Globe* article points out, the 5.6 million immigrants who became

Samuel Francis, Ph.D. *is a nationally-syndicated columnist.* *© 2000, Creators Syndicate, reprinted by permission.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

naturalized citizens between 1991 and 2000 live in "other battleground states, including Washington, Illinois, Michigan and Florida."

The conventional wisdom of Beltway conservatives holds that immigrants support the Democrats because of Republican support for immigration control in the early part of the decade. But the same conventional wisdom (which is usually more conservative than wise) also held that George W. Bush, with his campaigning in Spanish, would be able to win far more Hispanic voters and perhaps a majority.

Indeed, for the last four years, under the influence of the above-mentioned conventional wisdom, the Republicans have done everything they could to avoid alienating Hispanics. They abandoned immigration control entirely, and even reversed their own congressional votes for denying welfare benefits to legal immigrants. They pushed legislation that would have helped Puerto Rico become a state.

Bush even glowed over how immigrants were changing America into a reasonable facsimile of Latin America. "Just go to Miami, or San Antonia, Los Angeles, Chicago or west New York, New Jersey ... and close your eyes and listen. You could just as easily be in Santo Domingo or Santiago, or San Miguel de Allende," he beamed. And he boasted of how his own nomination signaled a "choice to welcome the new America" that immigrants were importing.

Bush and his party may have welcomed the new America, but the new America didn't welcome them — as the Democrats knew. The *Globe* article also reports how "the White House, with Gore's office taking the lead, pressured the INS to naturalize 1 million new voters by Election Day, according White House documents assembled by congressional investigators."

The result of the Clinton-Gore fast track for the new electorate was that the INS neglected to carry out fingerprint checks on some 180,000 immigrants naturalized before 1996, and that some 80,000 of them had criminal backgrounds, with more than 6,000 having committed serious crimes. But who cares about the standards of citizenship when political power is up for grabs? If the Clinton-Gore behavior cheapened citizenship and allowed criminals to become Americans, it was no less degrading that the political exploitation that Bush and his fellow Republicans practiced.

One moral of this ugly tale is that both political parties are so eager to gain votes from the electorate they're importing that the interests of the public and the nation become irrelevant. That's bad enough, but the second moral is that the Republicans totally missed the meaning of the electorate they allowed to come into existence. Because of this blunder, the Republican Party may have Committed suicide.

Immigration control, for the brief time the Republicans supported it, proved to be a winner for them. California's Proposition 187 won 63 percent of the white vote in 1994 and pulled Republican Governor Pete Wilson from political extinction. By running with the immigration control ball, the Republicans could have raised their share of the white vote from 54 percent to a level beyond, which their rivals could never hope to reach.

"One moral of this ugly tale is that both political parties are so eager to gain votes from the electorate they're importing that the interests of the public and the nation become irrelevant."

It's not too late for the Republicans to take up the banners of immigration control again. By doing so, they would not only stop the Democrats' new electorate from swallowing every election in the future, but also swell their own ranks with enough additional white voters to confront and defeat the racial politics the Democrats insist on playing. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Green Bay's Diversity Revolution

From 'Titletown' to 'All-America City'

by Michael Kuehl

Perhaps one can forgive Vernon Taylor for indulging in a bit of self-aggrandizement. After all, as the *Green Bay Press-Gazette*'s newest local "diversity" columnist, he's now a recognizable face, a "household name," a minor celebrity in this fabled National Football League city — a key player in local affairs, his opinions on race and culture and politics read or perused by tens of thousands of people.

> Not only on our southern borders and in our coastal cities, but America's heartland is also experiencing significant demographic change.

A portly, middle-aged black man with a short "Afro"and a scraggly mustache, he debuted in May of 1999 with a column entitled, predictably, "Green Bay enriched by growing diversity." As one of the first blacks to live and work in Green Bay (Packers excepted) he portrayed himself as a sort of historic figure, a harbinger of demographic transformation, a symbol of "progress" and "diversity" and "multiculturalism."

Not surprisingly, his coming to "Titletown" was a result of "affirmative action."

> *So why did I come to Green Bay? I came to Green Bay, as so many of us as people of color do, for opportunity. ... There was a position open, resulting from the transfer of a friend, at GMAC. Affirmative action was alive and well in the early 1970s* (implying, falsely, that it is dead or dying today —M.K.) *So it was recommended that I be hired.*

***Michael Kuehl** is a freelance writer living in Green Bay, Wisconsin.*

He arrived from Texas on October 27, 1974 with a trunk, suitcase, and $28 and, as he puts it, "the rest is history." But, alas, the Green Bay of old was as "white" as Oslo or Dublin or Helsinki and, moreover, benighted and philistine; apart from the Packers — the legend of Curly Lambeau, Don Hutson, Vince Lombardi, Bart Starr, the "Ice Bowl," the first Superbowl champions, etc. — a place indistinguishable, racially and culturally, from such "cowtowns" as Fargo, Sioux Falls, Duluth and Cedar Rapids. He repines:

> *To my surprise I discovered that Green Bay was a rural, blue-collar community that was 99.75 percent white. Not knowing, most people would assume that a professional sports city like Green Bay would be more urban, cosmopolitan and racially diverse. There was very little that I could identify with. The Oneida Tribe of Indians was the only ethnic group of major proportions.*[1]

Twenty-five years later, Green Bay isn't dramatically more "cosmopolitan." In some ways it is more urban if by "urban" one means crime, gangs, drugs, poverty, overcrowded jails, traffic congestion, etc. But it *is* far more "racially diverse." "As we enter into 200," writes Taylor, "thousands have followed since my arrival in 1974." How many thousands? How much diversity?

First, before answering that question, it should be emphasized that, particularly in regard to "Hispanics," the overwhelming proportion of non-whites in Green Bay have come after 1990. As late as 1990 the population of Green Bay and Brown County

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was still approximately 95 percent white. Just nine years ago almost 9,500 non-whites lived in Brown County, and nearly 40 percent of these were American Indians: 3,869 "Indian, Eskimo, Aleut"; 2,522 "Asian, Pacific Islander"; 570 "Other"; 1,012 "Black"; and 1,525 "Hispanic". And in the city of Green Bay, there were 4,986 non-whites and 1,063 Hispanics.[2] And even more significantly, most who came after 1990 have come since 1995.

Recent Immigration

On Christmas Eve, 1996, in a paean to immigration that exhorted the people of Green Bay to embrace "diversity" and multiracialism, the *Press-Gazette* reported that

> *In this area, 2,112 legal immigrants — mostly Asians — have come to Brown, Door, Kewaunee, Oconto and Shawano counties the past ten years. In addition, 3,000 to 4,000 Hispanics — including an estimated 1,000 illegal immigrants — have moved into the region.*[3]

The editorial doesn't mention the source or year of such estimates. Unless outdated by several years, however, the numbers they cited were a gross underestimation. By the end of December, 1996 the population of Hmong and Lao in Brown County alone far exceeded 2,112 — to say nothing of the entire region of "Northeastern Wisconsin." And so, too, with Hispanics.

According to a pamphlet distributed by United Way of Brown County,[4] "Brown County's total Southeast Asian population is estimated around 4,200. Of this total, approximately 86 percent are Hmong, 13 percent are Laotian, and one percent Vietnamese." Did the number of Asians in Brown County more than double from 1996 to 1997? And if so, what is the current Asian population?

And now, less than three years later, the Hispanic population (virtually all Mestizos and Indians from Mexico and other Central American countries) may have reached 15,000, including thousands of illegal immigrants. "At the moment," writes Tom Perry in a pro-immigration editorial, "no one knows for certain just how many people with ties to Central and South America live in Green Bay. …Estimates range from 6,000 to 10,000 people. The 2000 census should bring the number into sharper focus."

Two years ago a TV anchorman said there were 10,000 Hispanics in Green Bay, and that their numbers were expected to double in 4-5 years. If accurate, that would mean 20,000 Hispanics in Green Bay by 2002 or 2003. But, incredibly, this assessment might have been an underestimation. A year later (give or take a few months) assuming the number 10,000 was correct for 1998, Brown County might have experienced a 50 percent increase in its Latino population. Writes Jim Kneiszel in the *Green Bay Press-Gazette*:

> *Because census data is old and many new Hispanic residents are difficult to track, the ethnic populations in Green Bay are an official mystery. But anecdotal evidence points to dynamic Hispanic growth and smaller gains in Asian growth. ...[T]he department of refugee migration and Hispanic services for the Archdiocese of Green Bay estimates there are about 5,000 Asian residents in the area.*[6]

This is remarkable, given that as late as 1990 (according to the census) the Hispanic population of Green Bay was 1,063, and that of Brown County 1,525. Thus, in less than a decade, the Latino population of Green Bay has increased from just over 1,000 in 1990 to perhaps as many as 10,000 in 1999 — and in Brown County, from just over 1500 to perhaps as many as 15,000. And, apparently, most have come after 1995. At this rate, the Hispanic population might exceed 20,000 in four or five years. And how many, one must ask, by 2010 and 2020 and beyond? And how many Asians? And how many blacks, including African and Caribbean immigrants? — impelled to migrate to a "racially diverse" Green Bay?

Demographically, in envisioning the future, perhaps the most illuminating and portentous datum is the number of nonwhite students in Green Bay's public schools. "In Green Bay," wrote the editors of the *Press-Gazette* in 1996, "white enrollment in the public schools was 82.8 percent last year compared to 92.3 percent in 1985. Hispanic, black, Asian and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Indian student populations all increased."[7] Put inversely, minority enrollment in Green Bay's public schools more than doubled in ten years, from 7.7 percent nonwhite in 1985 to 17.2 percent nonwhite in 1995.

"In 20, perhaps even 10 years, if Wisconsin's low-wage economy continues to boom and national levels of immigration remain constant or increase substantially, perhaps 40-50 percent of the children enrolled in Green Bay public schools will be non-white."

Since Hispanics are by far the largest minority group in Brown County, and since many of those now in Green Bay arrived after 1995, the current minority enrollment is surely much larger than 17.2 percent. And, of course, roughly half of the Asian and Latino students cannot speak English.

> *This year [1999], about 1,800 of Green Bay's 19,500 public school students can't speak English well enough to succeed in the classroom. Most are part of an influx of Asian and Hispanic immigration and migration that has increased the percentage of nonwhite students to 21 percent this year from 8 percent in 1986. Last year, 1,711 students speaking 24 non-English languages were enrolled.*[8]

Thus, minority enrollment in Green Bay's public schools almost tripled in thirteen years. And now, over a year later, the number is surely closer to 25 percent — if not even higher. By 1998, minority students were the majority at five Green Bay elementary schools. At Tank Elementary School white children were less that 28 percent of the student body. (Such statistics are all the more dramatic when we consider that most Hispanics seem to be young males in their late teens and twenties rather than family-members with children.)

In 20, perhaps even 10, years — if Wisconsin's low-wage economy continues to boom and national levels of immigration remain constant or increase substantially — perhaps 40-50 percent of the children enrolled in Green Bay's public schools will be nonwhite. As European-derived Americans age and die and have far fewer children than nonwhites, these "children of color" will be the future of Green Bay.

Currently, the metropolitan area of Brown County (Green Bay, De Pere, the suburbs) has a population of approximately 200,000. The city is roughly 97,000-98,000 — a figure that has remained more or less constant for years since, without annexation, the city cannot expand dramatically in area or population. Thus, 30 or 40 years into the next millennium, one can imagine Green Bay, only yesterday 99.75 percent white," as a "minority-majority" city. And not primarily because of the migration of Vernon Taylor and his fellow African-Americans nor, even less so, because of large increases in the Native American population, but because of massive Third World immigration.

On C-Span 2, April 24, 1999, at a *Los Angeles Times* "Festival of Books" symposium on *Americanos* (a "coffee table" book that celebrates Hispanic life in the United States), one David Carrasco joked about Anglos viewing Mexicans as "border people" huddled at the Mexican border. There was laughter in the audience and then came the punch line (I paraphrase): "As someone has said earlier, the Mexican border has now moved all the way up to Northern Wisconsin." I assume he was referring primarily to Green Bay.

From 'Titletown' to 'All-America City'

"Green Bay, a three-time winner of the Superbowl, is now a two-time winner of the All-America City Award," crowed the editors of the *Green Bay Press-Gazette*.[9] In June of 1999, at the Marriot Hotel in downtown Philadelphia, Greater Green Bay was one of ten winners, the eighth city to be so awarded.

Green Bay first won the All-America City designation in 1964 because of its community-based

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attack on air and water pollution. But 35 years later the criteria are different:

> *The All-America City Award is presented by the civic league and Allstate Insurance Company. It recognizes grassroots efforts to solve community problems and is especially focused on youth and diversity ... Green Bay highlighted three programs in its application and presentation. They were Coalition to Promote Respect, Partners in Education, and Urban Partnership.* [Emphasis added][10]

"Thus, Green Bay won the [All-America City] award for its efforts to 'solve' problems that, just 10-15 years ago, did not even exist."

The above are all programs relating, one should emphasize, to problems of race and immigration: to ending "racism" (i.e. "white racism") and "discrimination" (only against minorities), "promoting cultural diversity," "assisting minority-owned businesses," and improving the educational performance of minorities. (In a *Sports Illustrated* article on the firing of Ray Rhodes, the first black head coach in Packer history, columnist Rick Reilly described "Coalition to Promote Respect" as a "Green Bay-area race-issues watchdog.") Thus, Green Bay won the award for its efforts to "solve" problems that, just 10-15 years ago, did not even exist. Ironically, Green Bay had to experience the problems of multiracialism and high levels of Third World immigration — far more crime than would be the case except for mass immigration; Hispanic, Asian and multiracial gangs with ties to Milwaukee, Chicago, California and Mexico; increased poverty; deteriorating neighborhoods; overcrowded jails and schools; bilingualism; racial strife; etc. — before it could be named "All-America City." In many ways, the vitiation of the "quality of life" was a prerequisite for nomination and victory. And now, for two years, it can use the award to "promote the city," encourage tourism, attract more businesses, and welcome more immigrants and "newcomers."

According to Clinton Smith, an "African-American business owner," "a graduate of Urban Hope and a representative of the Urban Partnership":

> *Diversity was the key to winning the award. The delegation was led to the podium for its presentation on Saturday by the Oneida Tribe of Indians singers and dancers, and more than half of the delegation members were minorities.*[11]

Appreciate the revelation: Insufficient racial "diversity" is now "un-American." ■

NOTES

[1] Vernon Taylor, "Green Bay enriched by growing diversity," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, May 20, 1999, p.A-15.

[2] *Wisconsin Blue Book 1997-1998*, p.714, p.769.

[3] *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, December 24, 1996, p.A-7.

[4] United Way of Brown County, "Practitioner's Workshop Series to increase your skills and capacities for working with the Hmong & Lao communities," January 1999; quoting in the pamphlet figures from the State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, September 30, 1997.

[5] Tom Perry, "Mexican immigrants chase 'El Sueno' in Green Bay," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, May 4, 1999, p.B-1.

[6] Jim Kneiszel, "Survival of the fittest," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, July 4, 1999, p.E-1.

[7] "Racial equality can't take a back seat," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, July 7, 1996, p.A-7.

[8] "We must help non-English-speaking students," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, March 8, 1999, p.A-5.

[9] "All-America City must not rest," *Green Bay Press-Gazette, June 29, 1999, p.A-7.*

[10] Steven Bruss, "An All-America City: Green Bay one of ten communities honored for efforts," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, June 27, 1999, pp. A-1, A-2.

[11] Ibid., p.A-2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Evolution of Environmental Policy

A historical survey and a look ahead

by Otis L. Graham, Jr.

Environmental policy is about fixing a problem — a large, complex, foundational problem. From the 1960s to the end of the century the United States engaged this problem on a wider scale and with more energy than ever before, as a part of a global, multi-national effort in this direction. Seen from our experience and vantage, what are the prospects ahead of humanity and Nature in the ongoing negotiation of our relationship?

Serious thought on this question usually begins not with historical inquiry but with reports from technology and the natural and social sciences, disciplines that habitually project events and trends ahead. But projecting likely futures also turns out to involve history, since formulating educated guesses about what lies ahead requires us to estimate what momentum and direction we have already established strongly enough to shape that future. The two broad schools of opinion on tomorrow have been called the Cornucopian and the Malthusian, labels which exaggerate the bias of the extreme ends of debate. Let us use the terms eco-optimists, people who wind up cheerful after they concede that there are a few problems, and eco-pessimists, who see bad outcomes but still believe that something can be done, or they would not be speaking.

The conviction that the American environment offered an inexhaustible resource was of course the primal assumption shaping our national history. Pessimism about using things up came later, the chief voices including George Perkins Marsh (*Man And Nature*. 1864), Frederick Jackson Turner's thoughts on the implications of the discovery in the Census of 1890 that the era of the frontier was over, the warnings of Teddy Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot and others in the first and second Conservation movements (who were usually optimists at bottom). The alarm-sounding books by Vogt and Osborn in 1948, and Walter Prescott Webb's *The Great Frontier* (1952), touched on the U.S. only as part of a global crisis of population pressing upon depleting resources, and were influential among a limited readership. The Sixties cranked up virtually every concern to a higher volume and larger audiences, and the reception of Stanford University biologist Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* (1968) — selling over a million copies in paperback, Ehrlich being interviewed in *Playboy* magazine and receiving wide media attention — gave the message of ecocrisis a mass audience. "The battle to feed all of humanity is over," Ehrlich wrote, predicting the deaths of 100s of millions of people in famines across the 1970s and mounting pressure upon resources and environment even in affluent societies like the U.S. The Club of Rome's best-selling *The Limits To Growth* (1972), written by a team of MIT scholars led by Dennis L. Meadows, offered a melancholy projection of population pressure, resource depletion and pollution that described a grim global slide over the next three decades into "a dismal and depleted existence," a miserable condition which they called "overshoot and collapse." Eight years later the U.S. government came out in broad agreement. *Global 2000*, an inter-agency report commissioned by President Jimmy Carter and published in 1980, reported that "if present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now."[1]

Otis L. Graham, Jr., Ph.D. *is Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Wilmington. He is the author of* A Limited Bounty: The U.S. Since World War II. *This essay is reprinted by permission from the* Journal of Policy History *published by Pennsylvania State University, Vol.12, No.1, 2000.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A counterattack against this strong current of Eco-pessimism was predictable. Offer an idea that receives wide public attention in America and people will piggy-back into the limelight by providing an opposite view. Further, optimism runs deep in American history, and tends to assert itself when gloom is expressed. More important, one implication of the forecasts of ecocrisis was criticism of and demands for curbs on growth, a sentiment fundamentally and deeply alarming to the business community and other elements of American society. Another reason for stiff resistance to the very idea of Eco-pessimism is its implication that there must be a larger role for government in regulating resource uses, waste disposal, even procreation. "Mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" in the area of human fertility was the recommendation, and "freedom in a commons brings ruin to all" a memorable line, in University of California biologist Garrett Hardin's widely discussed and reprinted 1968 article, "The Tragedy of the Commons." "Free market" loyalists sensed dangerous implications — government intrusion into land and resource use, perhaps even the bedroom. A final factor attracting criticism was that the pessimists sometimes predicted with too much specificity and enthusiasm, and some of the bad things forecast did not happen, or did not happen on anything like the scale or as soon, as foreseen. "The Prophet Paul," as one writer dubbed Ehrlich, had indeed said in a magazine interview that "our large polluting population is responsible for air pollution that could very easily lead to massive starvation in the U.S. within the next two decades," and "I believe we're facing the brink because of population pressures."[2] And Paul and William Paddock did predict mass starvation in China "within five or ten years" in their *Famine — 1975!*.

Enter the 'Eco-optimists'

To all of this the eco-optimists responded with a spirited critique and rebuttal. One of the earliest to emerge was to become a polarizing figure who went beyond skeptical questioning of the ecopessimists to assert an almost religious belief that more growth and more people were the formula not for disaster but for a rosy future. This was Julian Simon, a professor of marketing at the University of Illinois until, "in the midst of a depression of unusual duration," he found healing in a conversion to the cause of "having more children and taking in more immigrants."[3] He then moved to Washington, D.C. and began a productive and influential career as the leading eco-optimist. In a cascade of essays, public appearances, and books (principally *The Ultimate Resource* (1981)), Simon reversed every argument of the environmentalists. What was needed was more population which would bring us more Mozarts and Einsteins, building the knowledge and genius sufficient to solve environmental problems. "There is no meaningful physical limit — even the commonly mentioned weight of the Earth — to our capacity to keep growing forever," was one of Simon's most reprinted remarks, as well as his paraphrase of the *Global 2000* conclusion: "If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be less crowded, less polluted, more stable ecologically and less vulnerable to resource-supply disruption than the world we live in now."[4]

"The Eco-optimist point of view had many more voices, often located in Think Tanks such as the Heritage Foundation or Cato whose support came from pro-capitalist foundations, corporations, and individuals."

The Eco-optimist point of view had many more voices, often located in Think Tanks such as the Heritage Foundation or Cato whose support came from pro-capitalist foundations, corporations, and individuals. But the vulnerability of some of the language and predictions of the pessimists drew many and independent rebuttals. Journalist Gregg Easterbrook's *A Moment On the Earth* (1995) brought together an immense literature on environmental problems which he interpreted to mean that we were in fact winning the battle to preserve the environment. The air was cleaner, pollution is shrinking and will soon end, global warming is "almost certain to be avoided," and doomsday thinking is "nonsensical." Environmentalists should stop "proclaiming emergencies that do not exist."[5]

This was the core of the Eco-optimist critique, that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those they liked to ridicule as "the Doomsters" had vastly underestimated the power of our institutions to respond to problems. Market economies signal the pain of shortages or pollution, and mobilize the energies of capitalism, science and technology toward substitutes and remedies, innovating around problems. The predicted massive famines in the 1970s did not materialize, in this view, because science and technology launched the "Green Revolution" in agriculture, producing an unprecedented increase in yields. The oil shortages of the 1970s yielded to oil glut by the 1990s, and most minerals were not moving into shortage. Our institutions for generating innovation were coping quite well with global environmental-resource problems, and the Doomsters, like their Founder Parson Thomas Malthus, were wrong on their predictions because they misunderstood and underestimated both those institutions and humanity's ability to change behavior when it led to negative consequences. Rapid economic progress, not curbs on growth, promise to produce the resources, mental and physical, to remedy the problems in the humanity-Nature relation.[6]

The most sophisticated as well as history-based of such arguments came in the Summer, 1996 issue of *Daedalus,* in a symposium entitled "Liberation of the Environment." Editor of the symposium Jesse Ausubel in a lead essay pulled together the volume's several themes. Science and technology "can now ... liberate the environment from human impact." This confidence came not from hopes for tomorrow's miracle inventions so much as from an extrapolation of trends that technology had already launched. "The historical record reveals that for two hundred years the world has progressively lightened its energy diet" by moving from wood through coal and oil toward natural gas, with the effect that "the energy system is freeing itself from carbon" and moving toward a "hydrogen economy." Agriculture is spacially contracting and thus sparing the land. Industrial products are becoming lighter, smaller, produced with less waste. Social learning has reduced population excesses before, and may be expected to do so again. The several authors pursued these themes of "decarbonization" and "dematerialization" across centuries, toward reassuring conclusions.[7]

Thus history, interpreted in a certain way, provided a base from which the *Daedalus* authors constructed a narrative with an optimistic tilt at the end of the 20th Century, amid so much bad news about world population growth, Global Warming, deforestation, and much else. Another element glimpsed here and there in the essays deserved more emphasis — the arrival on the scene of a new ally, capitalist enterprise itself, once imaged as the smoke-belching polluter, but in the 1980s and 1990s seen to be waving green banners and joining the environmentalist army.

Business Takes Up 'Greening'

It was difficult to determine the depth or full effect of "the Greening of business," a phrase that can mean several different things. In the U.S., there is considerable evidence that a growing number of corporations have moved from grudging compliance with the encircling local, state and Federal environmental regulations, and have begun to aggressively seek competitive advantage through "greening" the entire corporation. This may mean redesigning production processes so as to minimize and recycle wastes, economize on energy use, design products that can be advertised to the growing number of "green" consumers as somehow "environmentally friendly," strike up alliances with well-known environmental organizations to jointly brainstorm less



"Right, people, we're marketing the environment, what are its selling points?"

From the Wall Street Journal. Permission, Cartoon Features Syndicate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

polluting and energy-saving ways of making products — or all of the above. DuPont developed a fabric made of cornstarch rather than polyester, Electrolux markets solar-powered lawn mowers and saws lubricated with vegetable oil, Interface (an Atlanta-based carpeting company) launched a "drive to zero waste" campaign and reported cost savings of $25 million, MacDonald's linked up with the Environmental Defense Fund to reduce fast-food waste and shift away from styrofoam packaging — these are a brief sample of stories from the media in the 1990s. When the global warming issue moved toward the international conference at Kyoto in 1997, energy industry lobbyists worked hard to dismiss the issue as unfounded, but a coalition of major companies including 3M, British Petroleum, Boeing, and several insurance companies accepted climate change as a serious threat, and lobbied for government-led action.[8]

Other evidence of a rising interest in a proactive corporate approach to environmental interactions was a stream of articles in the business press (such as "What Does It Mean To Be Green?", *Harvard Business Review*, July-Aug., 1991) and the rapid expansion of environmental management courses in American business schools ("Tree-Hugging Takes Root in B-Schools," announced *Eco* magazine in 1994).

The scholarly literature on the greening (or non-greening) of business is growing but is still small, and it is too early to gain a reliable sense of how deep the corporate concern for environmental impacts goes or what difference it is making. The EPA's annual *Toxics Release Inventory* (required by a 1986 law) showed in 1996 that toxic emissions from over 25,000 reporting manufacturing firms had declined 44% since the inventory began, allowing one to conclude that fear of penalties under tough governmental regulations may be producing proactive, "green" management practices inside the corporation. The giant auto industry moves toward an electric car, prodded hard by state and national air quality regulations and assisted by government R&D. Firms like 3M, Monsanto and Weyerhauser decorate their annual reports and occasional paid advertisements with hard facts about waste reductions and efforts to restore damaged habitat going far beyond what the law requires. But these are large Fortune 500 firms, and those who live downwind from medium-sized paper plants or downstream from manufacturing facilities and enormous hog producing and slaughtering installations (as this author does) retain a healthy skepticism that the Dirty Corporate Polluter is becoming extinct. The EPA's annual toxic inventory only covers some 600 chemicals, self-reported from less than 30 percent of American industrial operations, and its somewhat reassuring data may be misleading. And Monsanto Corporation, portraying itself as Green, is under critical scrutiny (along with rival DuPont) as the world's leading genetic food company utilizing biotechnology to engineer superseeds making supercrops. These giant corporations seem poised to become a vital part of the solution to the problem of feeding humanity without enlarging agricultural acreage,

"Nonetheless, there can be no denying that strong incentives are altering business attitudes toward their environmental impacts."

or sources of unprecedented chaos through genetic pollution in the plant world — or both. Scientific and political uncertainty in the area of genetic engineering of crops could hardly be higher.[9]

Nonetheless, there can be no denying that strong incentives are altering business attitudes toward their environmental impacts. The environment outside the American-based firm as the century ends not only includes the land, water and air beckoning as a dump for waste and source of the natural resources to be removed and turned into products. It also now includes a rising number of consumers drawn to "green" products and potentially ready to boycott firms tagged with a Brown reputation or event; environment-oriented investors; a media eager to report noxious emissions or toxic accidents; a swarm of environmental groups skilled in public relations and lobbying; and, since the early 1970s, a structure of law and regulation intended to protect the environment. The Greening of American Business is now a train moving on the tracks, and since manufacturing corporations account for 40 percent of GNP, their active and positive participation in the search for a lighter human impact on the earth is essential for progress. We

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should wish for as much evidence of a greening of management practices and attitudes among the other major polluters — the military, municipal sewage and solid waste bureaucracies, agriculture, tourism, and the great American suburban commuter coming home to carry out the garbage and spread a fertilizer-herbicide combination on his green lawn.

The 'Great Wagers'

Was the counter-argument of the Eco-optimists against the Eco-pessimists convincing? The outcomes of a bizarre wager launched in the 1980s by the man the media came to call "the rosy economist," Julian Simon, was taken by some as a qualified Yes.[10] On second thought, it seems to point the other way.

Simon believed that the Eco-pessimists were not just often wrong here and there, predicting too much pain too early, but were in all cases and always 180 degrees wrong. For Simon, everything was getting better — resources more abundant and cheaper, population growth bringing us more geniuses to help solve problems, the environment actually moving toward health. So in 1980 he offered to bet any environmental scientist that commodity prices for a basket of five metals would fall over the next ten years, reflecting the trend toward resource abundance and the truth of Simon's claim that humanity "would never run out of anything." Paul Ehrlich and two University of California, Berkeley physicists bet Simon a total of $1,000. The price of three of the five metals went down, two up, and Simon received a check for $576 (the average decline of the five prices) in 1990 and claimed victory.[11]

He then offered another bet in 1995, claiming that "*all* long-run trends point in exactly the opposite direction from the projections of the doomsayers." This time he would wager up to $100,000 "on anything pertaining to material human welfare — life expectancy, price of a natural reource, numbers of telephones in China."[12] Ehrlich and Stanford climatologist Stephen Schneider countered with an offer to bet $1,000 per trend on fifteen continental and global indicators ranging from global warming through atmospheric carbon dioxide and acreage of tropical moist forests to the number of plant and animal species, the end date 2005.[13] Simon would not wager, objecting that he preferred direct measures of only human well-being.[14]

"To this writer ... the worriers have the most convincing scenarios, globally and even in the United States..."

The Debate Mellows

The debate between environmental optimists and pessimists will roll on like the River Jordan. But all parties should hope that the death of Julian Simon in 1998 might turn out to mark the symbolic end of the era of exaggeration on all sides. Reckless charges can always be heard on the far margins, talk show hosts like Rush Limbaugh ridiculing the very idea of environmental problems and occasional fringe writers like the Unabomber announcing impending environmental doom. But this immensely complex and important debate seems now to be increasingly carried on under the groundrules that one must get the science right, and the contrary arguments must be dealt with and usually have at least some merit. The worriers at the end of the century tend to concede some good news without a sense that this destroys their position. And they have made the point that their warnings made a major contribution to the awakening in public opinion, governments and corporations which led to remedies making for outcomes better than worriers had predicted. The optimists at the end of the century tend to concede some bad news without a sense that it destroys their basic position, and seem to have made some room for their core conviction that science, technology, and private sector energies are formidable tools for changing course.

With these signs of maturity in the debate, there is still quite a gulf between the Eco-optimism displayed in *The Economist* and the editorial pages of *The Wall Street Journal*, on the one hand, over against the sense of crisis soberly transmitted in the annual volumes of Lester Brown's Worldwatch series, *State of the World*, and in the continued writings of scientists Paul and Anne Ehrlich, the Meadows of MIT, Norman Myers, Gretchen Daily, David Pimental, David Quammen, and countless others who still and unapologetically use the language of crisis.[15]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To this writer, at the end of the 1990s, the worriers have the most convincing scenarios, globally and even in the United States, as I am obliged to explain.

There would be no debate if there weren't facts and arguments on both sides. Optimists point out that global population growth projections are slightly improving, the UN Population Division now seeing the likelihood (if current trends persist, always the fundamental qualifier) of a world population reaching (this is the middle of five projections) 10.8 billion by 2050, stabilizing at 11 billion persons around 2100. Earlier estimates in the middle range for 2050 had been closer to 12 billion, with responsible demographers fearing 16 billion (or more). Population growth rates have been declining more broadly than earlier projected. This is good news, depending on how you look at it.[16] Is ending up with the smallest bad scenario therefore good news?

In Europe the population worry has actually veered around to a very different, "birth dearth" anxiety. Most European nations began reporting below-replacement fertility rates in the 1970s, giving rise to fears that a shrinkage of nations lay ahead. Rising immigration rates into the prosperous nations of the European Union have ensured that nations will not shrink, but give rise to a more volatile concern over national identity. Will Italy, for example, with the lowest birth rates in the world and ever recorded, still be Italy in one hundred years, when it is populated by Muslim immigrants from Albania, Algeria and elsewhere?

Thus the world faces two demographic problems — unprecedented population growth in the poorer and underdeveloped regions where most humans live, and stabilized and even potentially shrinking nationalities (not populations, which are replenished by immigration) in Europe, Australia, and the fastest growing industrialized nation since it permitted mass immigration with a 1965 law, the United States. To simplify, the global population is going to double (not triple, as we feared two decades ago), and nations whose fertility choices lead to shrinking populations will be put back on the growth path by immigration, welcome and legal or neither. (Japan will not permit immigration, and as probably the only nation in the world that retains control over its demographic destiny, will have to decide very shortly how much to shrink.) Out of this mixed picture, some people make doubling rather than tripling into good news, the lesser of two disasters.

The enormity of the demographic upheaval whose final century we now enter should not be trivialized by calculations that trim a couple of billion off at the end. As Bill McKibben pointed out in 1998, "the *increase* in human population in the 1990s has exceeded the *total* population in 1960. The population has grown more since 1950 than it did during the previous four million years."[17]

"Rising immigration rates into the prosperous nations of the European Union have ensured that nations will not shrink, but give rise to a more volatile concern over national identity."

While this awesome event is at the core of our difficulties, we must know much more than whether "the population bomb" will in the end be judged an earthquake at Richter 6.5 or 7.0. The first question is food supplies, then the constellation of measures of human well-being that extend from mere survival. Here I will argue that much of the apparent good news is being misinterpreted.

Taking Ecological Capital Into Account

As the Simon-Ehrlich bets show, we move through an era in which those who measure progress in the conventional ways — looking at measures of human well-being such as food production per capita, the prices (and thus availability) of basic commodities, life expectancy including infant mortality, automobile or home or telephone ownership, and, in most societies in the second half of the century with Africa as a major exception, per capita income — can report impressive gains, and win Simonite bets. Even measurements of "natural resources" such as timber or fossil fuels, or environmental "quality" as defined in the environmental protection statutes since the 1960s, contain some grounds for optimism, a sense of winning momentum. As Eco-optimist writer Gregg Easterbrook said in 1995, there has been in the U.S. , an "astonishing, and continuing, record

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of success" in improving water and air quality that humans use, more recycling of wastes, expanding acreage of forests — all of this at less cost than business and anti-environmental lobbies predicted.[18] He might have mentioned gasoline dropping in 1999 to $1 per gallon in the U.S., decisive evidence of a "natural resource shortage"that did not — to date — follow the scenario of the greens.

But shift the focus from these conventional accounting categories in measuring human welfare to measures of ecosystem health — from the economists' evidence that humans are consuming more and living better (on the whole) to the ecologists' evidence that the ecosystem foundations are eroding — and the future takes on a worrier's look. Complacency, wrote an international team of scientists in *Science* in 1998, persists because "conventional indicators of the standard of living pertain to commodity production, not to the natural resource base on which all production depends."[19] We Americans (and Canadians, Europeans, Asians, Australians, New Zealanders, most Latin Americans) are still "making progress," enlarging our consumption and numbers — while drawing down our basic capital, the ecological foundations of the earth's limited capacity to sustain humans. Economists are accustomed to report on our well being measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but "Ecolate" (Garrett Hardin's term, meant to go along with Literate and Numerate) natural scientists are desperately trying to get the public's attention for another category of reporting: the status of the bio-physical basis of our economies. Ehrlich and his colleagues offered in the second bet to measure some of these — atmospheric pollution affecting global climate, habitat destruction, species extinction — knowing the trends to be negative.

Wherever one samples the trends they signal the depletion of ecological capital, some of it surely irreversible. Arable soil acreage shrinks by erosion, salinization, and urban development. Habitat mutilation or disturbance, and invasive species, accelerate species extinction, shrinking the range and potential benefits of biodiversity. Human pollution and harvesting sterilize the oceans. And that most temporary piece of good fortune, humanity's wonderful energy bonanza of fossil fuels, when burned sends skyward a global blanket warming the earth and stressing every ecosystem upon it.

"As the century comes to a close Americans cruise into more and more affluence on a remarkable economic roll, not the best climate in which to absorb the complex news of the melancholy trends in our ecological bank accounts."

A powerful new conception of this capital draw-down has emerged in the phrase "ecosystem services." Described in Paul and Anne Ehrlich, *Extinction* (1981), Gretchen Daily et al., *Nature's Services* (1997) and in a lead article in *Nature* in 1997 by Robert Costanza and associates, ecosystem services are the free goods drawn upon by the human economy and taken for granted, but now rapidly contracting: pollinating crops and natural vegetation, controlling potential agricultural pests, filtering and decomposing wastes, forming soil and maintaining fertility, maintaining the gaseous composition of the atmosphere.[20] In the *Nature* article, Costanza and his associates, in an effort to gain the attention of policymakers and public, estimated the value of ecosystem services at $33 trillion a year, or twice the world's annual GDP.[21]

Teddy Roosevelt thought we were running out of vital resources — forests, petroleum, wildlife, places of natural beauty. He wasn't wrong, but we now see more deeply into the problem. Ecosystems and their services are wounded and shrink, both because of overharvesting and conversion to agricultural or urban uses, and because "what we are running out of is what the scientists call 'sinks', "in the words of Bill McKibben, places to dump our garbage at no (apparent) cost.[22]

As the century comes to a close Americans cruise into more and more affluence on a remarkable economic roll, not the best climate in which to absorb the complex news of the melancholy trends in our ecological bank accounts. That side of our situation is difficult to see. Economists, journalists, and law-trained policymakers are looking in another direction, measuring conventional things with prices on them. And the vast majority of us, woefully uneducated by our schools, universities,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

churches, and media, have only a dim understanding of the erosion of the often distant ecological foundations of our livelihood. We have no idea of where or how our "ecological footprint" is felt. Ecological footprint — a helpful concept in the hands of ecologists who hope to measure and visualize the far-flung impacts of our urbanized communities, "the 'load' imposed by a given population on nature," in the words of Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, authors of *Our Ecological Footprint* (1996). Seen in this way, Chicago may have (let us say) cleaned up its air and wastes and restored fish to the Chicago River. All appears well locally. But to discover that city's ecological footprint requires calculation of the ecological goods and services appropriated from far away — from distant agricultural land, from oceanic and forest carbon sinks absorbing atmospheric carbon dioxide, from waterways asked to dilute and break down wastes, from fisheries and forests harvested. The calculations have not been made not only because they are immensely complicated but also because no one has fixed a price for these ecosytem disturbances nor knows who or how to charge. But whatever the calculation, we can be certain that Chicagoans, and all Americans in this perspective, are, due to their affluence, "larger" (and thus their footprint larger) than people from Brazil, some of whom are clear-cutting the Amazonian rain forests and thus have a much larger footprint than the residents of the Bangladesh flood plain. Where and how the footprint disturbs nature is out of sight and off the account books of our households. But to better foresee the human future requires an accounting that reaches across jurisdictional borders and is not confined to things already assigned pricetags.[23]

More 'Whimper' than 'Bang'

Three decades ago, alarmed writers about the future like Paul Ehrlich, Barry Commoner, and the Club of Rome *Limits to Growth* authors occasionally used words like "bomb," "collapse," "descent into barbarism," "the death of the planet." Scientists all, they wished to gain attention, and did. But this occasional language, along with an under-estimation of the role of human ingenuity, gave them the Parson Malthus problem: the disasters did not arrive on time. A generation later, lookers ahead who come to pessimistic conclusions report with more sophistication, allow more complexity and perplexity to come through, and do not specify the date of the next famine. In *The Population Explosion* (1990), the Ehrlichs agree with T. S. Eliot that while the world might end with a "bang" it is more likely to end in a "whimper," the slow breakdown of both natural and agricultural ecosystems, with disease outbreaks, water shortages, and rising social disorder.[24] This scenario, like most, looks to the experiences humans may expect, but there is a holocaust of sorts ahead for plant and animal life. Writer David Quammen surveyed paleontologists and found them convinced that "we are entering another mass extinction, a vale of biological impoverishment" in which "somewhere between one third and two thirds of all species" will become extinct. The resulting world will still have wildlife, of course, but only those who survived the ecological mauling by 10 billion humans. "Wildlife will consist of the pigeons and the coyotes, " Quammen writes, the black rats and the brown rats," rodents, cockroaches, house sparrows and geckos "and the barn cats and the skinny brown feral dogs ... a Planet of Weeds."[25]

This upcoming cascade of ecological breakdowns was increasingly seen as arriving regionally rather than uniformly around the globe. Many observers foresaw escalating problems ahead for the fast-growing giant, China, adding 13 million people a year, her thin soils eroding and cities choked with traffic, garbage, and heavily polluted air from coal combustion. In *Who Will Feed China?* (1995), Lester Brown warned that a combination of droughts and depletion of groundwater aquifers meant an imminent decline in the supply of water for Chinese farmers. Taken with conversion of farmland for urban uses, floods and erosion, agricultural production would fail to keep pace with a growing population, throwing that formerly food-sufficient nation of 1.2 billion onto world grain markets. The ripple effects would include rising grain prices and shortages in poor nations, a formula for famine and political instability.[26]

It is the latter that increasingly draws attention. The world's poor will suffer as their numbers press ever harder upon degraded resources, but they cannot be expected always and everywhere to suffer patiently. Human conflicts between the globe's rich and poor seem likely to be a core dynamic of the difficulties ahead. Journalist Robert Kaplan caught President Clinton's attention with a 1996 article reporting on his travels along an arc of countries from Africa through the Middle East

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where he found repeated examples of ecological collapse intensifying tribal and civil wars with several "failed states" losing control over national borders.[27] In a sophisticated look out toward *The World in 2020* (1994), Hamish MacRae sees water shortages, a tightening of oil supplies, relentless habitat destruction, and unavoidable international conflict as China replaces the U.S. as the world's chief air polluter and thus driver of global warming. Even that Texas optimist Walt Rostow, in his recent look ahead at the 21st century, sees the period from the 1990s to 2025 as "a period of maximum strain on resources and the environment when global population is still expanding" and there might be, starting first in certain regions, "a global crisis of Malthusian consequences."[28]

"The world's poor will suffer as their numbers press ever harder upon degraded resources, but they cannot be expected always and everywhere to suffer patiently."

Rostow shares with most other forecasters a relaxed optimism about oil, not having checked lately with geologists. "With so much to worry about," Rostow writes, "why worry about energy," especially since massive new oil reserves are under development in the Caspian Sea region of central Asia?[29] But the time of troubles that he sees ahead in at least the first half of the 21st century will apparently include the next and final oil crunch. Some time in the first decade of that century, geologists are now arguing, world oil production will begin to decline and prices will rise. Whether or not political instability in the Middle East brings artificial shortages, oil production will soon begin falling behind demand which is growing at 2 percent a year to double in 34 years. "The Petroleum Interval" for humankind began about 140 years ago when Colonel Drake drilled oil in Pennsylvania, points out Walter Youngquist in *Geodestinies*, and will be over 300 years from that event, "a brief bright blip on the screen of human history."[30] No, says *Science* magazine, there is quickly gathering a consensus among geologists that "mankind will consume it all in a 2-century binge of profligate energy use." The time available to come up with alternatives is much shorter than anticipated.[31]

Global Warming Enervates the Eco-pessimists

Thus there seemed a shift across a broad front in the direction of Eco-pessimist anticipations, laced (as they had not been in the 1960s-1970s) here and there with a qualified optimism about the possibility of technological leaps over or around some of the problems. Perhaps the decisive factor making for an overall sense of crisis was the evolving understanding of climate change. In the 1990s the scenario of Global warming moved from a widely disputed hypothesis to an assumption about the planetary future, at least at the broad center of scientific and governmental opinion, augmented by some business converts which included British Petroleum. Earth may surprise us, all admit, and not warm as predicted. But at century's end the added factor of almost certain warming and climatic instability seems like the draw of the game-killing black queen in a game of Hearts. What will the "period of maximum strain" feel like, if greenhouse warming comes upon our overcrowded world as expected (all agree that no policy changes in any country can slow or reverse it until the second half of the next century)? Writer Bill McKibben imagined it "stormier" than before, both wetter and drier; spring coming earlier, summers hotter and longer; glacier meltings and retreat, rising oceans, altered ocean currents bringing abrupt climate change on shore; crop failures; millions of environmental refugees. "The next fifty years are a special time," he concluded in language suggesting difficulty in finding the right adjective, but not wanting to use any of the common terms of alarm. Clearly it would not on the whole be a nice time, when wishing you to have a nice day will be enough. "The single most special thing about it may be that we are now apparently degrading the most basic functions of the planet."[32]

From this perspective, Americans at the end of the 20th Century are enjoying an Indian Summer before the arrival of what Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson calls in understated terms "The Century of the Environment."[33] Pleasant news and prospects surround us, by standard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measures. Our own national economy as of this writing (early 1999) seems the only healthy, inflation-free, full employment, steadily growing stock market booming large economy in a world of mixed performances including the utter collapse of the system of our former rival. U.S. environmental policies and private sector responses have produced welcome improvements in some measures of environmental and human health, and impressive institutional learning. As a people we are overweight and living longer than ever.

Yet a time of troubles looms ahead, in the view of most natural scientists and a growing number of other observers, one that will spare no country and respect no borders. Environmental problems and policy will push to the front of national and international agendas, and laterally inject themselves further into policy realms like national defense, trade, public health. We cannot imagine how another symposium of this sort thirty years from now might assess U.S. environmental politics and policy. But since the anticipated problems a generation out into the doubling of human numbers are sure to be more formidable than the oil spills and pesticide warnings that launched in the Sixties a new era of environmental concern, our resources are also greater. It is well to briefly take stock of them.

Thirty years of serious pollution fighting has collected an impressive scientific, technological, and analytical base in American governments, universities, research centers, and corporations. Public support for environmental protection holds at high levels, even if the public is confused and misinformed about some things — relative risks of various hazards, and the basic demography of the U.S. and the planet. The "Brownlash" against environmentalism, as Michael Kraft's essay in this volume relates, did considerable damage but also forced some hard thinking about policy alternatives.

At century's end there seems more long-term wind in the Green sails than the Brown. Simonite denial of environmental decline is found only on the journalistic fringes, untenable any longer in the science-respecting mainstream. A steady boost in public environmental concern and education can be expected as we go to school amid future episodes of crisis — mammoth oil spills, local famine, epidemics, extreme weather disasters. The same can be said of the daily existence of Americans living amid intensifying pressures of urban congestion and suburban sprawl driven by the developed world's fastest population growth rate. These conditions will worsen, and bring environmental matters to the foreground. The Green persuasion has already spread beyond its largely affluent, WASP social base and put down roots among ethnic and racial minorities in both urban and rural settings, and gathers new recruits from American religious communities, as well as from a surprisingly vigorous animal rights movement. The

"Yet a time of troubles looms ahead, in the view of most natural scientists and a growing number of other observers, one that will spare no country and respect no borders."

"business community," if that phrase has any meaning, has moved from solid hostility toward costly environmental regulations to an unevenly "Greened" or pro-active ally in lightening our ecological footprints. Environmental grassroots activism is invigorated and given intellectual and political leverage in the 1990s by the internet, where millions of citizens exchange information and encouragement, quickly mobilize constituencies and focus political pressure.

All-important Growth

Still, these and other assets applied to environmental repair will not be enough, for they have not yet been enough. One could read the history of environmental effort during the last four decades of the 20th Century as exposing a core defect in the campaign to realign humanity's relationship to the natural world. Environmentalism aims at what, in the end? "Clean air" and "clean water" are useful phrases for media releases and legislation. But environmentalists have not communicated a compelling national goal, a vision of a future on the other side of the struggles to contain the succession of crises that growth produced. If thinking is not strategic, then it becomes tactical, and we clean up the nearby creek — but the growth path is never challenged. Americans, and apparently all others, still march to the equivalent of the Bible's injunction from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Genesis chapter I: 28: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth ..."

For a brief time in the penumbra of the Sixties the audacious idea of realigning the purpose of American life away from perpetual national expansion seemed to make headway, as Beck and Kolankiewicz relate. "Limits to growth" was a book title and much volleyed phrase in the early 1970s, and an intellectual high-water mark in the search for a larger strategy for environmentalism came in 1972 when the Commission on Population and the American Future concluded that "no substantial benefits would result from continued growth of the nation's population" and that the nation should welcome and plan for stabilization.[34] This was the sine qua non, a foundation on which could be built a more complete vision of what Franklin D. Roosevelt liked to call "a permanent country."

But the effort to re-aim America away from the growth path toward something else — the "stationary state" of John Stuart Mill? — foundered under intense and emotional opposition. Critics of the Rockefeller Commission recommendation of population stabilization were quick to attach to that idea the scent of government intrusion into procreation, and to mobilize against one recommended tactic in particular, abortion rights. Then the media learned that demographers were reporting that replacement-level fertility had already been reached in the U.S., a finding widely misunderstood to mean that U.S. population growth was over. Author Ben Wattenberg, among others, began to warn of a "birth dearth," and public discussion of population growth and goals slipped into a hopeless confusion through the Reaganite 1980s in which governmental policy actually aligned itself with the expansionist position of the Vatican.

By the 1990s those still concerned about population growth within the U.S. knew that the nation's growth rate was the fastest among industrialized nations, adding 3 million people a year (which meant a doubling time for the national population of 60-70 years), growth driven increasingly by the massive immigration released by the Immigration Act of 1965. As Beck and Kolankiewicz describe, a few environmental groups still called for U.S. (and world) population stabilization (one organization, Negative Population Growth, for a reduction), as one objective among many others. But most avoided the issue to sidestep the extra controversy thought to come with it. Members of the Sierra Club in 1998 forced a referendum to commit the Club to population stabilization and the reduction of immigration levels required to achieve that, and were turned back on a 60-40 percent vote by board and staff opposition arguing not that the facts were wrong but that any position on immigration would attract criticism from ethnic spokespersons and create negative image problems.[35]

Thus in the four decades under review the first strategic goal on the way to "a permanent country" — population stabilization — was for a while endorsed from a presidential commission down through environmental intellectuals to the grassroots. Then it slid quietly to the margins until in 1998 the goal of capping population growth even if it required immigration limits could not carry a vote in the Sierra Club. As U.S. population surged ahead the effort to put stabilization back on the American political agenda was blocked because it required immigration reduction and that was not politically correct among the leadership of most environmental organizations. The entire period after the Sixties thus takes on the aspect of a vigorous and expanding environmental movement that somewhat puzzlingly lost its earlier grip upon a key component of a larger strategic purpose, turning increasingly to tactical battles over this redwood grove or that city's air quality. The commitment to global as well as domestic family planning of the Kennedy-Johnson years, even Nixon's brief interest in population questions, gave way to a broad

"As U.S. population surged ahead the effort to put stabilization back on the American political agenda was blocked because it required immigration reduction and that was not politically correct among the leadership of most environmental organizations."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resignation about and a growing ignorance of global and especially national demographic trends. This was a part of the larger acquiescence by mainstream environmentalists in the Growth Path, after the Club of Rome had briefly stimulated a debate about establishing limits.

Of course, to redesign human values and institutions so that "growth" — in most material things, but not, as Mill pointed out, in matters of the mind and spirit — would meet limits involved a hellishly complicated set of tradeoffs and calculations that only a priestly few wanted to discuss, let alone begin. American history marshals a long heritage of open frontiers and individualism against it. "Don't go to limited access!", shouted an agitated New England fisherman at a hearing on the shrinking stocks of bluefin tuna: "I don't want to be limited! That's not American!"[36]

The easiest part of such a tectonic shift in social outlook on growth and limits, however, would be to end population growth. Indeed, in places it began to happen without a law, national policy, or much debate. Voluntarily, European, American and some Asian women began to choose smaller families or no offspring at all, so that by the end of the 1990s some sixty countries (the U.S. was in the group until 1995, when immigration pushed fertility rates again above 2.1) had reached or moved below replacement-level fertility, prevented from absolute population shrinkage only by immigration from still-growing societies. At the 1994 UN Conference on Population at Cairo 179 nations established (not unanimously; several Roman Catholic and Islamic nations objected) a plan to cap global population at 9.8 by 2050, an objective thought optimistic but not beyond reach. This would leave the earth swarming with 10 billion increasingly industrialized humans, and international discussion of how to reduce that burden would lead to bitter disputes over very hard choices.

One new feature of the landscape of international environmental politics, however, may force all nations to debate these choices. This is Global Warming. The ongoing international negotiations launched at Kyoto require all developed nations to accept binding limits on their CO^2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, and eventually all nations will in one way or another come under such pressure. For the U.S., our permanent ceiling, absent some scientific recalculation, has been determined to be 7 percent below 1990 emissions. A limit has finally been set, a firm number! We hope to reach it by technological innovation and conservationist discipline, and these will be indispensable. But another logic is at work. In making our reductions to get within specified levels and then in staying there, each additional person in a nation's population — by excess of births over deaths, or by immigration — reduces the allowable amount to be divided among that population. Population growth, and some forms of economic growth, now have a new and formidable opponent, the zero-sum game of Greenhouse emission containment. One could again at least imagine that time called for by the 1972 Population Commission, when the environmental restoration project could aim at goalposts that are not forever moved outward by mounting human numbers.

Sustainable Development

As to what the ultimate goal should be, the idea of calculating the earth's "carrying capacity" was years ago lifted out of population biology and used as a basis for discussing ideal human population limits and lifestyles. The concept stimulated some fresh thinking, but it had at least the disadvantage of appearing to assume that the goal was mere physical survival of the largest number of humans at any given time. Then in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development, or Brundtland Commission Report, *Our Common Future*, finally brought together the global discussions of economic development and the environment that had been on separate and sometimes hostile tracks since Third World countries at Stockholm in 1972 had forced developed countries to concede that development came first and must not be impeded by environmental concerns. *Our Common Future* attempted to reconcile and join economic and environmental goals, defining "sustainable development" as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[37]

Those vague words devised in an attempt to bridge the perspectives of First and Third worlds boosted "sustainable development" into a position at the end of the century as "a mantra that launched a thousand conferences," in the words of one participant in such global discussions.[38] But perhaps Sustainable Development will be more than a short-lived topic at conferences. It affirms that it is possible to reconcile environmental and economic objectives, and therefore it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is necessary. It has at least the advantage over Carrying Capacity that it changes our accounting by emphasizing intergenerational equity, the passing on of not only a viable ecological base to the next generation. And the word "needs" implies a menu of human wants that goes beyond mere resources sufficient for survival to include a need for nature's spaces and vistas and textures, even for sustainable hunting and fishing. In any event, the "thousand conferences" appear to be having some results. "Indicators of Sustainability" have begun to be developed to keep track of the state of ecological and socio/economic systems, changes in them, and cause and effect relationships. Canada published sustainability indicators in 1993, President Clinton's Council on Sustainable Development began a series of reports in 1994 that includes 32 indicators, the European Union has an indicators program, and the city of Seattle launched a sustainability program in 1990 that has proposed 40 indicators of the "long-term health" of the environment, population, and community. Much is unclear and ill-defined in all this activity. But the process of debating and then monitoring sustainability indicators involves, and educates, hundreds — in a city like Seattle, thousands — of participants. A "buzz word" to enhance reports and project proposals, Sustainable Development seems at this stage also a promising conception of how humans might clarify their goals, match them to the long-term viability of ecosystems, and begin to honor their obligations to posterity. Fifty or a hundred years ago, when a now forgotten word was viable, this would have been called Planning — for a different and better future than the stressful one dead ahead.[39] ■

NOTES

[1] Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (Ballantine Books,1968), p.11; Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth* (Universe Books, 1972), p. ; GLOBAL 2000.

[2] Ehrlich interview with *Playboy* in 1970, quoted in Edward Pohlman, ed., *Population: A Clash of Prophets* (New American Library, 1973), pp.15,20.

[3] Julian Simon, *The Ultimate Resource* (Princeton University Press, 1981), p 9. See also Julian Simon, ed., *The State of Humanity* (Blackwell, 1996).

[4] Albert Bartlett's review of Simon, *The Ultimate Resource*, in *American Journal of Physics* (March, 1985).

[5] Gregg Easterbrook, *A Moment on the Earth* (Penguin Books, 1995), pp.xv-xvii.

[6] For several essays in this mode, see Ronald Bailey, ed., *The True State of the Planet* (Free Press, 1995).

[7] Jesse H. Ausubel, et al, "The Liberation of the Environment," *Daedalus* 125 (Summer 1996), 2-15.

[8] Ross Gelbspan, *The Heat Is On* (Addison-Wesley, 1977), and Molly Ivins, "Global Warming Games," *The Washington Post* (August 16, 1998), p.69.

[9] See Jennifer Kahn, "The Green Machine," *Harpers Magazine* (April, 1999), pp. 70-73; Jeffrey Kluger, "The Suicide Seeds," *Time* (Feb. 1, 1999), pp. 44-45; Michael Pollan, "Playing God in the Garden," *The New York Times Magazine* (Oct. 25, 1998), p. 44-82;"Genetically Modified Food," *The Economist* (June 19, 1999), pp. 19-21.

[10] C. Pettit, "Two Stanford Scholars Take on Rosy Economist," *San Francisco Chronicle* (May 18, 1995).

[11] For an account of the two bets and citations to sources, see Paul and Anne Ehrlich, *The Betrayal of Science and Reason* (Island Press, 1996), pp. 100-104 and notes 34-45, and Bart Barnes, "Econoclastic Economist Julian Simon Dies," *The Washington Post* (Feb. 11, 1998). See also J. Tierny, "Betting the Planet," *New York Times Magazine* (Dec. 2, 1990).

[12]Fern Shen, "Professor's $100,000 Slice of Pie in the Sky," *The Washington Post* (Feb. 6, 1996).

[13] Ehrlichs, Betrayal, pp. 100-104.

[14] Julian Simon died in 1998.

[15] See for example the exchange between Mark Sagoff, "Do We Consume Too Much?" *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1997), and Paul R. Ehrlich et al, "No Middle Way on the Environment," *The Atlantic* Monthly (Dec., 1997).

[16] United Nations World Population Projections to 2150," *Population and Development Review* (March, 1998), pp. 183-84.

[17] Bill McKibben, " A Special Moment in History," *The Atlantic Monthly* (May, 1998), p. 56.

[18] Gregg Easterbrook, "Here Comes the Sun," *The New* Yorker (Apr. 10, 1995), pp. 38-43.

[19] Gretchen Daly et al, "Food Production: Population Growth and the Environment," *Science* 281 (August 28, 1998), p. 1291.

[20] See also G. C. Daily, *Science* 269 (1995).

[21] Laura Tangley, "How Much is a Forest Worth?" *U.S. News and World Report* (May 26, 1997), p. 60-61.

[22] McKibben, p.64.

[23] Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth* (New Society Publications, 1996), p. 11.

[24] Ehrlichs, *Population Explosion*, pp. 174-78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[25] David Quammen, "Planet of Weeds," *Harpers Magazine* (October, 1998), pp. 67-68.

[26] Lester Brown, *Who Will Feed China?* (W. W. Norton, 1995).

[27] Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Feb., 1994). See also Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Random House, 1996). Other travel accounts reporting similar ecological crises are Mark Hertsgaard, *Earth Odyssey* (Broadway Books, 1999), especially good on China, and Eugene Linden, *The Future in Plain Sight: Nine Clues to the Coming Instability* (Simon and Schuster, 1998).

[28] W. Walt Rostow, *The Great Population Spike and After* (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 187-88.

[29] *Great Population Spike*, p. 95.

[30] Walter Youngquist, *Geodestinies* (National Book Company, 1998), p. 164.

[31] Richard A. Kerr, "The Next Oil Crisis Looms Large — and Perhaps Close," *Science* (August 21, 1998), v. 281, 1128-31. See also Colin J. Campbell, *The Coming Oil Crisis* (Multi-Science Publishing Co., 1997), and Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrere, "The End of Cheap Oil," *Scientific American* (March, 1998), pp. 78-83.

[32] Bill McKibben, "A Special Moment in History," *The Atlantic Monthly* (1998), pp. 55-78.

[33] Jane Lubchenco, "Entering the Century of the Environment," *Science* 279 (January 23, 1998), p. 493.

[34] From transmittal letter of Chairman John D. Rockefeller, 3rd, to Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population and the American Future* (New York: 1972)

[35] Roy Beck and Leon Kolankiewicz, "The Environmental Movement's Retreat from Advocating U.S. Population Stabilization (1970-1998): A First Draft of History," *Journal of Policy History*, Vol.12, No.1, 2000, The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp.123-156.

[36] Michael Parfit, "Diminishing Returns: Exploiting the Ocean's Bounty," *National Geographic* (Nov. 1995), p. 29.

[37] World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 69.

[38] Architect Sim Vander Ryn, quoted in Mark Dowie, *Losing Ground* (1995), p. 235.

[39] Alex Farrell and Maureen Hart, "What Does Sustainability Really Mean?" *Environment* (Nov., 1998).

Sierra Club Members:

Watch for your ballot in the mail Feb-Mar.

Then vote YES on the Sprawl Ballot Question

to include population growth as a significant subject within the Club's expensive Sprawl Campaign.

www.susps.org

Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization
PO Box 60736, Palo Alto, CA 94306-0736

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Speculative Scenarios

Is there a way to use and sustain our planet?

by John Cairns, Jr.

> *The great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they believed themselves to have to deal only with the relation of man to man.*
> —Albert Schweitzer
> (as quoted in Wallace, 1998, p. 412)
>
> *The nations of the region will act rationally once they've run out of all other possibilities.*
> —Abba Eban
> (as quoted in Postel, 1999, p. 133)

Literature on sustainable use of the planet is beginning to accumulate at a fairly rapid rate, although the general public and politicians, with some notable exceptions, have given the issue little or no thought. On a finite planet, human population size is clearly a central issue, yet most countries have no population policy and some use tax breaks to subsidize large families. Arguably, quality of life is an equally important issue, but is discussed mostly in economic and material terms. In addition, industries that are harmful to human health and the environment will fight vigorously to continue their present practices. Exponential growth of all kinds (economic, technological, urban, etc.) produces problems at a rate for which the social system is woefully unprepared. Finally, individual interest in any problem is markedly diminished if it is perceived as distant in time or space or both. Still, humans have proven amazingly adaptable when the consequences of not showing an interest in a problem so are made clear. However, history shows that such a recognition does not often happen in time to prevent major human suffering. I remain optimistic about what could be done to achieve sustainable use of the planet, which is why the first scenario discussed here is a "soft landing" — regrettably a paradigm shift rarely occurs without devastating consequences preceding it. Therefore, I remain pessimistic about will be done, as is evident from the other five scenarios.

***John Cairns, Jr., Ph.D.**, is University Distinguished Professor of Environmental Biology Emeritus in the Department of Biology at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia.*

Scenario #1: The Soft Landing

One might easily justify a view of gloom when speculating about the future of human society. Much of the developed world has a large number of elderly compared to productive workers (e.g., Longman, 1999). Economic news from most of the world is not good; terrorism is increasing, as are the devices used by terrorists; ethnic strife is rampant. Even in this setting, Brown (1999) makes a persuasive case for an environmental awakening. Fossil fuel subsidies in developing and former eastern bloc countries have dropped from $202 billion in 1990-1991 to $84 billion in 1995-1996. Global average price for wind power has dropped from $2,600 per kilowatt in 1981 to $800 per kilowatt in 1998. World production of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons was 1,260,000 tons in the peak year of 1998 and only 141 tons (excluding black market) in 1996 (all the examples are from Brown et al., 1999). Despite biotic impoverishment, continuing global deforestation, water shortages, and the like, human society might find enough of the natural world remaining to rehabilitate it to some semblance of its former integrity.

In the soft landing scenario, Earth's carrying capacity is exceeded but the duration is short; natural systems have not lost their resilience and human-assisted ecological restoration is remarkably successful. Brown (1999) sees signs that the world may be approaching the threshold of a sweeping change in the way society responds to environmental threats. He believes that this social threshold, once crossed, could change the outlook as profoundly as the one, which in 1989-1990, led to a political restructuring in Eastern Europe. Having worked with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toxicological and ecological thresholds for a half century (e.g., Cairns, 1992), I am cautious in both determining thresholds and extrapolating the results. Still, compelling evidence shows that thresholds exist and are useful in making a variety of decisions despite both false negatives and false positives (e.g., Cairns, 1999).

One practical consideration in using thresholds is that their existence is often not known until they have been crossed (e.g., Cairns, 1998). What if human society crosses the threshold but gets back to the right side in time — then what? Society must realize that it cannot jump back and forth across the threshold. The first "then what?" would be an early warning system. Society should become acutely aware of when the threshold is too close, and retreating to more sustainable practices should become automatic. Sustainable practices should not have to be the consequence of losing a legal battle.

The second "then what?" should prompt society to recognize that environmental thresholds oscillate, and society should become aware of why and when thresholds change. The third "then what?" is the hardest! Human society must acknowledge dependence upon an ecological life support system and alter human practices and behaviors to protect the life support system's integrity. Carrying capacity — the maximum number of organisms of a given species that can be supported in a given habitat or geographic area — is a crucial limit or threshold. The quest for sustainable use of the planet is focused on the "cost" of maintaining healthy ecosystems and the services they provide in the context of the costs of growth in human population size and per capita level of affluence. The assumption of ecological limits is a *sine qua non.*

Discussions of limits to growth are described by detractors as "gloom and doom" prophecies. However, science makes no moral or ethical judgments since scientists merely report evidence on the probable consequences of a particular set of circumstances. One rarely hears gloom and doom accusations about carrying capacity signs on elevators, airplanes, bridges, and the like. Ecological systems are continually adjusting to the chemical/ physical/ biological limits they encounter. Is it asking too much of human society to do so as well? Unless adjustments are made, a "soft landing" seems quite unlikely. Human society should not behave as if the survival of *Homo sapiens* has been preordained. Individuals who do not value a comparable quality of life for their descendants and the descendants of others are unlikely to devote time, resources, and energy to the quest for sustainability.

Scenario #2: The Hard Landing

All species have an upper limit or threshold on population size that is determined by resources, space, predators, disease, and competition from other species. Technology has enabled humans to modify the factors that govern population growth, but not abolish them. In the absence of predators, herbivorous mammals will overexploit resources. They will first rise to an extraordinary population size and then crash to well below previous levels as a consequence of damaging the integrity of the resource base. How large might the crash be? Individuals with poverty level incomes are not economically situated to meet major emergencies, and this segment of society constitutes a sizable portion of the approximately 6 billion people now on the planet. Adding 4 billion people in the next century will definitely worsen the situation. However, barring a major nuclear exchange, extinction of the human species seems unlikely since small groups of hunters/gatherers still exist in various parts of the world. These people could probably adjust to living off the natural systems since they are already fairly adept at doing so. Even if the carrying capacity of the region is temporarily reduced, sustainable practices will almost certainly increase it over time spans that may not benefit the individual but should benefit the species.

The book *Beyond the Limits* (Meadows et al., 1992) estimates a world human population crash about 2030. Such a crash has happened before on a smaller scale on Easter Island, Mangareva Island, and a number of other areas of the world. I find the island examples particularly forceful since the inhabitants were intimately associated with their resource base and could personally witness its use by the people dependent upon it. Is an unexpected crash more or less likely in a situation where inhabitants are more removed from witnessing the sources of their food,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

energy, etc.? If a hard landing occurs, it will almost certainly be due to a number of factors rather than a single major cause. A few illustrative factors follow.

(1) Failure to grasp the rate at which exponential growth changes circumstances from acceptable to unacceptable.

(2) Attempts to get just a bit more profit before the system collapses (e.g., ocean fisheries).

(3) Overexploitation of resources by countries or corporations with headquarters well outside the area being damaged (e.g., chip mills).

(4) Denial or distortion of the evidence by those engaged in unsustainable practices (e.g., production of greenhouse gases).

(5) Cumulative effects of a series of actions seemingly harmless individually but disastrous in the aggregate (e.g., loss of wetlands and forests exacerbating the damaging effects of floods).

(6) Attempts to resolve scientific issues within a legal system unsuited for this purpose (e.g., are the scientists who testify in the judicial system qualified to serve on a National Research Council scientific evaluation committee?).

Any reader who doubts that society is too clever to make a series of foolish judgments should read Will Rogers' column "No Tax on Optimism — Yet" (pp. 408-410 in Sterling and Sterling, 1982). As usual, Rogers goes unerringly to the truth and even makes it humorous.

Scenario #3: Selective Soft and Hard Landings

As Wallace (1998) notes, Blacksburg, Virginia, U.S.A., a town of 30,000 persons, maintains 400 miles of streets — about 2,500 acres of asphalt pavement; Beaune, France, a city of 20,000 persons, is smaller than 500 acres, including *houses, shops and streets* (emphasis mine). Which of these cities has the smallest "ecological footprint" and is thus able to maintain a quality life on fewer resources? Kerala (a state in India) has a very small per capita ecological footprint, yet it compares well in attributes, such as life expectancy, with areas that have large per capita ecological footprints (United States and Canada). Clearly, it is unreasonable to expect Kerala to assist areas with large per capita ecological footprints to make the adjustment to resource limitations. What about the relationship between, for example, the United States and Haiti? The former has a large per capita ecological footprint and the latter a small one. Should the United States, as a matter of policy, reduce per capita ecological footprint size and send more aid to Haiti, even if this results in further population growth in Haiti without concomitant growth in resources? Haiti now has 42.6 percent of its population under age 15 and only 4.1 percent at 65+ (New York Times, *The World Almanac 1999,* p. 795). Major shifts in Haitian societal practices will be needed to achieve sustainability.

In addition, Haiti has no significant military capability. What happens if some country with military capabilities experiences a population collapse as a consequence of exceeding some resource threshold? Acquisition of additional resources by military means will undoubtedly occur to some political leader as it has to others in the past. War, of course, lowers carrying capacity through both diversion and destruction of resources.

Exemptionalism

Both Scenario #2 and #3 are likely to result from excessive optimism about "exemptionalism" — the belief that humans are exempt from the laws of nature that limit population growth and per capita affluence of other species because of their creativity, technology, and ingenuity. If resources are infinitely substitutable, they are not limiting and the human population can continue to grow in both numbers and affluence far into the future (Simon, 1981). Others (environmentalists) believe that there are limits to growth on a finite planet, although science and technology have increased Earth's carrying capacity for humans beyond the limits identified by Malthus over 200 years ago. Arguably, the best single point-counterpoint debate on this topic is the Myers and Simon (1994) book, now regrettably out of print but available in many major libraries.

Wilson (1998) notes that, for the committed exemptionalist, *Homo sapiens* has in effect become a new species. Wilson even provides a new name — *Homo proteus* or *shapechanger man* — with the following description (p. 278) of this hypothetical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

species:

> *Cultural. Indeterminately flexible, with vast potential. Wired and information-driven. Can travel almost anywhere, adapt to any environment. Restless, getting crowded. Thinking about the colonization of space. Regrets the current loss of Nature and all those vanishing species, but it's the price of progress and has little to do with our future anyway.*

Cairns (1998) has discussed some aspects of the risk/uncertainty paradox regarding exemptionalism and some illustrative ethical considerations (Cairns, 1999) regarding our relationship with other species if the exemptionalist's assumptions proved robust.

However, another important consideration is the devastating effect that reliance on exemptionalism might have on human behavior. For example, belief in infinite substitutability of resources might cause humans to become even less sensitive to the limiting effects of resource depletion on other species. It is already abundantly clear that other species have neither the technology or ingenuity to replace their exhausted resources. Their only hope is that human society will become more compassionate with respect to their needs or, alternatively, they will disappear.

The "point of no return" is an important planning strategy for explorers, airplanes, ships, and other situations where resources are finite and cannot be replaced without returning to a supply or resource base. Earth is transporting human society through space, but there is no supply base to replenish resources when they are depleted. Human society's point of no return is when the natural capital that renews resources has been so degraded that it can no longer do so at an adequate rate. There is no reliable gauge to measure this endpoint as there is for a fuel supply. Undoubtedly, those engaged in reckless exploitation of Earth's resources are unaware of the exemptionalist hypothesis or of infinite substitutability of resources. These reckless individuals deserve far less respect than the exemptionalists who have considered the resource base for future generations, despite a total disregard for the factors that limit other species and, arguably, humans even if to a lesser degree. The point of no return must permit some testing of the exemptionalist hypothesis while permitting a shift to sustainable use of finite resources if the exemptionalist hypothesis proves invalid.

It is regrettable that neither exemptionalists nor ecologists have given serious consideration regarding their course of action if the other side is correct. The Myers/Simon debate (1994) clearly shows the polarization that exists. The public is unaware of the reasoning supporting each viewpoint, although the profligate use of resources might suggest, to uncritical people, that there is stronger support for the exemptionalist position than may actually exist. Until a public debate occurs that goes beyond slogans and platitudes from both sides we can only speculate about public views. One hopes that this debate will occur before a point of no return has been passed.

Alteration of the First Three Scenarios by Episodic Events

There is a persistent tale about a plane that experiences "mechanical difficulties." As it descends for an unscheduled emergency landing, one passenger remarks "And I gave up smoking last month!" Other versions of the same philosophy are "When on the Titanic, you might as well go First Class," or "In the long run, we are all dead." Along the same lines, a large object from outer space could collide with Earth and cause mass extinctions or the Antarctic ice cap could shrink as a result of natural cyclic events or through anthropogenic effects or both.

A major catastrophe might not occur, and human society could still suffer enormously as a cumulative result of a an extended series of "small" decisions that in isolation seem beneficial. Or, as some of my friends have noted, "It makes no sense for a person who is 76 years old to be concerned about these things!" But, surely, it is comforting to envision that others will have the opportunity to experience the things that gave us pleasure! One must ensure that the precautionary principle is involved, which espouses the imposition of controls to protect the environment even when there is an incomplete understanding of the relationship between anthropogenic practices and their effect on the environment. Inevitably, some precautions will subsequently prove unnecessary, and others will be negated by events beyond the control of society. However, many of the principles will work, and some will have unexpected benefits. Carefully studied and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effectively communicated efforts to help others benefit both giver and receiver and should bring joy to both.

Scenario #4: For Humans There Are No Limits or Thresholds

Although ecology and economics are related (both refer to the home — eco-logy is the study of the home and eco-nomics is the study of its management), a casual observer might assume they have no relation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the debate between Myers and Simon (1994): Myers believes in carrying capacity for humans while Simon did not. If human ingenuity and technology can free the human species from the thresholds and limits that affect other species, sustainable use of the planet by humans has been achieved! However, much environmental damage is done under the economic growth banner and usually no other justification is needed. Many people who ravage the environment claim they are environmentalists. Every special interest group, from logging to highway construction, declares that its practices are sustainable. So where is the problem?

One big problem remains: What is the ethical and moral obligation to other species? Elsewhere (Cairns, in press), I have discussed this issue in more detail, but it can be summarized briefly: do humans drive other species to extinction just because they are not needed? This question leads to the next scenario.

Scenario #5: Humans Are Subjugated on Earth by a Technologically Advanced Species from Elsewhere

In the United States, the idea of humans being subjugated to an alien species was brought to national attention by a famous radio drama. The plot of the drama is that extraterrestrial invaders with vastly superior technology quickly subdue and enslave humans. The invaders are superior to humans in ways that permit dominance, and they have no compassion for "lower life forms." Ultimately, a lower life form saves the humans by infecting and killing the invaders. But, what if this result were not the ending of the drama? Humans do not enjoy this drama or premise because another species has views similar to humans toward "lower" forms of life.

Scenario #6: Sustainability is Achieved Because the Little Creatures that Have Always Run the World Take Full Charge

It seems unlikely that humans could destroy all life on Earth. Forms of life similar to those that preceded humans billions of years ago could take full charge again and the planet would operate sustainably. Of course, music, art, theater, radio talk shows, war, and other activities associated with humans would vanish. If humans damage their ecological life support system, intelligence (as humans define it) will join the long list of other evolutionary failures. This disaster does not mean the end of life on Earth — just the extinction of another species (humans).

Concluding Statement

A particularly encouraging sign for sustainable use of the planet is the significant shift in the viewpoints of theology and "hard science" in recent years. This shift has resulted in a substantive degree of consilience between the two. The often bitter disputes of the past are diminishing somewhat, and a few interactions may even approach camaraderie. Even physics has evolved from a deterministic view to the non-deterministic perspective of quantum theory and uncertainty. In the larger scientific community, there is increased willingness to accept some principles where hard data are difficult to generate on the basis of consilience with related hypotheses with more robust data. On the other side of the narrowing divide, theologians are using scientific evidence when reexamining their doctrines and religious affirmations. Arguably, the most important shift is the acceptance of limits to what their theologies can accomplish.

Scientists can now speak more freely of compassion and theologians of biotic impoverishment. Surely, this is a promising trend, albeit not without risks to both groups!

However, as Dobzhansky (1945) notes:

> *We like to believe that if we secure adequate data bearing on a scientific problem, then anybody with normal intelligence who takes the trouble to become acquainted with these data will necessarily arrive at the same conclusion regarding the problem in question. We like to*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> *speak of conclusions demonstrated, settled, proved and established. It appears, however, that no evidence is powerful enough to force acceptance of a conclusion that is emotionally distasteful.*

This makes Scenario #1, the soft landing, less likely than it would be if the evidence for limits to growth on a finite planet could cause the paradigm shift toward sustainable practices more rapidly. Most of us who share Dobzhansky's view would welcome being proved wrong. But, even optimists can be wrong so there should be plans B and C for coping with Scenarios #1 and #2.

Sustainable development is often described in terms that suggest a stable framework of practices will ensure success. For example, Murray and Powell (1999, p. 2) state:

> *Sustainable development is a concept in which communities seek economic development approaches that also benefit the local environment and quality of life. Sustainable development provides a framework under which communities can use resources efficiently, create efficient infrastructures, protect and enhance the environment and quality of life, and create new business to strengthen their economies. Where traditional approaches can lead to congestion, sprawl, pollution and resource overconsumption, sustainable development offers real, lasting solutions that will strengthen our future.*

Note the words *lasting solutions* (emphasis mine) in the final sentence. This implies a stable, biospheric environment, which is unlikely. A more realistic view is given by Odum et al. (1995):

> *While the steady state is often seen as the final result of development in nature, a more realistic concept may be that nature pulses regularly to make a pulsating, steady state — a new paradigm gaining acceptance in ecology and many other fields.*

A harmonious relationship with a pulsing system requires constant monitoring of the system's condition. Nothing less will make sustainable use of the planet possible! Yet, while every change in the economic system is given much attention and is widely reported in the news media, the condition of the ecological life support system is almost ignored. Until this situation changes dramatically, Scenarios #2 and #3 are highly probable, and Scenario #1, which is most attractive, is highly improbable unless human society becomes: (a) less recklessly opportunistic in the use of natural resources, (b) more concerned about the world left for future generations, and (c) more concerned about biospheric health and its corollary — not damaging ecosystems to achieve temporary competitive economic advantage. Our economic system may have once favored individuals that were recklessly opportunistic, but it has not produced many practices that are sustainable over large temporal or spatial spans. Sustainable use of the planet, as it is usually envisioned for humans, requires more long-range planning to avoid the societal disruptions and discontinuities that result from the aggregate tyranny of spur of the moment decisions.

What Are Some of the Steps that Can Be Taken?

There is persuasive evidence to justify optimism that there is much society can do to achieve a soft landing in the transition to sustainable use of the planet (e.g., Myers and Kent, 1998). There are many steps that would markedly enhance the possibility of a soft landing. These are easy to state — difficult to implement. Some illustrative examples follow.

1. Stabilize human population size until there is robust evidence that further expansion is possible without diminishing quality of life for humans and having even more adverse effects upon the ecological life support system.

2. Require solutions for each local environment that enhance both local and global sustainability. In short, solutions must be consilient with a mosaic of other local sustainability initiatives.

3. Become aware that each local sustainability initiative can have either beneficial or adverse effects upon other components of the sustainability effort. Mass movements of people to new regions of residence does not facilitate the sense of place or of community needed for exemplary local sustainability projects. On the other hand, ecotourism (at its best)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should enhance an awareness of global sustainability needs as well as a global environmental ethos.

4. Have a sense of equity and fairness in resource distribution so that the enormous disparity in per capita ecological footprint size (e.g., Rees, 1996) can be reduced. The citizens of Kerala (a state in India) have a tiny ecological footprint compared to citizens of the United States and Canada, but their life expectancy is not greatly different. Menzel (1994) depicts material differences with a series of memorable photographs and demonstrates that material wealth is not essential to a quality life. Disparities in resource consumption produce social unrest, and this disruption is not conducive to sustainable use of the planet.

5. Allocate more space to other species so that future generations will remember what was preserved rather than what was destroyed. Sustainability is achieved by "leavers" rather than "takers."

These and other steps to enhance the prospects for sustainable use of the planet should foster a great sense of community. Societies that neglect to leave a habitable environment for future generations decay or perish. Intergenerational connectedness as well as a feeling of kinship with nature are powerful contributors to personal well being. This scenario is truly a win-win opportunity! ■

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Eva Call for transcribing the first draft of this manuscript and to Darla Donald for skilled editing. Robert Benoit, Alan Heath, Bruce Wallace, Rudy Gelsey, and B. R. Niederlehner offered helpful comments on an early draft.

REFERENCES

Brown, L. R. 1999. "Crossing the threshold." *Worldwatch* 12(2):12-22.

Brown, L. R., Renner, M. and Halweil, B. 1999. *Vital Signs 1999: The Environmental Trends that are Shaping our Future*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Cairns, J., Jr. 1992. "The threshold problem in ecotoxicology." *Ecotoxicology* 1:13-16.

Cairns, J., Jr. 1998. "*Hydrobiologia*, Malthus, exemptionalism, and the risk/uncertainty paradox." *Hydrobiologia* 384:1-5.

Cairns, J., Jr. 1999. "Absence of certainty is not synonymous with absence of risk." *Environmental Health Perspectives* 107(2):A56-A57.

Cairns, J., Jr. In press. "Exemptionalism vs. environmentalism: the crucial debate on the value of ecosystem health." *Aquatic Ecosystem Health and Management.*

Dobzhansky, Th. 1945. "Review of *Evolution, Creation, and Science* by F. L. Marsh." *American Naturalist* 79:73-75.

Longman, P. J. 1999. "The world turns gray." *U.S. News and World Report* 126(8):30-39.

Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L. and Randers, J. 1992. *Beyond the Limits*. Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing.

Menzel, P. 1994. *Material World: A Global Family Portrait*. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books.

Murray, J. E. and Powell, J. A. 1999. "Commentary: The making of a national town meeting on sustainable development." *Nonpoint Source News-Notes* 58:1-3.

Myers, N. and Kent, J. V. 1998. *Perverse Subsidies: Tax $s Undercutting Our Economies and Environments Alike*. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

Myers, N. and Simon, J. 1994. *Scarcity or Abundance? A Debate on the Environment*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Odum, W. E., Odum, E. P. and Odum, H. T. 1995. "Nature's pulsing paradigm." *Estuaries* 18(4):547-555.

Postel, S. 1992. *Pillar of Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last?* New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Rees, W. E. 1996. "Revisiting carrying capacity: Area based indicators of sustainability." *Population and Environment* 17:195-215.

Simon, J. 1981. *The Ultimate Resource*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sterling, B. A. and Sterling, F. N. 1982. *Will Rogers: Reflections and Observations*. Thorndike, ME: Thorndike Press.

Wallace, B. 1998. *The Environment as I See It, Science is Not Enough*. Elkhorn, WV: Elkhorn Press.

Wilson, E. O. 1998. *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Hard Look at Postindustrialism

Manufacturing has unappreciated strengths

Book Review by John Attarian

To hear some people talk, the computer is the greatest thing since the steam engine — or perhaps the wheel. Supposedly America is entering a postindustrial New Economy based on services, especially manipulating information. Americans will earn high incomes in software development, finance, and other postindustrial services, and manufacturing will be farmed out to low-wage Third World countries.

Maybe not. In this informative and thought-provoking book, Eamon Fingleton, a former editor for *Forbes* and the *Financial Times*, and a veteran observer of the Japanese economy, argues persuasively that the postindustrial paradise isn't what it's cracked up to be. In fact, it has three lethal drawbacks. First, most of its jobs will go to the high-IQ elite. Whereas manufacturing enables people with average educations to earn good livings, postindustrialism offers them bleak prospects. For them, "America's shift to the New Economy is little short of disaster." This leads to the second problem: stagnant income growth. Since America started becoming postindustrial, per-capita incomes have lagged behind other developed countries such as Japan, Germany and Switzerland which are more manufacturing oriented; in 1998 America's per capita income was $27,821, versus $41,411 in Switzerland. Third, postindustrial exports are weak. Much information is only locally useful, hence unexportable, and intellectual property has scant protection in the internet age. More importantly, information work is labor intensive, making high-wage American postindustrial exports unattractive relative to low-wage countries' local products.

In Praise of Hard Industries: Why Manufacturing, Not the Information Economy, is the Key to Future Prosperity
by Eamon Fingleton
Boston: Houghton Mifflin
273 pages, $26.00

Fingleton elaborates with a survey of the postindustrial economy — a sobering deflation of "new economy" hype. Software's much-touted giants such as Microsoft are in fact small companies, generating few jobs. Not only is software weak in exports, but America faces a future import threat, since capital costs are low, making the industry easy to enter. Third World software engineers and programmers can be as good as Americans, and are much cheaper. India is an especially formidable potential competitor, with cheap labor proficient in math, and software companies of proven ability.

While banks and other financial institutions facilitate investment, protect against risk, and so on, the industry tends uselessly to inflate the volume of financial transactions. Moreover, financial exports are unimpressive, since much of finance companies' overseas activity is handled by overseas branches and subsidiaries.

As for the communications revolution, Fingleton is rightly skeptical, arguing that "in its most economically significant applications, the internet offers at best only a marginal improvement in productivity." E-mail's speed and convenience expedite urgent communication but generate gluts of insignificant messages. The internet's business information is mostly public relations. Virtual reality

John Attarian, Ph.D., *with a doctorate in economics from the University of Michigan, is a freelance writer living in Ann Arbor.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has useful engineering and research applications, but those who talk of selling virtual reality services worldwide forget that trade goes both ways. Movies aside, entertainment has only limited export potential, thanks to the ease of pirating compact disks and the limited appeal of many American products such as television talk shows.

By contrast, manufacturing has strengths which go unappreciated amid the postindustrialism hype partly due to a misperception of manufacturing as the labor-intensive final assembly of consumer goods. Fingleton sees manufacturing in terms of "hard industries" instead: manufacture of components and materials and the production machines which make them. Unlike the postindustrial sectors, hard industries have high barriers to entry. They are very capital-intensive, which makes start-up costs forbiddingly high. Also, existing firms can accumulate significant proprietary know-how enabling them to outperform newcomers. Low-wage countries have difficulty acquiring adequare capital and know-how. Therefore, "nations that achieve early leadership in [hard industries] are remarkably well insulated against future challenges from lower-wage foreign competition."

"...manufacturing has strengths which go unappreciated amid the postindustrialism hype partly due to a misperception of manufacturing as the labor-intensive final assembly of consumer goods."

In another eye-opening survey, Fingleton shows that the purportedly dead car industry still contributes substantially to prosperity in America and Japan; that Japan's Nikkon camera company is leading the world in manufacturing equipment for making semiconductor chips, that producing semiconductor-grade silicon is so demanding that only capital-rich, knowledge-rich developed countries can undertake it, and shifting its production to the Third World makes no economic sense.

Postindustrialists have argued that mature industries such as steel, shipbuilding and textiles are no longer economically viable for developed countries and would migrate to the Third World. John Naisbitt predicted in *Megatrends* that Brazil would displace Japan as the world's leading shipbuilder. Yet Brazil's shipbuilding industry has gone nowhere and Japan's still flourishes. The capital-intensive manufacture of synthetic textiles and textile equipment remains in developed nations. The First World's steel industry has embraced new technologies and methods, enabling it to boost productivity, cut costs, and remain vigorous.

Given all this, Fingleton persuasively argues, we are making a disastrous mistake opting for postindustrialism. If we persist in this, "we can surely predict a drastic deterioration in the American economy's performance." Personal income growth will stagnate, and our foreign trade will deteriorate. Yet the mainstream media ignore this danger, out of fascination with the internet, ideological bias, and sheer bungling. Fingleton scathingly reports how the American media got Japan wrong in the Nineties, seizing on Japan's stock market plunge to report a goner economy plagued by trade and budget deficits, when Japan's economy is actually thriving, living standards are rising briskly, Japan is running budget surpluses, and exports are bigger than ever. Similarly, talk of an American manufacturing and high-tech comeback overlooks dependence on overseas resources such as Japan for high-tech inputs, and the argument that Americans are uniquely creative ignores Japan's record in innovations.

All this is extremely useful for intelligently observing globalization. Unfortunately, having exploded postindustrialism's hype, Fingleton proposes some hype of his own. He paints a glowing picture of a coming "expanding universe." Far from having excess capacity, manufacturing faces rising demand as the Third World tries to raise its living standards. Moreover, technology may soon give the First World's hard industries exciting opportunities for making new products: production robots, voice

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recognition systems, water-efficient crop watering, alternative energy sources, etc. And it will have to be done in environmentally-friendly ways.

An appealing prospect, but he never presents even one estimate of what any of this would cost in terms of capital outlays. For good reason: that cost is daunting. Japan's Sumitomo pipe-making plant cost $700 million, for a capital outlay per job of $470,000. If current manufacturing is that capital intensive then future projects, using even more sophisticated technologies, would necessarily be even more so. This raises an awkward question: where will the enormous savings required to finance all this come from? How will we sustain living standards, pay for the Social Security, Medicare and other entitlements the Baby Boomers will soon start drawing and which we lack the courage to cut (a problem Fingleton ignores), and make these huge investments?

"[Fingleton] advocates tax incentives to channel more savings into manufacturing, and reengineering executive stock options to reward focus on long-term growth and penalize preoccupation with short-term profits."

While acknowledging the need to increase savings, Fingleton does not answer that — his one real weakness — but he does offer other worthwhile proposals. He advocates tax incentives to channel more savings into manufacturing, and reengineering executive stock options to reward focus on long-term growth and penalize preoccupation with short-term profits. To improve manufacturers' returns on investments and encourage them to reinvest profits for long-term growth, he advocates "a modest but adequate wall of tariffs."

This is heresy to globalist economites, but Fingleton' answer is music to the ears of those of us worried about galloping economism: "absolute economic efficiency is by no means the only consideration here." Just as families ignore efficiency maximization to obtain privacy and other amenities, a major economy may reasonably "waive the dictates of crude economic efficiency" to ensure self-sufficiency in essential manufactured goods. "The need to build firewalls against the worst excesses of globalization may not enter into economists' equations, but it is a real consideration nevertheless for anyone who has a wider concern for the human condition." If all peoples had like values globalization might work, but they don't. Westernization of non-Western countries is shallow and misleading. Consuming American fast food and soft drinks doesn't mean foreigners share our political or economic views. "Absent carefully thought-through safeguards, therefore, any attempt to mesh diverse cultures together is likely to end in tears." We need, Fingleton concludes, to balance improving the world with protecting the interests of our own country and our own people.

Hear, hear! It is refreshing to encounter an author brave enough to say such things and sufficiently well-informed to demolish the postindustrialist propaganda. Fingleton's concerns are well-warranted and have troubling implications. For capital-rich America to shift out of capital-intensive manufacturing where it has an advantage, to labor-intensive services, where it does not, may be good for specific corporations, but is it good for America? How can we preserve our way of life, our civilization which owes so much to prosperity (our superb libraries, museums and universities, like Europe's, were, after all, created out of an economic surplus), and our stable, peaceable social arrangements if a postindustrial economy leaves a large share of our population unable to earn a decent living? *In Praise of Hard Industries* is a badly-needed wakeup call. If it finds the audience it deserves it might help wrench America back to reality and common sense. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Bulletin Board

Immigration on the Internet

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT journal now has a research site by which all the articles published in previous issues of the journal are available at <thesocialcontract.com>.

Here are some other sites that readers may find of interest. By listing them here *The Social Contract* does not imply an endorsement of all the material on any specific site.

- The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) <fairus.org>.
- "Immigration by the Numbers" <numbersusa.com>.
- ProEnglish <proenglish.org>.
- A new voice for population/environment issues <www.sprawlcity.org>
- Center for Immigration Studies <cis.org>.
- Affirmative Action for Immigrants <pw2.netcom.com/~jimrobb>.
- Peter Brimelow, Scott McConnell, et al, <www.vdare.com>.
- News and commentary on ethnic and other conflicts worldwide <antiwar.com>.
- Carrying Capacity Network <carryingcapacity.org>.
- Negative Population Growth <www.npg.org>.
- California Coalition for Immigration Reform <www.ccir.net>
- Philip Martin's *Migration News* <migration.ucdavis.edu>.
- Professor Norman Matloff: <heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/pub/Immigration/Index/html>.
- Midwest Coalition for Responsible Immigration <enteract.com/~mcri97>.
- Sierrans for US Population Stabilization <susps.org>.
- A parody site: <sierraclubbed.com>.
- *People and Place* is published in Australia by the Centre for Population and Urban Research <elecpress.monash.edu.au/pnp>.
- Canadian Immigration Reform Committee <canadafirst.net>.
- Voices of Citizens Together <americanpatrol.com>.
- Council of Conservative Citizens <cofcc.org>.
- Columnist Samuel Francis <www.samfrancis.net>.
- The Biocentric Institute <ultralink/net/IAPM>.
- "Stalking the Wild Taboo" <lrainc.com/swtaboo/>.
- Project USA <projectusa.org>.
- The European Forum for Migration Studies <www.uni-bamberg.de/efms>.
- Floridians for a Sustainable Population <flsuspop.org/index.htm>.
- Population and Sustainability <www.ecofuture.org/ecofuture/populat.html>.
- American Renaissance <amren.com>.
- *Mankind Quarterly, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* — articles and reviews including population, immigration and public policy: <mankind.org>.
- Federal Publications (developments in immigration law) <fedpub.com/immigration>.

E-mail addresses for pertinent organizations:

- <center@cis.org> Center for Immigration Studies (CIS).
- <npg@npg.org> Negative Population Growth.
- <ccn@igc.apc.org> Carrying Capacity Network (CCN).
- <caps@calweb.com> Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS).
- <newsclips-subscribe@egroups.com> Conservative News Links.

And from the perspective of the opposition and their stand for open borders:

- The American Immigration Lawyers Association <aila.org/home.htm>.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'A powerfully argued case against multiculturalism.'

"Russell Kirk has been one of the most important influences in the revival of American conservatism since the fifties. [Kirk] belongs to an almost extinct species on both sides of the Atlantic — an independent man of letters."

— Merrie Cave, *The Salisbury Review*

"Professor Kirk's brilliant book … reminds Americans of the truly unique and extraordinary culture which they have inherited from the British."

— William Baer, *Reflection*

It is an incontestable fact of history that the United States, although a multiethnic nation, derives its language, mores, political purposes, and institutions from Great Britain. The two nations share a common history, religious heritage, pattern of law and politics, and a body of great literature. Yet America cannot be wholly confident that this heritage will endure forever. Declining standards in education and strident claims of multiculturalists threaten to sever the vital Anglo-American link that ensures cultural order and continuity. …Kirk shows how the English inheritance has determined the success and stability of the American republic. Elegantly written and deeply learned, *America's British Culture* is an insightful inquiry into history and a timely plea for cultural renewal and continuity. The late Russell Kirk was author of *The Conservative Mind, Eliot and His Age, The Roots of American Order* and twenty-six other books. He was a visiting distinguished professor on both sides of the Atlantic.

— From the book jacket



AMERICA'S BRITISH CULTURE
by Russell Kirk
Transaction Publishers
New Brunswick, New Jersey
© 1993, 122 pages

ISBN: 1-56000-066-X

Available from The Social Contract Press
$38.50 includes shipping and handling

Call Toll Free: 1-800-352-4843

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED